Opinion Who is the real superpower?
Making sense of Washingtons new footprint in East Asia
Geopolitics has a nasty habit of surprising people and embarrassing political pundits. Such is the case with the recent dramatic turn of events in US-China relations. Not too long ago,the conventional wisdom,prevalent in elite circles in Beijing and elsewhere in Asia,was that China was gaining the upper-hand in its rivalry with the United States. Since Uncle Sam,sagging under mountains of debt,has been bleeding blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan for nearly a decade,the strategic balance is thought to have shifted decisively in Chinas favour. Of course,such perception was not lost on Chinese policy-makers,whose foreign policy behaviour in the past few years has been,to use a euphemism,muscular.
But within the past month,the US pulled off a series of diplomatic coups and regained its strategic initiative in East Asia. At the East Asia Summit in Bali,Indonesia,the US coordinated its regional allies and friends to push back against Chinas territorial claims to the South China Sea. Beijing,which has insisted on solving the disputes through bilateral negotiations and resisted outside interventions,found itself isolated. Then,signalling its resolve to Chinas jittery neighbours concerned about the durability of American military presence in East Asia,President Barack Obama flew to Australia and announced the opening of a new American marine base that will station 2,500 troops. Immediately after the end of the East Asia Summit,US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made a historic visit to Burma and initiated a process of re-engagement with the military junta that may yield significant strategic dividends for America. Should this effort bear fruit,Chinas strategic hold on Burma could be gravely endangered.
Taken together,these adroit diplomatic moves accomplished two interrelated strategic objectives. First,Washington succeeded in debunking the conventional wisdom that it no longer had sufficient leverage against Beijing. As Asias ultimate guarantor of security and off-shore balancer against Chinese hegemony,the US demonstrated that it could apply not only its formidable military and diplomatic clout,but also rally most countries in the region with relative ease in countering Chinas growing power and putting China on the defensive.
In addition to regaining its overall strategic initiative in East Asia,Washingtons second objective was to make Beijing rethink its recent assertive foreign policy behaviour and work more cooperatively with the US. In many quarters in Asia,the prevailing perception of Americas recent moves is that the US intends to curb Chinas influence. While there is no doubt that Chinas prestige and influence will suffer as a result (they already have),it is doubtful that the Obama administrations principal intent is to confront China and intensify the US-China strategic rivalry. On the contrary,these moves likely reflect the ascendance of a different perspective on managing US-China relations.
Washingtons China policy has been swinging back and forth between two strategic perspectives. One focuses on direct bilateral engagement with China. Advocates of this perspective believe that Washington can better manage Chinas rise and build a more productive relationship by deepening bilateral relations. This perspective held the sway over Washingtons China policy in the second half of George W. Bushs administration and the first year of Obamas presidency. The policy manifestations of this perspective were an accommodative stance on a wide range of bilateral issues (from human rights to trade) and the creation of high-level channels of exchange (such as the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue) denied even to Americas closest allies. Yet,accommodation has yielded disappointing results for Washington. Beijing has not reciprocated enough.
This apparently has given the advocates of the second perspective a chance to argue for a policy shift. At its core,the second perspective reflects a more realist view of China. Its advocates argue that the most effective way of making China more cooperative and respectful of Americas vital interests in East Asia is not by directly engaging China (although that is always needed),but by strengthening Americas relations with its allies and with Chinas neighbours fearful of Beijings power. The thinking behind this perspective is that this indirect approach is less costly (since the US can leverage the power and influence of Chinas neighbours),less confrontational (as the US can form a united front and avoid being seen as picking on China unilaterally),and more effective (because fears of isolation would give Chinese leaders incentives to be more cooperative). The ultimate goal of those advocating the second perspective,it is worth repeating,is not to contain or confront China,but to make it behave cooperatively or pay a much higher cost.
Washingtons recent moves in East Asia suggest that this perspective is now guiding Americas China policy. The question on every ones mind now is whether it will work better.
Two things need to happen to achieve its desired results. Washington needs to be careful not to abandon the first perspective altogether. The most effective approach is a policy that strikes the right balance between both perspectives since they are not mutually exclusive. So we should see some attempts by the US in the near future to reassure China. But Beijing also needs to move carefully. Misreading Washingtons strategic intent and responding to these moves with hostile countermeasures could only lead to unnecessary deteriorations in US-China ties. The smartest thing for China to do,it seems,is to exercise strategic restraint and adopt a new Asia policy that will both address its neighbours fears of Chinese power and make its ties with the US more cooperative and less competitive.
The writer is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in the US,express@expressindia.com
Share
