Written by Sidharth Raimedhi
United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio has announced on X that he would “NOT” attend the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, later this month.
South Africa, Rubio alleged, is “doing very bad things”, including using G20 to promote “DEI and climate change” in the garb of the summit’s theme of “solidarity, equality, and sustainability”.
On Sunday, President Donald Trump had declared that “South Africa is confiscating land”, treating “certain classes of people VERY BADLY”, and that he would cut “all future funding” until the matter had been investigated. Trump’s close aide Elon Musk has repeatedly claimed without evidence that South Africa, the country of his birth, follows an anti-white policy.
But what has provoked Rubio’s sensational announcement?
Rubio’s tweet should be understood primarily in the context of South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has been receiving growing international support.
The case had angered prominent Republicans such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who had called the ICJ a “joke” and its President Nawaf Salam “a raving anti-semite”. In November last year, Graham had warned countries that if they “help the ICC…and force the arrest warrant against (Israel’s Prime Minister) Bibi (Netanyahu) and (Yoav) Gallant, the former defense minister, I will put sanctions on you as a nation”.
The tussle between South Africa (and its allies) and countries and legislative bodies such as the US Congress that have sought to undermine the ICJ, continues.
On January 31, South Africa and Malaysia announced a campaign to protect and uphold the rulings of the ICJ and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the face of alleged “attempts by US Congress to hit the ICC through the use of sanctions”. A nine-nation “Hague Group” was formed under South Africa’s leadership to defend the rights of Palestinians and to coordinate legal, diplomatic and economic measures against violations of international law by Israel.
It is pertinent to mention here that President Trump’s announcements on Tuesday wishing to resettle Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan is completely at odds with core tenets of international law regarding territorial integrity and sovereignty. Gaza is recognised by the ICJ as part of the Palestinian territories under Israeli military occupation.
It is also worth recalling that the first Trump administration (2017-21) imposed sweeping sanctions on the ICC and its officials. The decision was reversed by the Joe Biden administration, which supported the ICC investigation into Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
But this support suffered after the ICC announced that it would seek arrest warrants against both Israeli and Hamas leaders. The US House of Representatives passed a new ICC sanctions bill (H.R. 8282) that is currently under review by the Senate.
Soon after Trump’s re-election, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN Danny Danon had said that the outcome of the presidential election “presents an opportunity to neutralise the cases against Israel in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice… We expect the US to put pressure on these bodies that hold a double standard…against Israel”.
The ICC and ICJ are both international tribunals seated in The Hague, Netherlands. The ICC was established pursuant to the Rome Statute of 2002, and has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for serious international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ICJ is an organ of the United Nations that hears disputes between states.
In the above understanding, Rubio’s tweet would appear as being aimed not directly at G20 as a platform, but only at its current chair, South Africa. However, it does raise serious questions about the new administration’s commitment to the multilateral organisation, if the US decides to stay away.
The G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting is scheduled for February 20-21, and the Leaders’ Summit – which US President Trump, along with other Heads of State and Government including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is expected to attend – for November 22-23. South Africa assumed the G20 presidency on December 1 last year, and will hold it through November 2025.
During his first term, Trump pushed strongly for America First policies at G20, which led to both contestations and isolation on many issues. However, he was successful in altering, in 2017, the emphasis of G20 from free trade to “reciprocal trade”, in alignment with his views on international trade and his then upcoming trade war against China.
Trump 1.0 did manage to shape the G20’s agenda, and the body made peace with the US role within it. With its more radical and aggressive agenda, it is not certain that Trump 2.0 will necessarily value the role of G20, and will work towards building relationships of cooperation and support within the grouping.
In recent years India has conveyed that international institutions such as the G20 may be more suitable than organisations such as the UN in solving complex global challenges. India’s own pivot towards leadership of the Global South has benefited significantly from the rising status of G20, and from India’s position within the grouping in recent years.
Given the objectives of the Biden White House relating to the Russia-Ukraine war and the US rivalry with China, Washington was fully supportive of both New Delhi’s G20 presidency in 2023, as well as India’s leadership of the Global South to some degree. This enabled India to present itself as a consensus-driving bridge between the Global North and Global South.
But the policy thinking and priorities of Trump 2.0 appear markedly different. In the worst case scenario of the US either skipping G20 in South Africa or pulling out altogether, the grouping would unquestionably be weakened as a multilateral institution. More worrying still, it could come under greater Russo-Chinese sway and influence as a result.
In an alternative scenario, Rubio’s tweet is an opening salvo meant to prepare the ground for subsequent negotiations and compromises. In this scenario, South Africa is expected to show a more conciliatory approach in exchange for American goodwill. Such a course of events will have less serious negative implications for both the G20 as well as India’s interests in it.
For New Delhi, there could be an even wider concern. The new administration’s ambivalence (if not antipathy) towards the Global South could complicate India’s own Global South-related diplomacy. India’s bridging power remains salient when the US-led West perceives such a role favourably. But under a transactional leadership and administration, India’s role and value as a leader of the Global South may not necessarily be apparent to the White House.
Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research (CSDR), New Delhi.