Opinion Russia vs the West: A clash of civilisations

Firstly, both the brewing of the conflict in Ukraine and the short one that Georgia already suffered have their roots in NATO’s shock 2008 announcement in Bucharest regarding membership extension to Ukraine and Georgia. Russia under Vladimir Putin has been involved in four international conflicts — with Georgia in South Ossetia in 2008 (directly in response to the Bucharest announcement), the eastern troubles in Ukraine starting in 2014 (after the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2013), intervention in Syria in support of Basher al-Assad in 2015 and the more decisive move into Ukraine in 2022 that we are still witnessing. The Georgian conflict of August 2008 lasted 12 days and the casualties on both sides measured in hundreds, not thousands. The conflict ended with the Russian-speaking enclaves in Georgia becoming de facto Russian, and the chances of Georgia joining NATO disappearing. The Russian military intervention in Syria was a relatively minimalist operation designed to support ground combat being conducted by the Syrian regime’s forces, often against ISIS-type elements. Even today, Russia’s demands to end the war in Ukraine are limited to the recognition of Crimea as Russian (it is overwhelmingly a Russian population and has repeatedly voted for incorporation into Russia) territory, recognition of the two breakaway regions in the east (both overwhelmingly Russian-speaking) and a constitutional amendment to the effect that Ukraine would not pursue NATO membership. These are not revanchist objectives, but seemingly minimalist ones, especially in the context of the Russian interest in doing business with and in Europe.

Consider, therefore, what Russia has been up to in the economic sphere. It has been acting as a ready adjuster of the global oil supply as conflicts in the Middle East caused supply-side shocks, and a willing long-term supplier of critical natural gas to Europe via the jointly-built Nord Stream pipelines that run from Russia, across eastern Europe to Germany and the West (another pipeline running in the frigid waters of the north and skipping multiple countries along the way has recently been blocked by Germany). The construction of these pipelines was a signal of long-term Russian interest in economic integration with the West.

It is important to note the difference between a financing arrangement, free-market access or participation in a country’s stock exchange on the one hand, and the construction of massive cross-continental infrastructure for the delivery of natural resources. The former are flexible, modular types of economic interaction, capable of being moulded according to evolving dynamics and vulnerable to actions like financial sanctions and embargoes. The latter, of which Nord Stream is an example, are much harder to wish away when circumstances change.

What should the existence of Nord Stream I and the construction of Nord Stream II signal to the world about Putin’s Russia and its interests during the period 1997 to 2012 (when the project was first mooted and when it was inaugurated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel)? This is the same period during which Russian oligarchs’ capital poured into Europe. To even an amateur observer, these Russian behaviours ought to have signalled a willingness, even a desire, for closer integration with Europe. One does not build deep economic relations with and invest in the assets of a region that one is planning to go to war with or even develop future adversarial relations with. Either Putin and the entire Russian establishment are fundamentally irrational or this is a war that they never wanted, but have felt compelled to undertake due to a hostile aversion to NATO expansion so close to Moscow.

To go back to Huntington’s view of Russia as a “swing civilisation”, it is possible to see this period from the late 1990s until quite recently as the West’s best opportunity to move past its Cold War mentality, its insistence on shrill moralising and towards a pragmatic relationship with its old nemesis. This would have been the optimal strategy to ensure that in the face of the brewing rivalry between the US/Europe and a rising and intransigent China, Russia may have been peeled away from a Sino-alliance. Instead, the West’s utter inability or unwillingness to accept Ukrainian neutrality and economic integration with both East and West (Russia had mooted a four-way economic partnership prior to its takeover of Crimea in 2014, consisting of Ukraine, the EU, Russia and the IMF, which the West rejected), and its continued encouragement of Ukrainian membership of a formal, Cold War-era, anti-Soviet security bloc has all but ensured that Russia now “swings” right into Xi Jinping’s arms. This is a significant own-goal in terms of Western grand strategy. Crucially, overt Russian support for Chinese ambitions in Asia is a fundamental shift in geopolitics for India, which has always counted on Russian support.

India finds itself in an unenviable position, but has also proven itself to be an assertive, independent power with a subtle and sophisticated policy-response process. Unlike most western capitals today, the Indian government enjoys a degree of freedom in charting a path during this crisis, since domestic opinions are not strong either way. More importantly, India has correctly understood the strategic context, background and implications for the international order of these events, and will continue to move carefully, support dialogue towards an early end to the conflict and maintain a studious silence on the question of absolutist “moral” judgements.

India’s position is economically vulnerable to an extended war in Ukraine through the weakness of the rupee, dependence on oil and other imports, and the secular flight to safety of global (western) capital. This means that India’s self-interest lies in a rapid resolution of the military and economic warfare. It does not lie, however, in making any wild “swings” this way or that. Despite Huntington classifying us as a swing power, walking the path of independence and self-reliance while continuing to expand our burgeoning relationship with the West in the long-term is India’s best strategic choice. However, India’s relationship with the West will be based on mutual self-respect, rather than the traditional high-handedness that we have experienced hitherto.

This implies that any calls by commentators in India for India to “speak up” and condemn the Russian aggression in Ukraine are largely playing into the unidimensional and self-serving narrative of one side while paying scant attention to national interests. We have little to gain by jumping into the current shouting match, and much to gain by continuing to move steadily but carefully towards long-term partnerships with like-minded democracies, no matter their “culture”, religious traditions or the colour of their skin. The question is: Will culture eat strategy for breakfast (a favourite line of MBA-enthusiasts in the corporate world) or end up destroying us all in nuclear armageddon?

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 6, 2022 under the title ‘Ukraine and the culture war’. Shah is an alumnus of London School of Economics, Cambridge and Harvard, and lives and works in Mumbai.