Pakistan breaks truce with Afghanistan: Can Kabul afford to hit back?

First, a recap

In the early hours of October 9, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika, targeting what Islamabad claims were Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) personnel and infrastructure. Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the group’s alleged patronage of the TTP has been a key factor in the massive downturn in the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul.

Drawing ideological inspiration from the Taliban, the TTP was formed by Behtullah Mehsud in 2007 with the stated intention of overthrowing the Pakistani government to establish an emirate based on its interpretation of Islamic law. To that end, it has been running a draining insurgency, attacking both military and civilian targets primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and northern Balochistan.

The Pakistani establishment, which had covertly patronised the Taliban during the two-decade long American misadventure in Afghanistan, had hoped that after regaining power, the group would return the favour by cutting loose the TTP. But the Taliban government in Kabul refused to do so, partly out of ideological considerations, and partly as to not appear to be a vassal state to Pakistan.

This has, among other things, led to a complete breakdown of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship which culminated with the airstrikes on October 9, not the first such attacks in recent years but among the deadliest. That such an escalation occurred amid Afghanistan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi is not a co-incidence.

Afghanistan retaliated on the night of October 11-12 by attacking a number of Pakistani outposts along the Durand Line. Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s spokesperson, said at a press conference in Kabul on October 12 that these attacks had killed 58 Pakistani soldiers and wounded 35 others; the Pakistani military claimed that there was only one casualty.

At this point, the Taliban announced that its operations had been successfully carried out, giving Islamabad an opportunity to de-escalate. Pakistan, however, chose not to take the cue, and carried out massive retaliatory strikes in which it claimed to have killed more than 200 Taliban and TTP fighters. The Pakistan Army also confirmed that it had lost 23 soldiers in the clashes.

Fighting would once again resume on October 15, before a temporary ceasefire was announced.

Kabul’s dilemma

Kabul does not want to fight a war with Pakistan. It cannot afford to.

First, Pakistan has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Even with the massive caches of American weapons and equipment that the Taliban got its hands on in 2021, its forces are no match to Pakistan’s. For one, Afghanistan has next to no deterrence against Pakistani airstrikes: effectively, Rawalpindi can pick and choose targets in its neighbouring country with impunity.

Second, the Taliban government is still an international pariah. Its bid to gain UN recognition has failed, and even as it ramps up its engagement with countries like India and China, there are significant limitations to the “help” it can even hope to receive in case of a full-scale war.

Third, Afghanistan is cash-strapped and cannot afford a protracted war. Furthermore, much of international trade in the landlocked country occurs through Pakistan which can further starve the Afghan economy by simply closing the routes. (During the latest escalation, Pakistani forces were quick to seal the border.) As such, Afghanistan needs Pakistan to be an ally.

Yet, Kabul can also not take Pakistani attacks lightly for the very same reasons it has not unconditionally given in to Pakistani demands. At the heart of the matter is the Taliban regime’s need to assert itself as a sovereign nation state, with an independent foreign policy.

Balancing act

The Taliban’s attacks on October 12-13 provides a template of how any future retaliation might look like.

After decades of resisting foreign forces on its soil, the veteran Taliban fighters are expert at quick hit-and-run attacks, especially on isolated positions across the border. These fighters can inflict casualties and then scurry into the open country where the terrain and lack of connectivity make it difficult for regular Pakistani troops to hit back.

By melting into the civilian population, the Taliban can further increase the costs of a Pakistani retaliation. Although Islamabad has repeatedly claimed that its airstrikes have been “precise”, targeting only known TTP infrastructure and personnel, reports point to significant civilian casualties. In case of a larger conflict, such casualties are likely to only rise, which in turn, would invite international pressure on Pakistan to de-escalate.

That said, the Taliban also does not want to overplay its hand. While such tactics can work in limited ways, if Pakistan were to get serious about a full-blown war, the government in Kabul has very little to be able to deter its nuclear-powered neighbour.

However, even on Pakistan’s part, an all-out conflict is not desirable, despite the TTP’s ongoing insurgency exacting heavy costs. Its economy is in poor shape, and a war against Afghanistan could aggravate the law and order situation in the Pashtun-dominated KPK, providing ballast to insurgent groups like the TTP.

The upcoming meeting in Doha is likely to be significant in determining the near-term health of the two countries’ relationship. Afghanistan would be seeking an end to Pakistani hostilities and an opening up of the border, while Pakistan will push for action against TTP safe havens on Afghan soil. Militarily, Pakistan has all the leverage in the world; the question is whether it wants to use it or not.