Opinion Pahalgam attack: The lessons that we have learnt

Taking an all-India view, there have so far been five major Pakistan-sponsored terrorist incidents during the current century: One in Delhi, one in Mumbai and the remaining three in J&K. The first one was on December 13, 2001, when terrorists attacked the Parliament, killing nine people. All five attackers were also killed. There was a feeling of outrage in the country. Prime Minister Vajpayee talked of aar-paar ki ladai (a decisive war), and the Indian Army was mobilised for an all-out attack on Pakistan under what was called Operation Parakram. “The trumpets continued to sound and the drums continued to beat for nine long months”, as Lt Gen H S Panag has graphically described, but the operation was never given the green signal “due to a combination of international pressure, lack of strategic vision, political dithering, slow mobilisation and an unsure military”.

The second major terrorist attack was in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, when terrorists launched multiple attacks at different places in the metropolitan city, killing 166 people and injuring more than 300 people. It was the biggest terrorist attack on India, but a weak government at the Centre did not take any retaliatory measures. The internal security apparatus was nevertheless strengthened in its wake by decentralising the deployment of NSG, setting up the National Investigation Agency and drawing up an elaborate coastal security scheme.

The third major terrorist attack was on September 18, 2016, when terrorists attacked the Indian Army Brigade headquarters in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 soldiers. Soon after, within 10 days, Indian Army commandos crossed the Line of Control and conducted a series of surgical strikes in the course of which about 100 militants are believed to have been killed.

The fourth major terrorist attack was in Pulwama in J&K on February 14, 2019, when a suicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden vehicle into the CRPF convoy, killing 40 CRPF personnel. The government took serious notice of the incident and, on February 26, IAF Mirage 2000 planes bombed the JeM camp in Balakot inside Pakistan, inflicting heavy casualties.

Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, is the fifth major incident in which the terrorists gunned down 26 people. Prime Minister Modi has issued a stern warning that “India will identify, trace and punish every terrorist and their backers” and that “we will pursue them to the ends of the earth”. Some measures at the political and diplomatic level have already been taken. Out of those, the strongest one is the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably” abjures its support to cross-border terrorism. Action at the kinetic level is still awaited.

What are the lessons to be drawn from the aforesaid incidents? One, we need to set our house in order. This would involve action at multiple levels. We need to strengthen our intelligence apparatus at the ground level. Surprisingly, neither the IB, R&AW, nor the state intelligence had any clue about the impending attack in Pahalgam. Police response to an emergency must also improve. The terrorists had a free run at the Baisaran meadow for at least twenty minutes. In a union territory saturated with security forces, this is unacceptable. We also do not seem to have done enough to win over the support of the local people. At least 15 of them are believed to have provided logistical support to the marauders. There is an avoidable delay in the restoration of statehood to J&K. Meanwhile, the state government employees whose loyalties are suspect must be weeded out.

Second, weakness is always counterproductive, more so in statecraft. It only emboldens a rogue state and its terrorist proxies. Operation Parakram was a fiasco, and Pakistan must have felt that the Indian state is bluff and bluster only and that it does not have the courage to confront them. This impression must have been reinforced further when we shirked from a military response after 26/11. The barrage of terrorist attacks, therefore, continued. Mumbai was targeted again (July 13, 2011), and there were incidents in Hyderabad (February 21, 2013), Bodh Gaya (July 7, 2013), Pathankot (January 2, 2016), etc.

Thirdly, the kinetic response after Uri and Pulwama was perhaps not enough. Pakistan’s deep state cannot give up on cross-border terrorism. The Prime Minister has threatened to raze to dust whatever is left of the havens of terrorists.

The writer is formerly Director General of BSF, was also Member, National Security Advisory Board