Opinion What India’s G20 achieved for the Global South

That India batted for the African Union’s inclusion testifies to the longstanding links that Delhi has forged with developing countries at various multilateral fora. Clamouring for inclusion was a natural extension of India’s acute appreciation of how the international order structurally and institutionally (dis)regards the plight and condition of low-income countries. Neither was it surprising that India brokered the tempered language on climate change in the declaration given possible pushback from the Gulf countries, Russia, and China given its economic woes. What was perhaps a departure was having the G7, that has historically opposed India, multilaterally backing India’s efforts despite reservations on Ukraine, climate change, etc. The G7’s strident attitude over Russia could have vitiated proceedings but their leaders ostensibly assented given urgent global economic challenges that require solidarity and India’s strategic value as a rising power and pole given its economic heft. The G20 experience, however, sets a precedent where G7 leaders could expect India to shoulder additional global burdens ahead that cannot be summarily rebuffed. A pendulum appears to have been crossed now vis-a-vis India’s multilateral trajectory.

India’s priorities reflect its economic interests, not ideals or normative commitments, another long-standing feature of its multilateral persona. The 83-page G20 declaration signified a major triumph given rifts between major economies. Ukraine was a flashpoint. Besides the war, the joint agreement featured provisions on climate finance, debt relief, reforms of international financial institutions like the World Bank and a new “green development pact”. All issues are constraining the growth prospects of countries like India. In effect, India pushed for a growth-first agenda in a fickle and unpredictable international economy where capital is scarce given stubborn inflationary trends. The climate finance objective, in this context, appears particularly relevant; the promise of developed countries to provide $100 billion to help developing countries adapt remained unfulfilled and received a fillip. India also pushed to reorient the World Bank’s agenda to generate and disburse public and private capital for a climate-centric future, an issue that acquired consensus. Equally important in this vein is debt relief for developing countries facing economic headwinds. The launch of two important initiatives — the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the Global Biofuels Alliance — exemplify the Indian government’s motivation to connect varied partners all united by a need to drive decarbonisation, spark connectivity, and create infrastructural opportunities for their firms. That the corridor project is a rejoinder to the BRI served to amplify its importance for some. For India, its G20 became a vehicle where development concerns could be mainstreamed, not treated as ancillary issues, and where specific actors like the US, UAE, EU, and Saudi Arabia could pool capabilities for workable side initiatives. This trend could rear in upcoming G20s where hosts stitch coalitions together on an ad hoc basis.

Finally, India’s successful G20 presidency leaves behind less-than-positive effects on multilateralism writ large. The redistribution of economic power away from Europe toward Africa and Asia will activate more calls for greater representation of the Global South at international organisations and bodies. Representation could stymie effectiveness and action. Focus recedes. When crises hit, like the 2008 financial crisis, it might prove difficult for the G20 to swiftly coordinate and act given extra interests and agendas. What happens when there’s another global financial crisis? Or another pandemic? Or when climate disasters like floods, fires, and droughts accelerate? A multipolar world with competing power centres, rising economic fragmentation, and deglobalisation will only compound the pressures on institutions like the G20. With great power tensions at an apogee, resolution might not matter as discussions and resolutions pivot to smaller and smaller “like-minded” groups. India’s use of the G20 to launch the biofuels alliance and transcontinental corridor could compel future G20 chairs to use the forum to spawn minilateral groupings focused on specific issues like infrastructure, climate, health, etc. So far, minilaterals have emerged out of a confluence of great power rivalry and a vacuum to provide certain public goods. India’s G20 proves that great power politics and institutional innovation within existing institutions can also produce new arrangements.

The writer is Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore