Opinion Expanded BRICS – Delhi must look out for geopolitical agenda with Chinese characteristics

The Chinese statement characterises the interaction as a “candid and in-depth exchange of views”, while we have suggested it was an informal conversation. There is also divergence on what transpired during the interaction: Our briefing indicates that the two leaders agreed to “direct their relevant officials to intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation”, while the Chinese statement suggests that the two sides should “bear in mind the overall interests of their bilateral relations and handle properly the border issue so as to jointly safeguard peace and tranquillity in the border region”.

This discordance is emblematic of the present state of India-China relations and their different positions on border-related issues. It should not discourage us from keeping communication channels open with China, including at the highest level, without investing them with undue hope or optimism.

The initiative for the expansion of BRICS came from China, with the support of South Africa and Russia; media reports suggest that India and Brazil were initially less than enthusiastic. The Johannesburg Declaration refers to “consensus” being reached on “the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures of the BRICS expansion process”, details of which have not been made public so far.

While India has good relations with all six new members, the ability of China, the largest economy and most influential country in the grouping, to drive the agenda and future direction of BRICS should not be underestimated. It is sobering to recall that China has been the key player in most of the milestones in the evolution of BRICS since its inception in 2006: The first expansion in 2010 with the inclusion of South Africa; the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2015 with its headquarters at Shanghai, even though the idea of a BRICS bank was proposed by India; the setting up of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2015 with China as the largest contributor ($41 billion as against $18 billion contributed by India); Xi mooting the “BRICS Plus” arrangement at the Xiamen Summit in 2017; and now the enlargement of the grouping with more members to come.

Looking ahead, India will have to guard against BRICS emerging as an anti-West grouping and as an instrument in China’s power play. In his remarks at the 14th and 15th summit meetings of BRICS, Xi launched into barely veiled attacks on the US-led West. At the 14th summit on June 23, 2022, he referred to “dark clouds of Cold War mentality and power politics”, with “some countries” attempting “to expand military alliances to seek absolute security, stoke bloc-based confrontation by coercing other countries into picking sides, and pursue unilateral dominance at the expense of others’ rights and interests”. He deployed similar language at the Johannesburg Summit.

The rapid expansion of members also introduces new contradictions. Apart from the profound differences between India and China, we now have tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia which are deep-rooted despite limited rapprochement. There are also fault lines between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Besides, many of the members do not pass the test of economic vibrancy, a consideration that shaped the launch of the original BRIC platform of countries, which were expected to emerge as the dominant players in the global economy. Now the Chinese economy is slowing down and some others, including Russia, Iran, Argentina and Brazil, are going through periods of difficulty in varying degrees. Lacking internal coherence and with sluggish economies of several member countries, an expanded BRICS may just end up being more unwieldy and contentious, unless steps are taken to prevent it from becoming more political and strategic.

India’s agenda should be to encourage the economic and developmental priorities of the grouping and use it to articulate the concerns and aspirations of the Global South and promote its engagement with the latter. We must be wary of projects like the BRICS currency (a not-starter) or de-dollarisation. Alternative payment mechanisms can be explored but that can be done under bilateral arrangements. Given our problems with China and its proclivity for weaponising economic interdependence, it does not serve our interest to promote a larger role for the Chinese Yuan in global trade or as a reserve currency.

India will have to devise a careful strategy to ensure that the grouping is not dominated by China to advance its strategic agenda. This is feasible because all decisions are taken in BRICS on the basis of consensus and there is a lack of appetite among other member-countries, except for Russia and Iran, to take sides in the Sino-US rivalry. India will have to engage the grouping proactively and not shy away from wielding its veto in decision-making and exposing China’s hypocrisy on issues like the expansion of the UN Security Council, which figures in the Johannesburg Declaration. The West, too, must introspect as to why it is losing the Global South and the reasons behind 40-odd countries seeking to join a grouping that has, at best, limited achievements to its credit.

Finally, India should continue to not let its bilateral differences with China come in the way of its engagement with platforms like BRICS and SCO where China is playing an increasingly central role. Indeed, there is a good case for stepped-up involvement while recognising the limitations of these groupings and the need for countering Chinese dominance.

The writer is a former Ambassador to China