Opinion Something’s changing

To be sure,there were moments last week when it seemed Rao’s journey to Pakistan might be ambushed by familiar turbulence. The reported close encounter between the Indian and Pakistani naval vessels,INS Godavari and PNS Babur,could have easily become the incident to derail the accident-prone relationship.

Then there was that familiar hair-splitting over what exactly Rao and Bashir were going to talk about. There was the Pakistani foreign office saying terrorism was not on the agenda and the Indian side responding that the Mumbai attacks on 26/11 would indeed figure prominently in the talks.

In normal circumstances,this kind of argumentation could have rapidly escalated,thanks to the amplification by the TV news channels on both sides,and wrecked the prospect of any positive conversation between the foreign secretaries.

But the current situation in Pakistan is anything but normal. Delhi’s political classes must recognise that Indo-Pak relations are now a side-show to the extraordinary dynamic that is unfolding on Pakistan’s western frontiers and its impact on our neighbour’s internal politics.

Despite his claims of being very “India-centric”,the Pakistan army chief,General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani,has other fish to fry. Take a look at what Kayani is trying to handle since May 2,when the US Special Forces raided deep into Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad.

One,Kayani has had to answer questions from the rank and file in cantonments across Pakistan on the nature of the army’s complicity and competence in the bin Laden affair. While the talk of a “colonels coup” might be overblown,there is no denying the disaffection in Pakistan’s only credible institution — the army.

Two,Kayani has watched with some bitterness as the civilian government led by Asif Ali Zardari chose to remain a bystander amidst the unprecedented public criticism of the armed forces. Having given no say for the civilian leaders on the conduct of Pakistan’s foreign policy,Kayani gets little protection now.

Three,the terrorist attack on the PNS Mehran,a naval base near Karachi,with apparent insider collaboration and the arrest of a serving army brigadier for connection with jihadi groups have underlined the widespread fears about extremist penetration of the Pakistani armed forces.

Four,despite the loud protestations of the army and the national assembly,Washington has persisted with drone attacks on Pakistan’s western borderlands and is pressing Kayani to mount a ground offensive against militant sanctuaries in the tribal belt.

Five,as US President Barack Obama prepares for a major drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan,his administration has chosen a direct engagement with the Taliban rather than going through the intermediation of the Pakistan army.

Six,Pakistan’s economy is in a bad shape,and Kayani’s plans to mobilise a Chinese financial rescue have not succeeded,at least for now.

Given the scale of Kayani’s problems,what should India’s expectations from the peace process be? Very little to modest is one answer. Others would point to a potential “India option” for Kayani.

There are two ways in which Kayani can play out the India card. One is to raise military tensions with Delhi either to muddy waters or change the boundary conditions of the problems that he now confronts. Such a diversionary move might have its short-term uses,but it would not address the structural challenges confronting Kayani.

The other is a more hopeful scenario in which Kayani might want to move forward with India in order to improve his position at home and abroad.

While normalisation of relations with India might indeed

allow Pakistan greater wiggle room,Delhi has no reason to bet that Kayani is about to change the army’s strategic perspective on India.

Dramatic policy reversals are not easy for nations even when they are led by competent and visionary leaders. Political and policy inertia tends to favour continued investment in status quo,even if its pursuit is harmful,and very visibly so as in Pakistan today.

All of Kayani’s actions since May 2 have shown resistance to change rather than a recognition of the futility of past national security policies.

Delhi’s realists rightly assume that Kayani’s interest in engaging India is entirely tactical and that the Pakistan army can pull the plug on it at any time. India’s pragmatists,however,must necessarily explore the opening for any incremental gains that might present themselves.

As they review this round of talks,Rao and Bashir will find the landscape not entirely hopeless. While there were no breakthroughs on the big issues like the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes,there have been some positive ideas on boosting bilateral trade and easing the visa regime.

Rao and Bashir have the mandate of their own to improve the implementation of confidence-building measures related to Kashmir and consider new ones. They can also review and refine the nuclear and military CBMs.

As Pakistan passes through a difficult moment in its national life,India’s emphasis must be three-fold. One,India must avoid making itself a needless target to the ideological and institutional opponents in Pakistan to the normalisation of bilateral relations.

Two,Delhi must continue to engage Pakistan without any expectation that a divided and distracted establishment across the border will satisfy India’s core concerns.

Three,India must demonstrate the strategic patience to await structural changes on Pakistan’s western frontiers,the political will to support positive internal transformation of Pakistan,and the negotiating skill to take small steps forward.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi,express@expressindia.com