Opinion Pak-Saudi pact: Has Islamabad bitten off more than it can chew?

Thus, apart from deploying trainers, troops, and hardware in Saudi Arabia, the real vital contribution that Pakistan can make to Saudi Arabia was clarified by Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif. Describing it as an “umbrella” and “defensive” pact, Asif has asserted that all capabilities that Pakistan has, including nuclear deterrence, will “absolutely” be available to Saudi Arabia. He also indicated that “doors were open” for other nations to join the pact.

The “nuclear issue” would have certainly provoked the current US administration, which has often claimed credit for the ceasefire between the nuclear-armed neighbours of South Asia. Was the US consulted prior to the pact? Notwithstanding the White House lunch hosted for Pakistan Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir in June and the invite for the US Central Command ceremony in August, the US-Pakistan relationship has inherently been transactional for decades. As always, the Pakistan army has chosen to play along, drawing mileage out of the US-Pakistan “optics” to boost its own internal standing and external grandstanding. In the current environment, US concerns about the pact are unlikely to have been a factor for either side. In 2023, Saudi Arabia went ahead with Chinese mediation to establish peace with Iran, seen as an “arch enemy” of Israel.

A direct potential military role of Pakistan in the Middle East and extension of its nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia theoretically brings Pakistan face-to-face with Israel. Pakistan would not have made this bold move without explicit clearance from China, which remains the backbone of Pakistan’s military heft. This may well also turn out to be a Chinese foray into the region to offer its military hardware with training by Pakistani officers. As the US is being seen withdrawing from taking care of the “unpaid” security of other nations, including NATO, a Chinese model may well be emerging as an alternative- by design or by default.

The US may have “sensed” the real force behind Pakistan’s bold move. This might explain President Donald Trump’s sudden declaration on September 18 in London that he wants to take back the Bagram base in Kabul in Afghanistan. He publicly clarified the purpose by suggesting that the base was “an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons”. For decades, the US has chosen Indo-Pacific and not South Asia, to challenge Chinese military might. This novel move, though “reactionary” in nature, may raise temperatures in South Asia and result in unintended consequences even for US security concerns. It would not be prudent to view it through a “Pakistan lens” or “Taliban lens”.

Pakistan has already built dependable military and political relationships with China and Turkey. The pact with Saudi Arabia would further bring wealth to Pakistan to boost its economy and military might. It is possible that more Arab States may join the pact to enjoy Pakistani “nuclear deterrence”. However, by tying its destiny with the increasingly complex and volatile Middle East, Pakistan may have bitten off more than it can chew. In reality, it divides Pakistan’s military heft between South Asia and the Middle East.

Lastly, any US-China military competition in South Asia has a serious potential to destabilise the entire region and may affect India in more ways than one. The US has recently revoked the Chabahar Port waiver, identified India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and Myanmar amongst “major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries” and hiked H1-B visa fee phenomenally. These may well be attempts to generate new levers of power in South Asia, not just for trade and tariffs, but far beyond them.

The writer is a security analyst and former director general of police