Opinion A history of forgetting

Let’s start with the historical questions. The received wisdom explains failure against China through Nehru’s naïve idealism: the Panchsheel and the slogan “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” are held up as prime examples. The extracts from G.P.’s diary are interesting precisely because they record Nehru’s disavowal of both these attitudes in March 1958. What’s more,Nehru held that the Chinese were “arrogant,devious,hypocritical and thoroughly unreliable.” This only confirms what we know from several other sources.

A persistent myth about Nehru’s China policy is that Vallabhbhai Patel recognised the threat from China whilst Nehru was complacent. Patel’s note to Nehru in late 1950,warning of the need to secure frontier areas,is widely quoted. But Nehru’s response to this,in a note to his cabinet colleagues,is surprisingly ignored. Here Nehru agreed that there were “certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory.” This led to the appointment of a committee under the deputy defence minister,M.S. Himmatsinhji,to recommend measures to strengthen India’s hold on the frontiers with China. It also led to the Indian decision to oust the Tibetans and take full control of Tawang in February 1951.

Nehru harboured no illusions about China’s goodwill. Speaking to a delegation that was visiting China in 1952,he noted: “We must not let China have the upper hand. Else,we start on the slippery path.” Writing to the Indian ambassador in Burma immediately after the Panchsheel agreement of 1954 was signed,Nehru observed: “In the final analysis,no country has any deep faith in the policies of another country,more especially in regard to a country which tends to expand.”

Nehru’s comments to G.P. in 1958 were expressed during a noticeable cooling in relations. Beijing’s denunciation of Yugoslavia’s ideological stance was seen by Nehru as indicative of its willingness to breach the Panchsheel principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. He instructed the foreign secretary to be “particularly careful in the future in what we say and do in regard to China.” China’s reluctance to allow Nehru to visit Lhasa was another issue during this period. Visiting Bhutan in September 1958,he drew the King’s attention to the revival of Chinese expansionism under cover of communism.

Then why did he fail to anticipate the war? At least since 1950,Nehru believed that the threat was of infiltration and attempts to grab bits of territory,and not a large-scale military attack. He discounted this possibility owing to international factors: an attack on India would carry the risk of great power intervention. Moreover,Nehru was quick to discern the emerging split between the USSR and China. He believed that Moscow was keen to avoid alienating a non-aligned India,and hence would restrain China. Neither of these assumptions was off-beam until the summer of 1962. Thereafter Nehru failed to keep up with the evolving situation.

The question is why these assumptions proved so tenacious. There is ample evidence that these were held not just by Nehru but by most of his top advisors. Explanations based on group psychology seem too facile.

To get a more nuanced understanding,we will need access to official records.

This brings us to our approach to the history of the recent past. Most historians still prefer to work on the colonial and earlier periods. Consequently,myths and poorly-informed narratives of foreign policy have gone unchallenged and have congealed into conventional wisdom. The absence of historical sources is an untenable argument. This article has drawn on material available for nearly three decades now,especially the magnificent work of Sarvepalli Gopal. So long as the historical profession refuses to take contemporary history seriously,it will be difficult to overturn erroneous but entrenched wisdom.

Then again,the government’s policy on declassification is a major hurdle. There are signs of change,but a lot more needs to be done. There is no reason to refrain from declassifying any historical material that pertains to ongoing conflicts. Countries such as Israel that confront persistent conflicts do follow the 30-year rule. More damagingly for India,even China has started allowing access to its records on the run-up to 1962: future historians will rely largely on the Chinese material.

Unless we have informed debates on the past,we can neither understand the present nor prepare for the future. In the short term,there may be partisan attacks on historical figures; but eventually important,substantive issues will occupy the foreground. And then we will realise,as did

the historian Jacob Burckhardt,that the point of history is not to make us clever for the next time but wise for ever.

Raghavan is the author of ‘War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years’

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