Why Rumsfeld has to go

The retired generals seeking his resignation are men with more than 30 yrs in service who swore after Vietnam not to quietly acquiesce again in 8216;8216;half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons8217;8217;

The calls by a growing number of recently retired generals for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have created the most serious public confrontation between the military and an administration since President Harry S Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur in 1951. In that epic drama, Truman was unquestionably correct8212;MacArthur, the commanding general in Korea and a towering World War II hero, publicly challenged Truman8217;s authority and had to be removed. But this situation is different.

First, it is clear that the retired generals8212;six so far8212;surely are speaking for many of their former colleagues, friends and subordinates who are still inside. In the tight world of senior active and retired generals, there is constant private dialogue. Retired Marine Lt Gen Greg Newbold, who was director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the planning period for the war in Iraq, made this clear in an extraordinary, at times emotional, article in Time magazine this past week when he said he was writing 8216;8216;with the encouragement of some still in positions of military leadership8217;8217;.

These generals are not newly minted doves or covert Democrats. In fact, one of the main reasons this public explosion did not happen earlier was probably concern by the generals that they would seem to be taking sides in domestic politics. They are career men, each with more than 30 years in service, who swore after Vietnam that, as Colin Powell wrote in his memoirs, 8216;8216;when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons8217;8217;.

Yet, as Newbold admits, it happened again. In the public comments of the retired generals, one can hear a faint sense of guilt that, having been taught as young officers that the Vietnam-era generals failed to stand up to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Johnson, they did the same thing.

Second, it is also clear that the target is not just Rumsfeld. Newbold hints at this; others are more explicit in private. But the only two people in the government higher than the Secretary of Defense are the President and Vice President. They cannot be fired, of course, and the unspoken military code normally precludes direct public attacks on the commander in chief when troops are under fire.

This has put President Bush in a hellish position at a time when security in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to be deteriorating. If Bush yields to the generals8217; revolt, he will appear to have caved in to pressure. But if he keeps Rumsfeld, he risks more resignations8212;perhaps soon8212;from generals who heed Newbold8217;s call that they should now speak out on behalf of the troops in harm8217;s way and to save the institution that he feels is in danger of falling back into the disarray of the post-Vietnam era.

In the end, the case for changing the Secretary of Defense seems to me to be overwhelming. Put simply, the failed strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be fixed as long as Rumsfeld remains at the epicentre of the chain of command.

Holbrooke is a former US ambassador to the UN

Richard Holbrooke