Opinion As Xi meets Putin: What the West gets wrong about the Russia-China partnership

The Russian leadership, spurned by the West, is working hard to retain its ties with the non-Western world. Its survival is at risk without critical support from the countries of the Global South. Viewed from this perspective, Xi’s visit would offer a huge respite to the Russian leadership. Moscow can demonstrate that Russia is not isolated.

On the other hand, Xi can project China as a defiant global superpower, a reliable partner, and a potential peace-maker. He would reassure Putin that Beijing would remain steadfast in its commitment and not abandon Moscow. Coming on the heels of the landmark Riyadh-Tehran Accord, he might present himself as a potential peace-maker in Ukraine.

However, he is aware of the complications involved in the process. Beijing can only succeed in such an exercise with support from powerful countries of the Global South. The required legwork has not been done. In fact, Xi is unlikely to obtain any concession even from Moscow. The Joe Biden administration, too, has dismissed Beijing’s peace proposal as ambiguous and unworthy of further attention. Therefore, this summit would predominantly focus on strengthening bilateral ties and reiterating the virtues of multipolarity, sacrosanct sovereignty and reformed multilateralism.

The Western media is likely to interpret Xi’s visit as irrefutable evidence of an imminent alliance between the two states. The term “alliance” is used very loosely in the international media — the meaning of which can vary from a “formal legal military obligation”, as in NATO, to informal political and security agreements between two states. Advanced alliances include “a common defence policy, integrated military commands, joint military placements for defence and military base exchanges”. To be sure, Russia and China have strong military and comprehensive political ties. Russia provides critical technologies to China for its fighter aircraft, missile defence system, tanks and other weapons. They also conduct annual joint military exercises.

However, they are still far from a formal military alliance that will obligate a party to support the other in a conflict. China is cautious about supplying weapons to Russia during the Ukraine war.

In reality, neither Russia nor China wants to sign an alliance pact. Formal alliances contain the burden of commitment and legal obligations. John Mearsheimer, a well-known American political scientist, argues that “a country can be dragged into another’s conflict (fear of entrapment), and a partner may not comply with the treaty clause (fear of abandonment)”. Hence, many countries prefer a strategy of non-alliance partnership, rather than a binding military commitment.

Contemporary Russian and Chinese works reveal the respective apprehensions of each state. China fears getting entrapped in a conflict where its stakes are very low. Russia has intervened thrice in other countries in the last 20 years: Georgia, Syria and Ukraine. China has little interest in these states and would not like to get involved there. Similarly, Moscow fears it would get entrapped in China’s ever-expanding territorial ambition in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Russia has independent ties with countries such as India and Vietnam. These countries may abandon Russia, or downgrade their ties if Russia and China sign a formal alliance treaty. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that they would move towards an alliance. Beijing’s support to Russia in its war against Ukraine has been limited. This, however, should not lead one to believe that their military-technical cooperation will not grow more robust in the coming years.

Chinese scholars argue that the West deliberately creates a facade of a Russia-China alliance and projects this as a coalition of authoritarian states against democracies. Beijing worries that such a portrayal will adversely impact China’s ties with other countries. It would face backlash and be subject to isolation if it were seen as taking sides with Russia. Beijing’s trade with Russia is merely 2 per cent, and much of its trade happens with the West. As a trading country with global outreach, Beijing would not sacrifice its economic interests to protect Russia, which is of marginal significance for its commerce. Beijing would resist even when Russia desired an alliance. Wang Qi, writing in The Global Times, argues that Beijing must save itself against Western attempts to tie China and Russia into a “political and military bloc”. He says that China has global interests, and the West intends to create a rift between China and the rest of the world. Experts in Russia mirror identical apprehensions. Alexander Lukin, a Russian political scientist, argues that Russia must support China, but not unconditionally. He argues Russia should support China in Asia on a reciprocal basis. It cannot have the same policy as that of China in Asia. For instance, China can have adversarial relations with India, Vietnam and some countries in South East Asia. But Russia cannot blindly support that position.

The Western narrative of “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” has galvanised these states against the West. Earlier, the US National Security Strategy 2022 stated bluntly that Russia poses an immediate threat to the international system as in its aggression against Ukraine. China, by contrast, harbours the intention and has the economic, technological, diplomatic and military clout to reshape the international order. The US policy is largely responsible for growing defence ties between the two states. The Biden administration seeks to take Russia down first, leaving China for future presidents.

The West has begun to recognise the strength of this partnership, but it lacks a long-term vision and strategy to deal with it. It would serve Washington better if Secretary Antony Blinken revisited Henry Kissinger’s 1971 “Ping Pong Diplomacy”. With or without a formal alliance, Beijing and Moscow are increasingly becoming unmanageable for the US. The West would be ignoring their global influence and disruptive capacities at its own peril. Fortunately, New Delhi’s close ties with Moscow will deter this partnership from working against India’s interests.

The writer teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi