BRICS 2.0: Addition of new members will make more room for dialogue

At Johannesburg, BRICS increased its membership to represent a larger share of world population, global GDP and international trade. This was initially driven by China with the backing of Russia and South Africa. But once India and Brazil accepted the principle of expansion, the choice of six new members was based on consensus. The accommodation was important, given that at least 23 countries of the Global South had conveyed interest in seeking BRICS membership. This was a recognition of the grouping’s value, notwithstanding the negative view taken by the West.

Two questions need answers. First, is the expansion good for BRICS? Its leaders think so. The new BRICS-XI will have more political clout, but the extent of its increased influence will depend on building inner unity. Second, why were these six countries chosen? Argentina was brought in to expand Latin American representation. Egypt, given its excellent ties with China and India, was a natural choice. Ethiopia was a surprise, the result of a compromise between the claims of Nigeria and Kenya. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and the UAE will help in recapitalisation of the New Development Bank, enhancing its capacity to finance development projects. Iran’s entry reaffirms its strategic location as a bridge between West, Central and South Asia. BRICS 2.0 will also have six of the top 10 oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, UAE, Brazil, and Iran — a definite global power shift and one not defined by the West.

At Johannesburg, the leaders decided to direct the foreign ministers to “further develop the BRICS partner country model”. In line for admission are Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Nigeria, Kenya, and a Latin American country. The immediate rebalancing focus is UNSC membership for the original BRICS members — India, Brazil, and South Africa — articulated in Paragraph 7 of the Johannesburg Declaration. This requires the support of the permanent members, China and Russia, or it will further expose their doublespeak on this issue.

The question of a common BRICS currency also dominated the pre-summit headlines, despite the BRICS itself not seeking to create it. Instead, paragraph 44 of the joint statement makes clear that the grouping will encourage local currencies in trade and financial transactions “between BRICS as well as their trading partners” and for “fast, inexpensive, transparent, safe and inclusive payment systems.” Should it contribute to de-dollarisation, the outcome may not be unwelcome to a large segment of the international community.

Both UNSC membership and local currency trade are welcome to India. Two other possibilities discussed are favourable too. First, it was reiterated that G20 is the premier multilateral forum for “international economic and financial cooperation”. China and Russia conveyed their support for the successful hosting of successive G20 presidencies by India, Brazil, and South Africa. This generates hope that these two states may become a little more conciliatory, and a consensus-based Delhi Declaration is delivered at the G20 summit in September.

Second, the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the summit’s side lines, may offer fresh impetus for expediting a workable resolution of the border issues in the western sector of Ladakh. After Covid, Galwan, and Ukraine, BRICS faces a changed world in which its two members — Russia and China — are heavily involved in confrontation with the US-led West. The other BRICS members do have differences with the existing global order, but they prefer reform through dialogue. As the six new members join BRICS, these inner dynamics will evolve further. India will have a seminal but challenging role, given its growing cooperation with the West on the one hand and its active articulation and pursuit of the interests of the Global South on the other.

The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House, and a former High Commissioner to South Africa