The subtitle of Alan Beatties book promises surprises. He keeps his word in the very first paragraph,which invites the reader to recall September 11th,2001. Everyone remembers,dont they,that days terrorist attacks on the superpower,Argentina? Not so many remember the umpteenth collapse of the American economy a few months before.
Of course,says Mr Beattie,in reality it was the other way around. But,he argues,it need not have been. For much of the 19th century the two countries had similar potential,not least in an abundance of empty,fertile land to be taken over by European immigrants. At the end of it Argentinas economy,relative to its population,was a little bigger than Frances and much bigger than Italys. That America became the superpower and Argentina the basket-case was not preordained.
This provides the opening example of the books thesis,explored in thematic chapters ranging from urbanisation to natural resources. To explain why countries have ended up rich or poor requires a close look at the detail. Time and again,the answer lies not in luck,nature,the strictures of this or that religion,or the plots of perfidious foreigners,but largely in the choices of rulers and ruled.
Too often,for example,natural resources turn out to be a curse rather than a blessing. They create few jobs for locals; the profits go to foreign multinationals; what riches stay in the country end up in politicians bank accounts abroad. Yet that need not be. Mr Beattie contrasts how much more cannily Botswana has managed its diamond wealth compared with Sierra Leones wretched squanderings.
Turning to religion,Mr Beattie asks: Why dont Islamic countries get rich? Ah,he replies,some of them do. Islam is often held up as inimical to economic progress. That is nonsense,he says. The Muslim Hausa have provided some of Nigerias most successful traders for centuries. Had Max Weber lived among the Hausa,Mr Beattie sniffs,he might well have concluded that Muslims were good for growth and constructed his convoluted psychological theories around the tenets of Islam. The author picks his way through religious texts,history and modern commercial practice to argue that there is no reason to draw a firm causal connection between any faith and economic progress.
Mr Beattie,the world-trade editor of the Financial Times,writes with passion and a keen wit. He draws freely on secondary sources,especially when delving into history,but also relies on his own reporting experience to point out traps for policymakers and commentators alike. Why have African countries not moved up from harvesting cocoa,say,to producing higher-value chocolate products? Not because of nasty European tariffs,he notes former colonies can send their wares to Europe tariff-free but because of a lack of finance and expertise,and poor logistics.
In a shortish book on a vast subject,Mr Beatties thematic structure makes sense. In a chronological or regional treatment,short would surely mean superficial. Here,unusual examples can stand out,such as Egypts transition from ancient exporter to modern importer of food. The tales of the erstwhile political power of the English woollen industry are also fun.
He does,however,try a little too hard to be surprising at times. Transferring the September 11th attacks to Argentina is one example; a digression on pandas is another. Claiming that if America does not sort out the flaws in its financial system it could turn out like Argentina looks like a stretch. This,and the inevitable hopping from country to country or century to century,give the book an untidy air in places. But Mr Beattie pulls together enough evidence to make his conclusion,borrowed from Shakespeare,hard to deny: Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie/Which we ascribe to heaven.
The Economist Newspaper Limited 2009