Warning of Pak action ignored

KARGIL/SRINAGAR, JUNE 1: Even as charges are bandied about of an intelligence failure by the Army on Kargil, facts are emerging that poin...

KARGIL/SRINAGAR, JUNE 1: Even as charges are bandied about of an intelligence failure by the Army on Kargil, facts are emerging that point to laxity in anticipation and surveillance as well. They show that there were enough warning signs the Army should have heeded, but did not.

At a press conference on January 11, then Officiating Commander of the 15 Corps, Maj Gen A S Sihota, warned of a 8220;limited8221; Pakistani action to attract international attention to Kashmir. 8220;You can8217;t rule out the possibility of Pakistan trying to capture our posts along the LoC,8221; Maj Gen Sihota had said at the time. Words that couldn8217;t have been more prophetic.

Another discrepancy in the official line is the fact that the BSF continues to maintain posts above 18,000 feet in the 200-km stretch of territory characterised by the Army as unheld by both sides.

At Chhannigund-Drass, the 8 BSF maintained a post through the winter at a height of 18,000 feet while at Chorbatla, east of Batalik, the 8 BSF has sat through the winter at a height of 18,500 feet. Both these areas are relatively free of infiltration.

And then in March, for the first time in the 10-year history of counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir, the Army used helicopter gunships. The gunships were used to strafe Vajr Hill and Mala Post Hills in Kupwara in an exercise conducted under the direct control of Army HQ in New Delhi.

Army officers had said at the time that the gunships would be pressed into service in a conventional warfare scenario involving an escalation of conflict with Pakistan. 8220;In case the Pakistani Army tried to infiltrate into Kashmir like the three bids it made in the early 1990s, the gunships could be used to target them. Gunships also could provide support to the advance of ground troops,8221; a senior Army officer had said.

Despite all these indicators of anticipating an incursion, the Army chose to categorise the 200-km stretch from Gurrez to Turtuk as inhospitable and unheld by both sides and so safe to withdraw from in winter and lower guard.

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Army officers privately admit that the forces did not take into account one critical factor. 8220;This year the snows were less and melted three weeks earlier. But the forces under the 121 Brigade resumed patrolling on the previous years snow-thaw pattern without realising passes were clearing much ahead of schedule,8221; a senior officer said.

The 15 Corps8217; official explanation on the unprecedented incursion till now has been to deny any surveillance failure by ground patrols, Army helicopters and IAF recce aircraft. However, on May 29, the GOC-in-C Northern Command, Lt Gen H M Khanna for the first time admitted before a packed press conference that 8220;there was a certain amount of surveillance failure.8221;