Opinion Six years since the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K, belied promises

J&K’s $30 billion economy has grown at a much slower pace post the abrogation. The growth in Gross State Domestic Product has declined both in nominal and in real terms. The fall is much sharper in real terms, placing J&K far below the national rate of growth. As a result, the contribution of J&K to the national GDP has declined to 0.77 per cent. The tertiary sector, which accounts for 60 per cent of the local economy, has borne the brunt of the slowdown with its rate of growth getting halved to 5.8 per cent in 2023-24 from 11 per cent in 2022-23. Income growth from hotels and restaurants declined from 38 per cent to 13 per cent. The growth in real per capita income has also been halved — from 6 per cent to less than 3 per cent. In 2011-12, J&K’s per capita income was 84 per cent of the national average, but now it has declined to 76 per cent. The gap between the two is the highest ever in 2024.

Besides the slowdown in income growth, unemployment has been volatile post-2019 with temporary spikes much higher than earlier peaks. The unemployment rate spiked to 23 per cent in March 2023 and remained at 17 per cent in 2024. In the 15-29 age bracket, the unemployment rate of more than 30 per cent is almost double the national average. J&K is now among the states with the highest unemployment rate. It is high despite an increase in the labour force participation rate as well as the worker population ratio — this reflects economic instability. The number of workers in industry reached a decadal low in 2022-23. Even the number of factories has been stagnant at the 2016-17 level.

Underlying the slower growth and higher volatility, be it output or employment, is a drop in fixed capital. J&K’s fixed capital, which peaked in 2016-17, had halved by 2022-23. This drop is quite unprecedented and has not been distorted by the separation of Ladakh.

The UT’s government recently stated that J&K has attracted investment proposals worth Rs 84,544 crore across 42 industrial sectors. In 2023, actual investments on the ground reached Rs 2,518 crore, with 266 industrial units registered in Jammu and 148 in Kashmir. Yet, the official statistics collated by the central statistical bodies, such as the Annual Survey of Industries, show a decline in the invested capital in J&K. Capital investments started gaining momentum in 2015-16 and peaked the next year. By 2022-23, this had declined in absolute terms. In 2022-23, less capital was invested in J&K compared to what it was five years earlier. It should be obvious that the capital intensity of the economy has declined.

The decline in fixed and invested capital has been accompanied by a sharp rise in borrowings — a sure recipe for a fiscal crisis. Despite better revenue mobilisation, J&K’s fiscal health has deteriorated significantly with higher debt and deficits compared to pre-2019. Internal debt has almost doubled in just five years. The total liabilities of the government have also surged, making them more than half of the GSDP. The total outstanding liabilities of the government are now almost 60 per cent of the GSDP. The all-India average of states is less than half of this figure. The fiscal deficit continues to hover around 6 per cent, way above the stipulated FRBM limits. All this is despite the government earning more and spending more. The state’s own revenues have increased threefold in eight years. The tax-to-GDP ratio has increased sharply from 6.3 to 8.4 per cent, a consequence of implementing GST in July 2017. Yet, they are also borrowing much more.

Without investment growth, the sharp improvement in the credit-deposit ratio can be problematic. A higher credit growth is likely to be financing consumption, which can lead to a debt trap. The impact of credit growth has also been dampened by the negligible share of J&K in national credit, which is not even 1 per cent. The share in deposits, which has been growing at a slow rate, is around 1 per cent, indicating a net resource outflow. This continued low level of credit is validated by the credit-to-GSDP, which is as low as 38 per cent in 2024, compared to, say, Maharashtra, where it is 99 per cent. The low level of credit adds to the shortage of capital in an already capital-scarce economy and will have a crippling effect on the growth potential of the economy.

Inflation has normally been aligned with or slightly above the national averages. This is expected of an import-dependent sub-national economy like J&K. There was a sharp spike in 2019, after which the inflation threshold has remained the same, even as the average rate of inflation has been marginally higher than earlier. J&K is a high-wage economy. Inflation has resulted in the average daily wages of agricultural or construction labour in the UT being the second-highest in the country, after Kerala.

In the last six years, the historical structural features of J&K — a high-cost, import-dependent economy with parts of it being export-oriented — have only accentuated. An expansionary public expenditure policy continues as in the past, with the added feature of an overleveraged budget. Hardly the signs of an economy set for a take-off a la Rostow. It is unlikely to engender long-term sustainable economic growth, let alone transformation.

The writer is former finance minister of Jammu and Kashmir