Opinion China benefits from being on the sidelines of the Iran-Israel war. Here’s why

China’s response to the crisis has been swift and unequivocal in its condemnation of Israel and, more implicitly, the United States. On June 14, the Chinese envoy to the UN decried Israel’s attacks as a violation of “Iran’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. President Xi Jinping, in a June 19 statement, warned that further escalation would bring “greater losses”, urging an immediate ceasefire. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China helped put together a condemnation of Israel’s strikes, a move that drew a refusal from India, an SCO member adopting a differentiated view towards Israel. These statements, stronger than Beijing’s response to last fall’s Iran-Israel clashes, signal an escalation of rhetorical stance.

Yet, for all its verbal firepower, China has offered little material aid — no weapons, no troops. This gap between rhetoric and action has frustrated some in Tehran, where analysts like Andrea Ghiselli note that Iran craves “concrete help, like anti-aircraft systems or fighter jets.” Western observers, too, have seized on China’s inaction, framing it as evidence of Beijing’s limited clout in the Middle East. They argue that China’s absence underscores the widening gap between its great power aspirations and its inability to shape fast-moving crises. Such critiques, however, miss the point: China’s restraint is not a weakness, but a deliberate choice, rooted in a strategic discipline that has allowed it to outgrow its major rival for decades.

Beijing’s approach reflects a fundamental disillusionment with military intervention as leverage, a lesson drawn from the USSR’s collapse and America’s quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq. Oriana Skylar Mastro, a former Pentagon strategist, sees the US’s renewed entanglement as a blunder, diverting attention from the Asia-Pacific and depleting US resources without clear strategic gains.

The war in Afghanistan, which cost the equivalent of 10 Belt and Road Initiatives, stands as a cautionary tale for Beijing. Why, then, would China replicate America’s mistakes by diving into the Iranian quagmire? Instead, Beijing has chosen to support Iran through non-military means: Purchasing a large portion of Iran’s oil, brokering the 2023 Iran-Saudi reconciliation, and signing a 25-year cooperation agreement in 2021. These efforts have kept Iran afloat amid US sanctions, proving more impactful than any military adventure.

For sure, China’s economic stakes in the region are immense. Half of its oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and its investments span Iran’s energy sector and Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure. A wider conflict could disrupt these flows, threatening China’s core economic interests. Yet, Beijing’s diversified energy ties give it flexibility. Analysts from Fitch Ratings suggest that even a total loss of Iranian oil exports could be offset by spare capacity from OPEC-plus producers. Meanwhile, China’s push for energy independence, with renewables now accounting for 56 per cent of its power plant capacity, reduces its long-term vulnerability to geostrategic crisis.

Western media and policy circles, eager to paint Iran as China’s Achilles’ heel, have exaggerated the extent and depth of China’s partnership with Iran, branding the relationship as an “Axis of Upheaval”. They advocate for expanded US sanctions on Chinese refineries and banks involved in Iranian oil purchases, hoping to force China into a corner: Either double down on Iran and alienate Arab partners or abandon Tehran and lose face.

But China has deftly avoided this trap. Its non-confrontational approach allows it to “hedge its bets”, maintaining ties across rivalries. By condemning Israel’s actions without committing resources, China preserves much of its economic leverage and diplomatic credibility in the region.

The conflict even presents China with unexpected opportunities. Iran’s outdated air defences, exposed by Israel’s dominance, could open new markets for Chinese defence technology. Pakistan’s recent accord, using Chinese J-10C fighter jets and air defence systems, has piqued interest in Tehran, which may revisit arms deals with Beijing for the first time since 2005. Such sales would bolster China’s defence industry without requiring direct involvement in the conflict — a low-risk, high-reward prospect.

China’s strategic restraint extends beyond Iran. Its non-interference policy, applied consistently in conflicts like Russia-Ukraine and India-Pakistan, reflects a broader aversion to foreign entanglements. Even as Western critics decry China’s “rhetorical but not material” support, Beijing sees no contradiction. This stance frustrates those who expect China’s behaviour to mirror America’s interventionist model, yet it aligns with China’s long-term goal: To develop without the burdens of global policing.

For Beijing, the conflict could be a distraction that serves its interests. After all, a contained Middle East war keeps the US preoccupied, easing pressure in the Indo-Pacific. China, therefore, benefits from America’s overextension. The US pivot to Asia, perpetually delayed by crises elsewhere, largely remains a pipedream. By staying on the sidelines, China avoids the fate of the USSR, whose global military overextension led to economic collapse.

Many anti-West enthusiasts from the global south may clamour for Beijing to take a more active role, but their expectations align uncomfortably with the Western hawks’ desire to “drag” China into the conflict. Such a move would undermine the very strategy — economic focus, diplomatic agility, and military restraint — that has fuelled China’s rise. Beijing’s loud condemnations and quiet pragmatism are not signs of indecision but of confidence in a winning formula. As the US burns through resources and goodwill, China watches, calculates, and waits, secure in the knowledge that restraint is its greatest asset.

In the end, China’s approach to the Iran-Israel-US episode is neither altruistic nor timid. It is strategic patience, designed to maximise benefits while minimising risk.

The writer is among China’s new generation of India watchers