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The other problem,that of deficiencies in defence planning,is equally serious and unfortunately rarely debated in the public domain. What is known is that five-year defence plans have almost never been finalised in time. The sixth and the seventh plans were approved after a delay of two and three years,respectively. The eighth and ninth were never formally approved. The tenth could not be finalised and the eleventh is yet to be approved. Planning involves making difficult choices between costs,time and performance. When plans are not finalised those choices have not been made.  

It can,of course be argued that modernisation can take place even without approved plans. However,rigorous planning based on a realistic assessment of financial resources,rational choices made well in advance,along with pre-feasibility studies and preparatory work,can minimise ad-hocism and accelerate acquisition decisions,ensuring greater value for money spent.

As part of the post-Kargil reforms a defence acquisition organisation was set up,and procurement procedures were streamlined and further revised in 2006 and 2008. But delays and shortfalls continue to persist. What then needs to be done? 

First,the formulation of performance specifications or qualitative requirements of defence equipment need to be overhauled. They are now prepared by services staff that lack the necessary specialisation. These specifications are equipment- rather than capability-centric and often based on vendors marketing literature. They discourage competition and lead to single-vendor situations,making price negotiations a meaningless exercise. The CAGs 2007 report on Armys acquisition mentions that in 50 per cent of the procurement cases checked,specifications were changed after the issuance of tenders.  

Another area involving unacceptable delays is that of technical and trial evaluations. Expressing concern about delays,the standing committee on defence in its

2005-2006 report recommended time-bound completion of

trials. The time taken can be reduced by better scheduling and synchronising of events.  

In most advanced countries,defence acquisition structures are fully integrated organisations,with highly specialised staff. Their mandate covers every aspect of acquisition,from womb to tomb from conceptualisation of equipment and formulation of specifications to acquisition and maintenance support. India can learn many useful lessons from international best practices. The CAGs 2007 report recommends that an integrated defence acquisition organisation should be constituted by incorporating all the functional elements and specialisation involved in defence acquisition under one head. This structure should be staffed by a specialised cadre of acquisition managers intensively trained in different areas of acquisition project management,contract negotiation,contract management and exposure to professional procurement. Acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems can no longer be effectively managed by generalists,whether from the civil services or the armed forces. 

And finally,organisational and procedural reforms are unlikely to work unless acquisition managers are confident that they would not face undue harassment for bona fide decisions. The unfortunate controversies associated with most big-ticket defence purchases have made officials highly risk-averse. It seems safer not to

decide,especially when a large contract is involved. A national consensus that matters of defence will not be politicised on partisan considerations is vital for defence modernisation.  

The writer,formerly a secretary in ministries of Defence and Finance,is currently Director-General of IDSA

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