John Zubrzycki’s ‘Dethroned’ traces how Sardar Patel and his deputy VP Menon prevented the balkanisation of India at the time of Independence

The integration has been made out to be a largely bloodless affair, but this is far from the truth. Operation Polo which was the code name for the “police action” in Hyderabad, for instance, resulted in at least 25,000 deaths. Still, it could have been worse. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev remarked, “How did you Indians manage to liquidate the princely states without liquidating the princes?” That India narrowly averted being Balkanised is largely due to Patel’s pragmatism and the tactical skills of Menon. The two persuaded hundreds of rulers to sign the Instrument of Accession. By August 15, just a handful of states had refused to accede.

Nehru accused Patel of communalism and there is some substance to this charge. The annexations of Junagadh and Hyderabad were accompanied by communal violence, much of it due to calculated inaction. For his part, Patel was irked by Nehru’s reluctance to use force while dealing with Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad.

When Junagadh’s ruler Mahabat Khan announced his state’s accession to Pakistan, Patel immediately recognised that this would set a precedent for Hyderabad. Not challenging the accession would give Pakistan the right to object to the Hindu ruler of Muslim-dominated Kashmir opting for India. This made him insist that India intervene militarily. Patel also clashed with Nehru over his offer to hold a plebiscite in Junagadh, calling it “unnecessary and uncalled for.” The Junagadh crisis was resolved when Khan fled to Karachi but a more serious one erupted in Kashmir when Maharaja Hari Singh refused to accede to either nation. It required Patel’s firm hand to deal with the crisis.

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who was a colonel at the time, narrated how an angry Patel asked Nehru whether he wanted to keep Kashmir or give it away. When Nehru replied in the affirmative, Patel asked him to give orders to that effect. Before Nehru could say anything, Patel turned to Manekshaw and said, “You have your orders.” In Hyderabad, too, it was Patel who took the initiative to prepare for a military intervention to put an end to the state’s bid for independence. Once again, Nehru opposed using force to end the crisis.
Despite Patel’s antipathy towards the princes, he honoured his promises to them by enshrining their privy purses in the Constitution. In 1971, Indira Gandhi dealt the final blow when she abolished the privy purses. Written in engaging prose, the book holds the reader’s interest with lively anecdotes and unusual details. However, Zubrzycki’s largely stereotypical portrayal of princes as dictators given to wild excesses shows his uncritical acceptance of British portrayals of princely India. Many of the personal excesses were wild exaggerations,  if not fiction, and a ploy by the British to delegitimise native authority. Zubrzycki does refer to progressive rulers but only within the old cliché-ridden framework.