Opinion Why army inquiry on torture in Kashmir is welcome — and why it isn’t enough
The truth that innumerable army commanders have repeated over the decades is that the J&K conflict, like most other such conflicts including in Manipur, is politically rooted and requires a political solution
Rajnath Singh met families of victims last December. (ANI/File) 
The army’s inquiry into alleged torture by Rashtriya Rifles troops of 13 civilians in Poonch-Rajouri, three of whom lost their lives, has reportedly found that there is substance to the allegations. Given that the troops were caught on video beating the victims last December, it is difficult to see what else the committee could have said. Nevertheless, the report is welcome: Doubly so in the face of a growing cloud of impunity that many in the army themselves were concerned about.
The question is whether and what actions will be taken. Most Kashmiris remember the sorry saga of Macchil, in which troops convicted of extra-judicial killing spent a mere three years in prison because an army tribunal then ruled that the chain of evidence was incomplete. An assurance by the Home and Defence Ministers that the Macchil travesty will not be repeated would be helpful, but with the Prime Minister and most of his cabinet deep in electioneering, it is unlikely. Yet, the allegations of torture are not only deeply disturbing, they point to fault lines that have long existed in India’s treatment of internal conflict.
Kashmir, from Manmohan to Modi
During the 1990s insurgency, torture by security and special forces was widespread in Jammu and Kashmir, as it had been in Punjab in the 1980s and periodically in states of Northeast India such as Manipur. Once the insurgencies died down, torture became relatively rare. But it was never eradicated, despite routine reminders of standard operating procedures.
During PM Manmohan Singh’s tenure, an effort was made to withdraw the army from internal security duties, transferring them first to the CRPF and then to the J&K police. Implementation of the policy proved to be more difficult than anticipated since the Valley police had been transformed into an intelligence-gathering rather than a community police force during the insurgency. The only change was that complaints of human rights abuses were levelled against the police rather than the army. While the shift of blame offered some relief to the Union administration, it did not lead to lasting security reform.
The Modi administration that succeeded Singh not only returned to a policy of cover-up for security wrongdoing, it valorised such actions as using civilians as human shields. Who can forget Major Leetul Gogoi, who tied a young Kashmiri to the bonnet of an army jeep ferrying election officers as a human shield against stone-throwers, and was given a commendation?
It is in this context that the inquiry committee’s report is so welcome. But does it represent a shift in the Modi administration’s security policy? According to Home Minister Amit Shah, the Modi administration intends to withdraw the army from internal security duties in J&K, as Singh had done. The army is currently training local police to take over, Shah said in March, adding that while the local police were “not trusted” earlier (a reference to his own party’s attitude), it was now. Whether his statement can be seen as more than a flyer in election season remains to be tested.
A more draconian police?
A closer reading indicates that the Modi administration’s policy is significantly different from the Singh administration’s policy.
While the latter aimed to transform the J&K police into a community force, the former aims to train local police for counterterrorism. In other words, another 1,000 or so security personnel will now have the right to use draconian methods against civilians, since counterterrorism laws allow significantly greater latitude to security forces than other criminal laws do.
Read in tandem with the newly enacted penal and criminal procedure codes, the policy can only arouse foreboding. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (Indian Penal Code), scheduled to come into force this July, includes an expansive definition of terrorism, in addition to that already provided by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and stipulates that no commutation for good behaviour will be allowed for those sentenced to life imprisonment. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (Indian Civil Defence Code) provides that any person can be arrested on mere suspicion and any policeman can register an FIR even for acts committed in places outside his jurisdiction. The scope for misuse is large.
The larger implication of these measures is that the Modi administration will continue to see J&K primarily through a security lens, should it be elected for a third term. Security was earlier cited as a reason for delaying the return of statehood and elections to J&K. Though the Supreme Court accepted the argument without probing it on the issue of statehood, it ordered that assembly elections must be held before end-September 2024. If they are, the newly elected assembly will find that attempts to restore civilian rule of law have been preemptively hobbled by the Modi administration’s emphasis on counterterrorism. According to the J&K police website, there are already 35 armed police battalions in the UT, 24 belonging to the Indian Reserve Police and 11 to the JK Armed Police. Another 1,000 personnel is surely overkill.
Why J&K security needs elections
The truth that innumerable army commanders have repeated over the decades is that the J&K conflict, like most other such conflicts including in Manipur, is politically rooted and requires a political solution.
At a time when our land borders are turning volatile under Chinese provocation, the one thing that India cannot afford is to have its troops stretched thin. Using young people to plug the gap through the Agniveer programme is not a solution. It compounds the problem, given that they lack the depth of training required; the more seasoned troops have the added stress of compensating for raw recruits. Any reform that seeks to return the army to its primary task of defending the borders is more than welcome. But armed police will only intensify the internal problem in J&K. Let such a decision be left to the state’s elected leadership — when elections are finally held. They are, after all, answerable to their voters. No one else is.
Kumar is the author of Paradise at War: A Political History of Jammu and Kashmir
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