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— Md. Muddassir Quamar
(There are areas in the world that remain beset by conflicts. West Asia is one such region that has been in the grip of conflicts at least since the mid-20th century. The escalation after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war further upended the political landscape of the region. What are the prospects for containing the conflicts? How does regional instability affect India’s interests? We feature a series of articles on major conflicts in West Asia, exploring the root cause of the conflicts, the reasons behind the recent escalation, and its effect on India’s interests. In the following article, Md. Muddassir Quamar explores the Israel-Iran ties in broad strokes to help understand the ongoing tensions.)
On 31 July 2024, the chief of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismael Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran shortly after attending the swearing-in ceremony of the newly-elected President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian. Hamas, as well as Iran, blamed Israel for the killing and pledged a response.
Referring to the Israeli involvement in Haniyeh’s killing, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that by killing “our guest”, the Zionist state has “paved the way” for a “harsh punishment”. The incident heightened the tensions in the Middle East with fears of expansion of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.
Although Iran has so far not retaliated and is under international pressure to show restraint for the sake of a ceasefire in Gaza, the chances of Iran not responding at all are slim. In all likelihood, a symbolic response is expected to set the record straight and reinstate deterrence after the high-profile security breach in the heart of the Iranian capital. Hamas has also been prepping for a response, although it has not taken any major action.
The Haniyeh episode is the second major conflagration between Israel and Iran since October 2023. In April 2024, Israel and Iran had reached the cusp of a direct war after an Israeli strike in the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus led to the killing of Mohammed Reza Zahedi, a commander of the Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In response, Iran launched hundreds of coordinated rockets, missiles and drones inside Israel that, although they did not lead to any serious casualties, showed Iran’s military capability to target Israel.
The question that arises is why are Israel and Iran fighting. Why cannot the two Middle Eastern states resolve their difference through diplomacy? What makes them the sworn enemies? These are difficult questions, and there are no easy answers. The Israel-Iran conflict emerges from a combination of historical, religious, ideological and geopolitical factors.
The formation of Israel in 1948 was a watershed moment in the history of the Middle East. It triggered an Arab-Israeli war and the long Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Iran, although opposed to the formation of Israel and voted against the Partition Plan (1947) and Israel’s admission into the United Nations (1949), was the second Muslim-majority country after Türkiye to recognize Israel in 1950. During the Pahlavi regime, Iran and Israel shared friendly relations with notable economic and military ties.
The friendly relations between the two states were not always reflected among the wider population in Iran, as a section of the clergy and intelligentsia were sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians and their struggle for a state.
As Iran experienced domestic turbulence that eventually led to the overthrow of the Shah and ended the Pahlavi rule in 1979, Israel-Iran relations deteriorated with both considering each other enemy states.
The Islamic Republic of Iran cut off all official and diplomatic relations with Israel. Ayatollah Khomeini called Israel “Little Satan”, while the United States was declared the “Great Satan”. Iran and Israel also ceased all economic activities, and Israel refused to pay Iranian dues it had incurred for oil supplies and operation of the Asia-Europe oil pipeline that passed through Israel. Despite these problems, strategic considerations during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88) led Tehran to develop clandestine relations with Tel Aviv.
Iran reportedly received weapon and military supplies worth US$500 million during the 1980s from Israel, and the majority of the cost was paid in the form of oil supplies to Israel. The secretive ties between Israel and Iran were not entirely unknown. They had the sanctions of the Reagan administration in the US that was following a policy of dual containment against Ba’athist Iraq and Revolutionary Iran.
Besides the historical developments since 1948, the religious and ideological differences between Iran and Israel are deep-rooted. Although it was the Sunni-Arab republics that took the mantle of fighting Israel after 1948, the Shia theologians opposed the formation of Israel as the mandate Palestine and especially the Old City of Jerusalem was considered holy for Muslims as the first Qibla (the direction of the Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to which Muslims turn at prayer) and the location of Prophet Muhammed’s ascendance to heaven during Mera’aj. The holy places are considered waqf property, and Shia clergy in Iran are opposed to it coming under Israeli control.
After the revolution, the Islamic Republic supported the idea of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, terming Israel an “illegal” Zionist entity that needs to be obliterated. Hence, Israel considered Iran an existential threat. The ideological basis of Iranian opposition to Israel emanates from anti-imperialist and anti-Americanism rooted in the 1979 revolution. Besides Islam, these form the most important component of the revolutionary zeal of Khomeini, who considered Israel as an American and imperial outpost in the Middle East.
