Opinion Pieces of the Persian puzzle

More generally,regardless of whether there was significant fraud in the presidential elections,those among the architects of the political establishment who believed that the system allowed scope of reform and change find themselves face-to-face with an authoritarian structure that uses extreme violence to ensure its political survival.

Though the pre-reform clerics such as moderate former president Mohammad Khatami have increasingly warned Iran’s conservative leadership of “dangerous consequences” if people were prevented from expressing their demands in non-violent ways,the Supreme Leader,Ayatollah Khamenei,argued that to make concessions to popular demands and “illegal” pressure would amount to a form of “dictatorship” and warned the protestors that they,rather than the police,would be held responsible for any further violence.

By clearly coming out in support of the conservative camp and acknowledging the fact that his views on foreign and domestic policy were closer to those of Ahmadinejad than to those of the president’s foes and critics,although historically his role is to remain an arbiter and above factionalism, Ayatollah Khamenei has jeopardised his political and spiritual legitimacy and the regime’s armour of invincibility,which are so central to the regime’s authoritarian control. One needs also to add that none of the quietest clerics in Qom came forward to endorse either the election results or Ayatollah Khamenei’s famous speech.

In other words,the fissure appears to be expressing itself not only between the Iranian state and the young civil society,but also between the Supreme Leader and the Grand Ayatollahs in Qom.

Rafsanjani’s opposition to Ahmadinejad has also raised speculation of possible rifts emerging in the ruling theocracy over the election. Rafsanjani heads the Assembly of Experts,a panel of clerics with the power to review the Supreme Leader’s performance and remove him — although that has never been used.

Therefore,that the elections might or might not have been rigged is now a completely irrelevant question. During the past few days the unarmed and peaceful Iranians across all ages and classes have flocked to the streets of Tehran,defying brutal paramilitary squads,to demand major transformations in the structure of the political establishment in Iran. With such a complex landscape and fast-moving developments on the ground,Iran’s political future has become even more obscure and uncertain than its immediate past.

That said,an equally important fact is that most of the young demonstrators who have been questioning the legitimacy of Iran’s electoral process and now the credibility of the Iranian political institutions,are not,unlike their parents,interested in revolutionary upheaval or violent change. Some could be prepared to take their protests to the limit. Many others,however,have no interest in an all-out mutiny against the country’s Islamic system. The protest movement,however,has appeared to gain some solid footing after days of street clashes that left different cities of Iran scorched and battered. There is common agreement among the demonstrators and civil activists that the main contradiction in contemporary Iran is the one between authoritarian violence and democratic non-violence. In the days and weeks ahead,we will have to wait and see how this dialectic between the powerless non-violent truth-seekers and powerful lie-makers and users of violence will work itself out.

The greatest degree of uncertainty surrounds a scenario in which the military elite conclude that the mass protests reflect deep-seated discontent and that a Tiananmen moment is necessary. Needless to say that Iran is incapable of following China’s path. Twenty years after Tiananmen,the Chinese Communist Party has increased its popularity through delivering staggering economic growth and cultivating a revived Chinese nationalism. If Ahmadinejad remains in power as the president,he has to address the budget deficit brought about by plummeting oil prices and the world financial crisis and justify his administration’s use of violence against those of his compatriots that he called “dust and dirt”. Should street violence escalate in Iran,it also spells a turning point in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies that the world will not forget or forgive. In short,no one can yet predict Iran’s political future,but one thing is crystal clear. Even if the Iranian political establishment outlasts the current upheavals,unrests all over the country will play out over months and years to come. The Iranian system would settle down uncomfortably as a divided house. As such,even if authorities in Tehran undermine the popular and republican elements of the Iranian constitution,this would only increase their vulnerability to future democratic demands and to a legitimacy crisis that is hanging over their heads. In short,no one can yet predict Iran’s political future,but two things seem clear. First,the crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and can only be solved by Iranians. But,second,there is no need to conceal the fact that that popular unrest in Iran has created a critical change to the security and stability of the region.

The writer,former head of the Contemporary Philosophy Department of the Cultural Research Centre in Tehran,has written more than 20 books including ‘Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity’ and ‘India Revisited: Conversations on Contemporary India’