Opinion The gulf of misunderstanding

The Persian Gulf standoff has several facets. Tehran believes that the US is mustering support for regime change when Iran is no direct threat to the United States. Iran continues to have uneven relations with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states supported by the West. Despite its obsolete conventional weaponry,due to earlier sanctions,Iran is outspent militarily by many of the regional states — all with American weapons.

A 2010 University of Maryland survey found out that 55 per cent of Iranians support the pursuit of a nuclear programme and 38 per cent support the building of a nuclear bomb. Given the bellicose Israeli and American rhetoric and sanctions,support for building a bomb has substantially increased in Iran. In 2009,when President Ahmadinejad supported a deal to ship uranium abroad for enrichment,he was opposed by former prime minister Mir Hosein Mousavi,the leader of “progressives” and the presidential challenger during the last elections. With the UN sanctions in place,in a survey last year,78 per cent of Mousavi supporters said Iran should not “give up its nuclear activities regardless of circumstances.” Even the worst critics of the regime are steadfast in defence of the revolution and Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme.

The mysterious assassinations of four nuclear scientists within two years,the latest in January,could also precipitate a decision if Iran was to go nuclear. Publicly accusing Israel and the US,Iran has formally informed the US interests section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran that the CIA was behind this assassination. This latest murder suggests neoconservatives are pushing for a stage where Iran is forced to react and where military action against Tehran becomes the only option.

The US belief that,following the Arab Spring,the regime can be changed in Tehran is not tenable because of two reasons. None of these ousted regimes faced external threats and none of those regimes came to power through fair and transparent elections. Iran holds regular and transparent elections even in the middle of wars.

The Iranian regime also understands how power works — the US,as they see it,waged war against non-nuclear Iraq but has chosen to pursue patient diplomacy with the nuclear-armed North Korea and continues to woo Pakistan. Western demonisation of Iran disallows a dispassionate understanding that Iran’s desire for space in the region is manifested in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine,spelled out in seventh State of the Union address by President James Monroe,is the bedrock of American foreign policy. The US invoked this doctrine most recently during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The deployment of US carrier task force in the Gulf,in addition to the string of military bases and regional rivals amounts to complete encirclement of Iran. If the United States considers Iranian military action against the deployment of carrier force in the Gulf a “red line” under the principle of the Monroe doctrine,it should wisely conclude that the deployment itself is a “red line” for Iran too. This heavy military presence around should be sufficient grounds for any state to go nuclear.

While much is made of the IAEA reports damning Iran,the latest IAEA Board of Governors report continues to “verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at [Iran’s nuclear facilities”. And yet,Iran’s intentions are continuously doubted by Western powers. Iran only insists in exercising its “inalienable” right to nuclear power for peaceful purposes given to it under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The US claim that Iran’s bomb will substantially improve its ability to intimidate the smaller,oil-rich but militarily vulnerable states in the region is not substantiated by historical precedent,as Iran has only gone for military action for defensive purposes.

Besides,even a nuclear-armed Iran will be unable to cow the non-nuclear Arab states if they are backed by American power. The real problem,argues Tehran,is US hegemonic ambition. However,there is little public empathy for the Iranian position,at least for now,in the western-backed Gulf States.

With Iran selling 2.4 million barrels of oil a day at above $100 a barrel,sanctions do not seem to hurt much. Many banks,unaffiliated with the US,are ready to trade and so are new suppliers in many countries. While the use of these circuitous routes has pushed up prices,the money through rising energy prices offsets the costs.

Though Iran still publicly professes the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme,many analysts now believe that,with such security threats,Iran may be compelled to cross the nuclear threshold. And if so,it could be treated with some deference,like North Korea or Pakistan.

With the large American military presence around,and all options to prevent Iran going nuclear on the table,Iran obviously believes its revolution remains under siege by the West. This military buildup means that a slip-up by either side could have dangerous ramifications for the international community,especially states like India and Pakistan.

The US calculation that the Iranian leadership will disintegrate under pressure is seriously flawed — given that this is a country still going through a phase of revolution,and facing an external threat. The threat of military action will only trigger Iran’s desire to acquire a nuclear bomb — exactly what the US-led powers hope to avoid.

The writer,formerly in the Pakistan Foreign Service,is adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,Singapore