The United Nations Security Council on Sunday (August 31) voted to begin an “orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal” of the 10,000-strong UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2027 after its extended mandate expires in December 2026. This decision comes after concerted pressure from Israel and the United States, who have long criticised UNIFIL for not only failing to disarm Hezbollah and also providing its positions with cover (an allegation that the UNIFIL has frequently denied). On Tuesday (September 2), US Envoy to Lebanon Thomas Barrack floated a proposal for an “economic zone” in southern Lebanon to facilitate the Lebanese state’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah. But that will be easier said than done. After the government in Beirut announced its intention to do so on August 20, the group, now under Naim Qassem, issued a firm rejection the very same day. “We will not abandon the weapons that honour us nor the weapons that protect us from our enemy,” Qassem said in a speech on August 25. Since last year, when Israel invaded Lebanon and killed Hezbollah’s top leadership, including longtime chief Hassan Nasrallah, the Lebanese militia has been left severely weakened. That said, continuing Israeli aggression has helped re-consolidate some domestic support. Hezbollah in Lebanon Hezbollah (‘Party of God’) was formed as an armed resistance force in Lebanon in response to Israel’s invasion and occupation of South Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. Since 1992, Hezbollah has also been a formidable political actor with representation in the Lebanese Parliament. Given Lebanon’s ethnic mix and history of civil war, the country has a tripartite governing system — a Maronite Christian President, Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, and a Shia Muslim Speaker. Over the years, Hezbollah has wielded influence on all three positions, and enjoyed popularity across geographic, religious and ethnic lines in Lebanon, beyond its core constituency in the Shia-dominated South. The group was cultivated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and has inextricable ideological, political and military ties to Tehran which has supplied the militia’s vast armory of missiles, rockets, and drones. Nonetheless, Hezbollah continues to assert its nationalist, Lebanese character. In fact, Hezbollah has consistently presented itself as a supplement to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) who have a poor military record against the Israelis. In 1989, when the Taif Agreement disarmed most of Lebanon’s armed groups to end a 15-year-long civil war, Hezbollah justified its continued armament through the need to resist the Israeli occupation. In 2000, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, and then again in 2006, when Israeli forces and Hezbollah fought each other to a stalemate, the group successfully presented itself as the only Arab force to have affected strategic defeats on Israel. This allowed Hezbollah to further consolidate its domestic position by drawing support from Lebanon’s Shia, Sunni, and Christian constituencies. Recent weaknesses In the last two decades, Hezbollah successfully leveraged its external raison d’être — the Israeli threat — to amass disproportionate internal influence in Lebanon’s politics and economy, enabled by the inherent weaknesses of the Lebanese state. In 2019, economic stagnation, record levels of unemployment, and rampant corruption and mismanagement triggered unprecedented protests across Lebanon. Successive Lebanese governments have been unable to successfully deal with the crisis. Hezbollah’s proximity to and support for the government in Beirut has meant that the crisis in Lebanon has significantly dented the group’s popularity, across ethnic lines. This meant that when the conflict in Gaza heated up in October 2023, Hezbollah was ill-prepared to mount a sustained ground campaign against Israel and restrained itself to carrying out calibrated rocket strikes. Israeli forces invaded South Lebanon last October. Unlike the protracted campaign of 1989-2000 and the short 2006 war, Hezbollah’s losses were more significant in this latest war. Nasrallah and the group’s senior leadership was wiped out, Israel’s pager bombings terrorised the rank and file, and airstrikes continue to take a toll. Hezbollah has responded with only the occasional rocket attack. Since last October, Israel has maintained its occupation of at least five points in South Lebanon and struck targets across the country almost daily. This has forced Hezbollah to remain to the north of Lebanon’s Litani river. But with Israel’s actions continuing to add to Lebanon’s death toll (which stands at at least 4,000 since last October), Hezbollah, although weakened, has been able to re-consolidate some ideological support. Challenge of disarmament Israel’s aggression and occupation of Lebanese territory create the same pressures on both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, although both have responded differently. Beirut has been trying to leverage international support, both to rein in Israel’s campaign in Lebanon and to bolster the government’s reform agenda. Propelled by the loss of $11 billion in the war since last October, shoring up state capacity is a key imperative. In this, Lebanon is backed by its Arab partners who have a keen interest in undoing Iran-backed Hezbollah’s lopsided influence in the country. Western capitals are similarly keen on removing the group’s ability to threaten Israel. However, any international plan or framework is contingent on the Lebanese state’s actual capacity to disarm Hezbollah, and cannot occur without the latter’s cooperation. As such, it is hard to see this cooperation coming any time soon. Despite its losses, Israel’s continued threat to Lebanon allows Hezbollah to consolidate support internally. Hezbollah now tactfully leverages Israel’s aggression in Lebanon’s neighborhood to drive home suspicions regarding Israel’s assurances of a phased withdrawal, and reaffirm its own role as a supplement to the LAF. Two key points from Qassem’s August 20 address shed light on the group’s self-characterisation. One, he asserted that were it not for the resistance (Hezbollah) Israel would have reached Beirut just as it did Damascus “and would have occupied vast areas as it did in Syria”. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role is now greater and more crucial “to prevent the occupation (Israel) from securing any stability,” he said. Note that despite the Israeli onslaught, Hezbollah continues to maintain a sizable portion of its armament and organisation. Two, he re-defined Hezbollah as “not a state army, but a supporter of the national army. It is not a substitute for the army, yet it backs and assists it, while the army remains the primary institution responsible for defending the nation.” Hezbollah’s continued unwillingness to disarm despite its weakness, and Israel’s continued aggression despite its promised commitments to the Lebanese state, complicate the Lebanon government’s ability to affect change. This means that the US approach of forcing a settlement which the actual parties to the conflict are unwilling or unable to embrace, is untenable in Lebanon.
