Opinion On Maldives’ ties with China, India must send out a clear message
Modi’s Balakot action of 2019 displayed a determination to use coercive elements to counter terror. Similarly, red lines must be quietly and subtly drawn to dissuade neighbours from interfering.
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar meets his Maldives counterpart Moosa Zameer, in Kampala on the sidelines of the NAM summit on January 18. PTI Developments in India’s ties with Maldives, following the election of Mohamed Muizzu as President in November last year, once again, profile the country’s difficulties in dealing with its immediate neighbourhood. These problems with neighbouring countries are not new but they have been exacerbated because of China’s persistent assertiveness in the region. India has sought to broadly counter China’s activities by seeking to bring in many neighbouring countries within the fold of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of “sabka saath, sabka vikas”. However, the neighbours are clearly finding it impossible to overlook Chinese overtures even while emphasising their links with India. The neighbourhood situation does not present a comforting picture for India, including in the security sector.
India needs a cogent and enduring framework of engagement with its neighbours which harmonises its interests and those of its neighbours. Before a few thoughts on such a framework are offered, a look would be useful at what has happened between India and Maldives after Muizzu’s victory. Muizzu, who has a reputation for being close to China, contested the election on the plank that he would ensure the removal of Indian defence services contingents from Maldives soil. After his victory, he was quick to assert that he would fulfil this pledge. Two days later, after meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on the sidelines of COP28 in Dubai on December 1, 2023, Muizzu said India had agreed to withdraw its “military personnel” from Maldives. The Indian statement on the meeting was silent on the question of defence services personnel. Instead, it emphasised the two leaders’ decision to set up a “core group” to strengthen “people-to-people linkages, development cooperation, economic relations, climate change and sports”.
Modi visited Lakshadweep early this month. He extolled its natural beauty and called on Indian tourists to visit the islands. There was nothing wrong with Modi asking Indians to visit Lakshadweep. Perhaps, some Indians while echoing Modi, need not have said that Indians should go to Lakshadweep instead of the Maldives. However, even if they did so, there was no reason for Maldivian ministers to abuse Modi and India. The Indian outrage was natural and Muizzu quickly dismissed the ministers but the damage was done. It added to the unease caused by Muizzu’s demand on Indian military personnel.
Muizzu visited China on January 8-12. He was warmly welcomed by the Chinese leadership led by President Xi Jinping. The China-Maldives relationship was elevated to the status of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”. Clearly, China is playing the Maldives card with gusto and, in Muizzu, has a committed partner who is willing to make “snide” remarks about India. On his return from China, Muizzu said, “We may be a small country, but that does not give you a licence to bully us”. It does not require any great imagination to comprehend who “you” refers to in this context.
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar met his Maldives counterpart Moosa Zameer recently in Kampala on the sidelines of the NAM summit. Jaishankar tweeted, after the meeting, that he had “A frank conversation on India-Maldives ties”. Meanwhile, the core group set up by Modi and Muizzu has also met. The Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said that both sides are working to find “mutually workable solutions” to “enable continued operation of Indian aviation platforms that provide humanitarian and medevac facilities to the people of Maldives”. These platforms are of the Indian Air Force and the military contingent in Maldives is for their operations.
It is good that Jaishankar has had a candid conversation with his Maldives counterpart. It is not difficult to estimate the message that Jaishankar would have given to Zameer. He would have stressed that India respects Maldives sovereignty and its choices. He would have also emphasised that India would be a reliable development partner. However, what India will not be able to accept is for a neighbour like Maldives to become a base from where its security comes under threat. It is natural for a country like India to draw such a red line not only in the context of Maldives but also in respect of other neighbours. It is precisely here that the Chinese are showing no regard for Indian concerns in the immediate neighbourhood.
For over six decades, China has used Pakistan as a cat’s paw against India, including through assisting it with the development of Pakistan’s strategic weapons and delivery systems. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with its special focus on the Gwadar port has further strengthened Pakistan’s client status. It is not feasible to consider that China will permit Pakistan, even if saner elements within it so wish, to normalise ties with India. China is also seeking to build ties with the Taliban regime to utilise the mineral wealth dormant in the Hindu Kush for its industries in its western regions. India has made openings with the Taliban regime but there is a strange reluctance to move forward. Besides, India’s current visa regime for Afghanistan is counter-productive for its interests. The Chinese are actively moving ahead in Nepal, putting pressure on Bhutan and have their talons in Sri Lanka. Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh considers that it has a coincidence of interests with India but some segments of Bangladesh’s society and polity do not share that view.
For over three decades, India’s other neighbours have witnessed this country being unable to take decisive action to successfully combat Pakistani terrorism. That did not send a message of Indian strength. Again, during these decades, the Indian economy grew substantially but China outstripped India by a factor of six. That too sent out a message to the neighbourhood. These have to be countered.
Modi’s Balakot action of 2019 displayed a determination to use coercive elements of national power to counter terror. A red line was drawn. What is needed is that, quietly and subtly, a series of Indian security red lines have to be enunciated for the region while emphasising the Modi doctrine of “sabka saath, sabka vikas” and of non-interference in the neighbours’ internal affairs. And if the red lines are breached, forceful action will necessarily have to be undertaken.
The writer is a former diplomat.