Opinion Christophe Jaffrelot writes: What the Indo-French relationship needs

Military deals dominate ties between the two nations. Other partnerships such as the International Solar Alliance have not acquired adequate momentum

In 2021, the 19th edition of Varuna — the joint naval exercise of the two countries — included for the first time the French aircraft carrier “Le Clémenceau” and the year before, joint patrols were conducted in La Réunion for the first time, thanks to the agreements that were signed during the 2018 visit of President Macron.

Christophe Jaffrelot

July 14, 2023 10:42 AM IST First published on: Jul 13, 2023 at 07:05 AM IST

Unlike Indo-German relations, which are dominated by trade-related matters with key roles for private companies, the ties between India and France are dominated by security objectives in which non-state actors are marginal players. Official narratives do emphasise structural affinities such as democratic like-mindedness, but what matters more are common, security-related interests.

First, both countries are keen to balance China in the Indian Ocean, a region where France is a resident power (with more than one million citizens). It owns a 2.7 sq million km Special Economic Zone in the Ocean. A significant sub-text of President Emmanuel Macron’s first Indo-Pacific speech at the Garden Island naval base in Sydney, on May 2, 2018, was resisting Chinese expansionism. India is equally worried about the growing influence of China in its neighbourhood. Its Quad partners matter a lot to India, but France’s military presence in the Indian Ocean is also significant, as is evident from the role of the French Armed Forces in the Southwest Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) in La Réunion and Mayotte. France has a force of around 2,000 in the South Indian Ocean Zone and its troops number around 1,450 in Djibouti.

In 2018, the partnership between New Delhi and Paris found expression in a Joint Strategic Vision of Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region and a logistic support agreement. These agreements gave the two countries access to each other’s military facilities. While France and India did conduct joint manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean (and sometimes beyond) in 1983, these exercises have gained momentum in recent years. In 2021, the 19th edition of Varuna — the joint naval exercise of the two countries — included for the first time the French aircraft carrier “Le Clémenceau” and the year before, joint patrols were conducted in La Réunion for the first time, thanks to the agreements that were signed during the 2018 visit of President Macron. This meant that for the first time, India was conducting Coordinated Patrols (CORPAT) with a country which did not belong to its neighbourhood — a clear indication of the level of trust in France.

Besides the convergence of the Indo-Pacific strategies of India and France, for years, big contracts have played a major role in consolidating the relations between the two countries. France has helped India to expand its pool of arms suppliers beyond Russia and the US, especially because the latter has imposed sanctions on New Delhi in the past. After the 1974 nuclear test, Washington stopped supplying enriched uranium to the US-built nuclear plant of Tarapur. France then took over from the US. The first Indo-French military deal, resulting in the sale of 40 Mirages, took place in this context. In the late 1970s-early 1980s, India decided to diversify its military equipment which was overwhelmingly coming from the USSR by turning to France, not to the US. The fact that France believed in strategic autonomy and therefore, had affinities with the Indian version of Non-Alignment played a role in the expansion of ties between the two countries.

Indo-French ties do go beyond arms sales. Nuclear cooperation — especially after the Tarapur episode — is a major part of the relationship between the two countries, especially after the signing of the official strategic partnership during the 1998 Indian visit of French President Jacques Chirac. The visit was marked by a major upgrading of Franco-Indian nuclear cooperation. France helped India in separating civil nuclear energy from the military use of the atom. France had been in India’s place when it developed its indigenous civil nuclear energy sector: It had not signed the NPT, and India was keen to learn from its experience. France did not impose sanctions on India after its May 1998 nuclear test — in stark contrast to the US, Japan and other European countries.

Military cooperation has continued to play an important role in Indo-French relations. The 2005 Scorpene contract included six submarines and major technology transfers. India purchased 36 aircraft as part of the Rafale deal in 2016. Can both countries build something more ambitious on the security trope? The International Solar Alliance initiated by the then French President Hollande and PM Modi before the Paris 2015 COP21 is a good model, but it needs to gain momentum. India and France could also conceive other forms of minilateralism and foster multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. France is a part of three regional networks — the Indian Ocean Commission, since 1986, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium since its creation in 2008 and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (created in 1995) since 2020. At the same, trilateral forums are also being forged. The France/India/Australia dialogue, for instance. It was interrupted for a couple of years after the making of AUKUS. Another minilateral has been forged between France, India and the UAE.

The writer is senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, and professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s India Institute, London