Opinion Differently realistic

We must also acknowledge a generational change. For most young Indians,Pakistan is probably the most foreign of nations in a cognitive sense: it is more abstract than any other country. While Pakistani culture is accessible,there is little nostalgia or yearning for a form of cultural engagement that is outside of the prosaic practicalities of politics or economics. In a way,this could be an advantage. For the next generation may not frame the problem in terms of deep civilisational issues or a sense of longing that is deeply and emotionally tied to coming to terms with the Other. They may be liberated to acknowledge that this engagement must rest on practicalities,unburdened by the fatality of deep historical memory or identity. In a sense,the challenge is not to make Pakistan special,either as an object of yearning or fear. The challenge is to normalise it. This is why sentimentalism is so out of place. The language of love often has its corollary in betrayal. Instead we need something more realistic.But realism has its own limitations. Realism presumes that countries will act on their interests,when they will palpably not. The potential gains from development and trade for both countries are pretty compelling,but they have almost no emotive force to move countries to act. Second,realism is often impotent when a country is marked by layers of psychological resistance. Pakistan has deeply internalised a narrative of victimhood. It holds India responsible for its vivisection and by implication for impugning the basis of its nationhood. It sees itself being used by the West to fight its own dirty wars. The legitimacy of these feelings is beside the point. The point is that demonstrative affection or an appeal to interest is not an effective antidote against victimhood. Cutting through it requires psychological engagement of a different order,one we have not even begun to find the right language for.

But the challenge this poses is that we will have to be imaginative about sending signals of reassurance. In hindsight,one of India’s biggest political mistakes was this. It cut Bhutto slack after 1971 and did not force a decisive settlement,but it failed to translate this into a political signal of Indian intention. Any negotiation has the unenviable task of balancing two objectives: not reinforcing the persecution complex that is at the source of this violence; at the same time,not letting Pakistan off the hook on terror. What instruments can achieve this is not clear. Perhaps the Musharraf-Manmohan framework or some imaginative regional compact on Afghanistan can do it. But negotiating on this psychological terrain will require a sophistication that goes beyond simple-minded notions of what constitutes victory.

Realism runs up against the internal contradictions of Pakistan. Pakistan has elements of an establishment committed to a low cost bleeding strategy against India. Exercising any other option would actually undermine their whole raison d’etre. Interests of power holders and interests of the people almost never coincide,especially in societies undergoing stress. The realistic option threatens the very legitimacy of powerful groups. This is an issue only Pakistan can sort out,and the primary driver will remain Pakistan’s internal political economy.

Fourth,the involvement of outside powers in Pakistan has distorted all realist equations. These powers have and continue to feed the very same military establishment that is the source of the problem for Pakistan. They have tilted the domestic balance in favour of militarisation. They have kept the illusion alive that they can be used by Pakistan to put pressure on India,as a price for Pakistan doing their bidding. If talks are to make any progress,all external powers involved in the region will have to send an unequivocal message to Pakistan that they will not feed its persecution complex vis-à-vis India. The extent to which external powers are ready to give Pakistan this message is not clear. The logic of interest will not work unless the interests of external powers change.

Finally,Pakistan is a state in structural crisis. The issue is not simply the challenge from its western borders. The issue is more complicated. There is a story often told of Japanese Kamikaze pilots who continued on suicide missions long after the war was over,because they did not know what else to do. Pakistan has a large number of refugees from the Afghan war. And the numerous assets it built up over the years as a strategic bulwark cannot be assimilated anywhere easily. The sheer proliferation of arms and armed groups in the region makes it very likely that those with an investment in violence will continue to have a toehold.

India-Pakistan negotiations will be a high wire act. There is no shortage of action items that every Track II dialogue comes up with. But those items encounter psychological resistance,because we are not dealing with a state where a normal calculus of interests prevails. Genuine realism will require taking some political risks,and the political establishments on both sides need to understand that.

The writer is president,Centre for Policy Research,Delhi

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