Since the revolution, Iran has called for the expulsion of all external forces from the region and to form a regional security architecture through collaboration among the regional states. Iran, therefore, is considered a revisionist power that wants to replace the US-led regional order with an Iran-led order. Understandably, other regional countries, including the Arab monarchies in the Gulf, Egypt, Israel and Türkiye, view this as a threat to their interest and ambitions. While the Iranian relations with Egypt and Türkiye have remained ambivalent, countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia have been emphatic in denouncing Iran’s “hegemonic” ambitions.
Iran’s regional activities of creating, arming and supporting non-state actors, especially in the vicinity of Israel and its pursuit of nuclear energy, are viewed in Israel with suspicion.
Israeli leaders and experts consider these a part of the Iranian plan to encircle Israel militarily and a preparation for a future war against Israel. Moreover, Iran’s ability to develop strategic depth in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq (Hash al-Shabbi [Popular Mobilisation Forces or PMF]) and Syria (Fatemiyoun and Zaynebiyoun brigades) and the deployment and presence of the Quds Forces in the three countries is considered a serious military threat in Tel Aviv.
Iran is also a major regional supporter of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and has been suspected of arming and training them as part of its ideological and geopolitical commitment to support Palestine and contain Israel. Hence, Israel considered Iran responsible for the October 7 attacks, even though any direct Iranian involvement has not been proven.
Before the current state of affairs, Iran and Israel had been, for most of the 2010s, engaged in a proxy war but had avoided attacking each other directly. Israel targeted Iranian nuclear scientists to reduce and delay Tehran’s ambition of attaining nuclear weapons capability. On several occasions, it targeted weapon depots, transport lines and infrastructure in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to destroy Iranian supply lines to its regional proxies. On the other hand, the Iranian proxies, namely Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PMF and Houthis, have often targeted or threatened Israel.
The Israel-Hamas war has, however, started a new phase in the Israel-Iran war, with the two gradually moving to a direct confrontation. The Israeli attack on the Iranian diplomatic complex in Syria and killing of IRGC commanders and officers, its constant targeting of Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon and the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran are part of the pattern that underlines that Israel is taking on not only Hamas and Hezbollah but is testing the Iranian will and capacity to respond.
Iran, too, is no longer satisfied with showing restraint and issuing verbal threats, as was visible during the 13 April rocket, missile and drone attacks. Tehran has used its proxies to target Israel and its interests constantly. For example, the Houthis in Yemen have been targeting Israeli and international shipping to and from Israel passing through the Red Sea to increase the cost of the Israeli war against Hamas. They have continued with their activities despite the US-UK air strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.
For Iran, the killing of Haniyeh was a serious provocation as it was a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and also to its military capacity and deterrence. The thought process in Tehran is that the killing cannot go unanswered as this will be construed as a weakness and leave Iranian deterrence exposed. Tehran nonetheless faces the dilemma because any reckless action can lead to an all-out war and might force the US to join Israel, which Iran would like to avoid at this point. Hence, it is likely that the Iranian response will be measured, coordinated, and symbolic, which can reinstate deterrence without necessarily leading to major conflagration.
The situation in the Middle East remains tense, and any serious escalation in violence in the region would adversely impact Indian interests. Notwithstanding the fear of serious disruption in hydrocarbon supplies and price rise, India’s growing diplomatic, strategic and geoeconomic investments in the Gulf and Middle East would be seriously tested.
New Delhi would also like to avoid a situation wherein two of its close friends enter into a direct war, forcing it to choose sides, which it has carefully avoided. Indian strategic thinking favours a peaceful Middle East, with diplomacy taking precedence over conflict. However, in the divisive Middle East, confronted with multiple and escalating war fronts, peace remains an elusive commodity, thus posing serious questions for India’s strategic choices.
How did the Iran-Israel ties turn from friendly relations to sworn enemies?
How have India’s relations with Iran and Israel evolved?
How would the escalation in violence in the Middle East impact India’s stake in the region?
(The author is an Associate Professor of Middle East studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views are personal. @MuddassirQuamar)
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Read other articles from the series on Conflicts in West Asia:
Conflicts in West Asia: A brief history of the Israel-Palestine conflict
Conflicts in West Asia: Iraq in disarray
Conflicts in West Asia: Israel-Hamas war and the Yemen quagmire
Conflicts in West Asia: Kurds and their struggle with statelessness