Written by Yusuf T Unjhawala
India’s acquisition of 26 Rafale M fighter jets for the Navy, estimated at Rs 63,000 crore, is the most significant enhancement to the country’s offensive naval capabilities in recent years. These planes will significantly strengthen the Navy’s capacity to project power, boost deterrence in the Indian Ocean Region, and improve combat readiness amid increasing Chinese naval presence.
The Rafale M is a proven fighter used by the French Navy, and its induction will finally give India a modern carrier-based jet to replace the disappointing Russian MiG-29K. But while the decision is strategically sound, it also comes with its share of limitations. For starters, the 26 aircraft being purchased fall well short of the Navy’s original requirement of 57 fighters. Moreover, only 22 will operate from a carrier. The remaining will be land-based, twin-seat trainers. This means that the long-standing capability gap will remain, and India’s approach to procurement, once again, has ended in a piecemeal fix rather than a comprehensive solution.
Why Rafale M?
The Rafale M outperforms the MiG-29K in every way that matters. It comes equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, better sensor fusion, a robust electronic warfare suite, and the ability to carry a wide array of weapons, from long-range air-to-air missiles to precision-guided munitions. These features enable the aircraft to operate in contested airspace and deliver precision strikes, and will enhance India’s deterrence capabilities.
It also helps that the Indian Air Force already has 36 Rafales. So logistics, parts, training, and maintenance systems are in place. Platform commonality across services is not just efficient; it is also cost-effective in the long term. Add to that India’s strategic ties with France, a dependable partner for India that has consistently supported India’s defence needs without strings attached.
A long, delayed journey
For years, the Indian Navy has been looking for a replacement for the MiG-29K due to low serviceability, technical problems, and limited operational capability. The Naval LCA, a carrier-capable version of the indigenous Tejas, was tested but eventually rejected due to insufficient thrust, payload limitations, and limited endurance.
The Navy had planned to acquire 57 carrier-based fighters. Two aircraft, Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and Dassault’s Rafale M, were tested at India’s shore-based facility in Goa. In December 2022, India requested that Boeing and Dassault extend the validity of their proposals till June 30, 2023. Only one of the two was asked to extend the validity of their offer before it expired on that date, which was Dassault, leaving Rafale M as the only option. While it was the default option, it was a good one given the aircraft’s combat-proven track record and existing support infrastructure in India, as well as India’s strategic ties with France.
While the Rafale M is capable, integrating it with the INS Vikrant will be challenging. The carrier’s aircraft lift was specifically designed for the MiG-29K, and accommodating the Rafale, which has a larger wingspan, is expected to be a tight fit. Modifications or workarounds may be required to ensure smooth operation. Furthermore, the delivery time frame adds another wrinkle: The first Rafales are slated to arrive three years after the contract is signed, with the entire order delivered early next decade. The order books for Rafale are full, with a backlog of 220 aircraft as of December 2024. That is a lengthy wait at a time when maritime tensions in the Indo-Pacific are high and China has increased its naval operations in the Indian Ocean Region, including frequent surveillance missions in addition to warships and submarines.
The Indian Navy’s decision to purchase 26 jets when they actually needed 57 will create a significant shortfall. If India does not quicken its efforts to develop indigenous aircraft, the Navy may have to order additional Rafale Ms in the future. The Navy is counting on the Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF) programme, which is being developed specifically for carrier operations. The Indian Navy projected a requirement for 145 TEDBFs for a three-aircraft-carrier fleet. However, they have been instructed to revise the requirement to only two carriers, reducing the need to 87 fighters. Regrettably, this programme is delayed, and the first fighters are not expected to enter service until 2035, with full deliveries likely extending into the 2040s.
There is also the issue of future capabilities. Eventually, the Indian Navy will need a fifth-generation carrier-based fighter. However, global options are limited, and if an indigenous solution is not developed, the Navy may have no choice but to seek options from abroad again. This would perpetuate a cycle of imports and lost opportunities for the domestic industry.
A familiar pattern of missed opportunities
The broader issue is India’s fragmented approach to military procurement. The IAF’s original plan to acquire 126 Rafales under the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) programme was scaled down to just 36 in 2016. Now, India is set to negotiate for another 114 Rafales under the MRFA (Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft) programme — this time through a government-to-government deal. If India had pursued a larger order of Rafales earlier, potentially with a domestic production line, it could have benefited from economies of scale, technology transfer, and industrial growth. Instead, we’re buying in small, expensive batches — plugging capability gaps without ever truly filling them.
The Rafale M acquisition is a critical and overdue step in modernising India’s naval aviation. It brings capability and credibility to the Navy’s air arm. But it’s also a reminder of India’s piecemeal defence procurement strategy. The capability gap is being plugged, not filled. And without a robust indigenous alternative ready in time, the cycle of foreign dependency could repeat itself.
The author is an adjunct scholar at the Takshashila Institution