Opinion The crumbling idol
How will the jihadist-on-the-street react to Osamas death?
To the al-Qaeda members I interrogated at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere in the aftermath of 9/11,Osama bin Laden was never just the founder and leader of the group,but also an idea. He embodied the belief that their version of Islam was correct,that terrorism was the right weapon,and that they would ultimately be victorious. bin Ladens death did not kill that idea,but did deal it a mortal blow.
The immediate reaction of al-Qaeda members to bin Ladens death will be to celebrate his martyrdom. The groups ideology champions death for the cause: songs are composed,videos made and training camps named in honour of dead fighters. Bin Ladens deputies will try to energise people by turning him into a Che Guevara-like figure for al-Qaeda a more effective propaganda tool dead than alive.
But it wont take long for al-Qaeda to begin wishing that bin Laden wasnt dead. He not only was the embodiment of al-Qaedas ideology,but also was central to the groups fund-raising and recruiting successes. Without him,al-Qaeda will find itself short on cash and members.
Bin Ladens fund-raising (especially through his connections to fellow wealthy Saudis) and his personal story (his decision to give up a life of luxury and ease to fight in a holy war) had brought him to prominence during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and later secured his position as al-Qaedas leader. He further cultivated that image by trying to model his ascetic life on that of the Prophet Muhammad by dressing similarly and encouraging his followers to ascribe divine powers to him. Bin Laden regularly hinted at this when discussing al-Qaedas strikes against America and his ability to withstand Washingtons wrath.
Not only has al-Qaeda lost its best recruiter and fundraiser,but no one in the organisation can come close to filling that void. Bin Ladens deputy,Ayman al-Zawahri,who will probably try to take over,is a divisive figure. His personality and leadership style alienate many,he lacks bin Ladens charisma and connections and his Egyptian nationality is a major mark against him. Indeed,one of the earliest things I discovered from interrogating Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Yemen as well as Guantánamo was the groups internal divisions; the most severe is the rivalry between the Egyptians and members hailing from the Arabian Peninsula. (Even soccer games pit Egyptians against Gulf Arabs.) While Egyptians typically travel to the Gulf to work for Arabs there,in al-Qaeda,Egyptians have traditionally held most of the senior positions.
It was only the knowledge that they were ultimately following bin Laden a Saudi of Yemeni origin,and therefore one of their own that kept non-Egyptian members in line. Now,unless a non-Egyptian takes over,the group is likely to splinter into subgroups. Someone like Anwar al-Awlaki,the Yemeni-American who is a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,is a likely rival to Zawahri.
Bin Laden was adept at convincing smaller,regional terrorist groups that allying with al-Qaeda and focusing on America were the best ways to topple corrupt regimes at home. But many of his supporters grew increasingly distressed by al-Qaedas attacks in the last few years which have killed mostly Muslims and came to realise that bin Laden had no long-term political programme aside from nihilism and death. The Arab Spring proved that,contrary to al-Qaedas narrative,hated rulers could be toppled peacefully without attacking America.
But we cannot rest on our laurels. Most of al-Qaedas leadership council members are still at large,and they command their own followers. They will try to carry out operations to prove al-Qaedas continuing relevance. And with al-Qaeda on the decline,regional groups that had aligned themselves with the network may return to operating independently,making them harder to monitor and hence deadlier.
Investigations,intelligence and military successes are only half the battle. The other half is in the arena of ideas,and countering the rhetoric and methods that extremists use to recruit. We can keep killing and arresting terrorists,but if new ones are recruited,our war will never end.
Ali H. Soufan,an FBI special agent from 1997 to 2005,interrogated al-Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere
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