Opinion Shashi Tharoor writes: The return of Chindia

The symbolism is unmistakable. Indian pilgrims have returned to Hindu and Buddhist sites in Tibet. Direct flights are resuming. Visa restrictions are easing. Patrolling has resumed on our disputed frontier. Both nations are orchestrating a flurry of high-level exchanges to formalise the thaw. These gestures, though modest, are not without meaning. They signal a shared intent to move beyond the recriminations of the past and to reimagine a relationship that has too often been defined by its fault lines.

India and China share a rich tapestry of historical engagement that stretches back over two millennia, the era of the Golden Road and the Silk Road, which served as conduits not only for trade in silk, spices, and precious stones, but also for profound cultural and religious exchange. Buddhism, born in India, found fertile ground in China through the travels of monks and scholars, while ancient Indian texts like the Arthashastra referenced Chinese goods, attesting to early awareness and interaction. Chinese students studied at Nalanda, and an Indian monk, Bodhidharma, took martial arts to the famed Shaolin Temple in China.

Fast forward to the mid-20th century, and the spirit of cooperation was rekindled as both nations emerged from colonial shadows into sovereign statehood. India was among the first non-communist countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China, and the 1940s and 1950s saw vibrant exchanges in science, education, and diplomacy, with both countries participating in landmark events like the Asian Relations Conference (1947) and the Bandung Conference (1955), in which Jawaharlal Nehru’s India took it upon itself to introduce Communist China to the world. Despite later tensions, this era was marked by mutual respect and the optimism of “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”, laying the groundwork for a relationship that, even today, seeks to balance ancient affinities with modern aspirations.

At the heart of the Modi–Xi dialogue was a reaffirmation of a principle that ideally ought to be self-evident but has long been elusive: That India and China can be development partners, not just rivals. The assertion that “differences should not turn into disputes” is more than diplomatic boilerplate — it represents a conscious effort to de-escalate the dominant rhetoric since 2020, when it was all “Hindi-Chini bye-bye”. In an era of global volatility, where trade wars flare and alliances shift with alarming speed, such clarity is welcome.

Of course, the spectre of American tariffs looms large over this rapprochement. President Donald Trump’s stinging levies—30 per cent on Chinese goods, with threats of escalation to 145 per cent, and a punishing 50 per cent on Indian exports — have jolted New Delhi into reconsidering its strategic calculus. India, once courted as a prized partner, now finds itself labelled a “laundromat for the Kremlin” by Washington’s trade hawks. The economic fallout is real: Exporters face closure, jobs have been lost and more hang in the balance, and the promise of preferential treatment lies in tatters.

In this context, China’s overtures — welcoming Indian commodities, fast-tracking investments, and publicly rebuking American “bullying”— are not merely opportunistic. They reflect a recognition that Asia’s two largest economies must find common cause in a multipolar world. Strategic autonomy, a theme both leaders underscored, is not just a slogan; it is a necessity.

Yet, we must temper optimism with realism. The border remains a tinderbox, with no progress on de-escalation to the status quo ante of April 2020, even while both sides promise progress toward a permanent border agreement. Our massive trade deficit with China persists and is compounded by huge non-tariff barriers imposed on Indian companies. The structural asymmetries in the relationship — military, economic, and political — cannot be wished away.

Just recently the exodus of over 300 Chinese engineers from Foxconn’s pivotal iPhone 17 manufacturing facilities in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka revealed how painfully Beijing could squeeze our ambitions. China has leveraged its dominance in rare-earth production and processing by restricting exports of rare earths and rare-earth magnets, which are crucial for electric vehicles and electronics, to India. It has also imposed trade restrictions on the export of high-end capital equipment, including for electronics assembly and other sectors, heavy-duty tunnel boring machines and solar equipment, severely impacting India. The real test lies not in the symbolism of summits but in the substance of sustained cooperation.

Still, there is reason to hope. The resumption of dialogue, the restoration of people-to-people ties, and the shared commitment to multilateralism suggest that India and China are willing to engage — not as antagonists, but as interlocutors. In a world increasingly defined by zero-sum thinking, that alone is a victory.

The spirit of “Chindia”, it seems, is stirring once more. Slowly and cautiously, but unmistakeably. Let us hope it endures.

The writer chairs the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs