Opinion Just deal with it
Notwithstanding the hype about a possible US-Pakistan nuclear deal similar to the US-India deal that was touted before the recent US-Pakistan strategic dialogue...
Notwithstanding the hype about a possible US-Pakistan nuclear deal similar to the US-India deal that was touted before the recent US-Pakistan strategic dialogue,the final outcome was along expected lines with the US listening to Pakistans request without making any commitment. As a noted Pakistani analyst commented,the expectations raised by both sides about the fourth round had exceeded what was achieved in the two-day talks. That was not surprising considering the fact a US-Pakistan nuclear deal has to overcome a lot of obstacles on both sides before it can fructify. What are the obstacles?
Those on the American side are well known. The US Atomic Energy Act,doubts about Pakistani commitment to non-proliferation given its past record,convincing NSG members to make another exception,etc. In case of the US-India nuclear deal,both sides had made certain commitments which required them to give up some elements of their past policies to accommodate the others requirements. The US was required to make an exception to its policy of requiring fullscope safeguards for nuclear commerce. India,meanwhile,was required to (i) place under IAEA safeguards a number of indigenous reactors that were otherwise free from such safeguards; and (ii) conclude an additional protocol that required India to notify IAEA about future Indian nuclear-related exports. This was especially important to NSG members since India is the only country with full industrial capabilities in the full range of nuclear fuel cycle activities,which was not a member of NSG and also not an NPT member.
Subsequently,India offered to place a large number of civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards eight out of the 16 indigenous reactors as well as three heavy water plants. Unfortunately Pakistan has no such civilian facility reactors or heavy water plants to offer to place under safeguards. All of its current nuclear facilities of importance reactors,heavy water plants and reprocessing plants that are currently not under safeguards cannot be offered since they are all engaged in Pakistans strategic programme. Nor does it have any such programme underway,which it can offer for IAEA safeguards. In short ,neither the US nor the international community will get any benefit from having any additional Pakistan nuclear reactors or other significant nuclear facilities under safeguards as a result of a nuclear deal with Pakistan.
There is another equally significant factor that makes such a deal unlikely. Indias record on non-proliferation is highly commendable. And its addditional protocol with IAEA only added to the international communitys comfort level with India. However,the case of Pakistan is entirely different. The history of A.Q. Khan network with its multi-country links China,North Korea,Iran,Libya and god knows who else needs no elaboration. However,from the international communitys perspective,A.Q.Khan has been protected by the Pakistani state from giving any information about the network to either IAEA or anybody else from the international community. It is highly unlikely that any of the parties that need to agree to a US-Pakistan nuclear deal the US itself,NSG,IAEA would even agree to consider the merits of such a deal unless Pakistan agrees to make A.Q. Khan available for questioning by one of more of these parties. Pakistan has so far steadfastly opposed making him available for questioning by any non-Pakistani agency. This is,of course,for two major reasons first,it will embarrass its partners in proliferation and secondly,because Pakistan is still engaged in clandestine procurement of prohibited items in the international market and its strategic program will be compromised if A.Q.Khan the father of the Pakistani clandestine procurement network is exposed to international interrogation. As is well known,Pakistan is building two additional reactors for its strategic programme,quite possibly with assistance from one or more of its proliferation partners. It cannot afford to have these compromised. It is also engaged in clandestine imports of fissile material to operate its nuclear reactors and enrichment facilities. Although Pakistan does not reveal its production of indigenously mined natural uranium,estimates of Pakistans annual production,by the IAEA/OECD Red Book on Uranium reveals that it will not be sufficient to operate KANUPP power reactors,the three strategic programme production reactors and its two uranium enrichment facilities. There have been unconfirmed reports that China supplied Pakistan with 300 tones of natural uranium in the past without any safeguards to support its strategic programme and may well be still be continuing to supply such fissile material to Pakistan without any safeguard. Any close examination of Pakistans external nuclear commerce will seriously jeopardise both Pakistans strategic program as well its relation with the suppliers.
In short,for any US-Pakistan nuclear deal,the US as well as the NSG and IAEA have to be convinced about Pakistans sincerity about non-proliferation and the cessation of its clandestine procurement activities. That cannot be done without making A.Q.Khan available for interrogation by the US,NSG and IAEA. Any such interrogation will not only expose the activities of Pakistans proliferation partners in the past,it will also expose its current procurement activities with serious consequences for its strategic programme. Pakistan,therefore,cannot afford to make such a concession. In the absence of which,there will be consensus on the difficulty of offering Pakistan a nuclear deal similar to one that was offered to India.
The writer is visiting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation
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