Opinion Why One Nation One Election is a test – for basic structure doctrine and Supreme Court

In short, there will be an “appointed date” with reference to which the term of the Lok Sabha will be fixed for five years. The elections to the state legislatures will be synchronised to match that appointed date. If the Lok Sabha is dissolved either because the government of the day has lost the confidence of the House or the ruling party enjoying a majority finds the need to seek a fresh mandate, the fresh election can only be for the unexpired portion of the five-year term. Similarly, if a state legislature is dissolved either because of loss of confidence or the ruling party enjoying a majority finds the need to seek a fresh mandate, that fresh election can again only be for the unexpired portion of the five-year term.

If the idea of holding simultaneous elections was to reduce the frequency of elections, the recommendations of the Committee contradict that purpose. The Committee has rightly not abandoned the Westminster model, which means that if a government loses the confidence of the House, a fresh election is necessary. The Westminster model also means that the leader of the party enjoying a majority has the right to seek a fresh mandate mid-term to strengthen her hands for future measures. But by mandating that the ensuing mid-term poll will only be to elect an assembly for the unexpired portion of the previous one, the same inefficiency and wastage that are supposed to have necessitated the “one-nation one-election” idea will happen here again.

The Committee recommends amendments in as many as four Articles of the Constitution (Articles 83, 172, 325 and 327). It also recommends the introduction of two new Articles namely Article 82A (for providing an “appointed date” on which all legislatures meet, and reconvene on the same date every five years) and Article 324A (for empowering the Parliament to make law for simultaneous elections for Panchayati Raj institutions and municipalities). It also recommends the amendment to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, In the Committee’s view, only one amendment – the amendment which introduces Article 324A – requires the ratification of not less than one-half of the state legislatures because the subject of “local government” falls within the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Committee is right to the extent that this would be the only constitutional change requiring the consent of at least half the states. And so, a constitutional challenge on the ground of violation of the procedural requirement under the Proviso to Article 368(2) would not be available.

But, there is a much larger constitutional infirmity in the ONOE idea, and it is in the context of federalism. In the undefined list of basic features of the Constitution, federalism surely ranks very high, and it is this which is most seriously impacted when the terms of state legislatures are restricted to conform to the term of Parliament. And when the people of a state are deprived of their right to stable governance by artificially limiting the term of the representatives whom they elect to only the “unexpired” period, the principle of federalism is directly infringed. It is also a negation of the parliamentary form of government which was consciously chosen by the founders over the presidential form of government.

And so, despite crossing the procedural hurdle of Article 368(2), the ONOE idea will also have to meet the “basic structure” test. And once again, the basic structure doctrine will be on test and the Supreme Court itself will be on test.

The writer is a Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court of India