Use contempt penalty sparingly: SC

The petition by Supreme Court Bar Association challenged a court decision punishing Mishra by debarring him from practice through suspension of his licence for three years. The bench, comprising Justice S C Aggarwal, Justice G N Ray, Justice A S Anand, Justice S P Bharucha andJustice S Rajendra Babu, also held that the contempt power of the apex judiciary cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process contained in the Advocates8217; Act 1961 by suspending his licence to practice in a summary manner while dealing with a case of contempt of court.

Mishra was found guilty in 1995 of committing criminal contempt of court for having interfered with and 8220;obstructing the course of justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening language8221;.

The question which the Supreme Court was called upon to decide in the petition by the SCBA was whether the punishment for established contempt of court committed by an advocate can include debarring him from practice by suspending his licence for a specified period, in exercise of its powers under article 129 read with 142 of the constitution.

The court said suspension of an advocate from practice and his removal from the state roll of advocates were both punishmentsspecifically provided for under the advocates act for proved 8220;professional misconduct8221;.

While exercising its contempt jurisdiction the only cause before this court was regarding commission of contempt as there was no cause of professional misconduct, pending before the court.

The judges said there was no doubt that contempt power of the court was an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and was free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operated as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent 8220;clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice8221;. 8220;However article 142 even with its width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly8221;, the judges said.

The court held that punishing a contemner advocate while dealing with a contempt of court case by suspending his licence, a power otherwise statutorily availableonly to the Bar Council, was therefore, not permissible in exercise of jurisdiction under article 142.

The judges hastened to add that this should not mean that the SC was a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. It was indeed well-recognised and established that this court had always been a law maker travelling beyond mere dispute settling.

The court said since the jurisdiction to grant licence to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vests exclusively in the bar council of the state, the jurisdiction to suspend his licence for a specified term or to revoke it also vests in the same body though under the advocates act the apex court was the final appellate authority.

The court said inquiry initiated by the bar council in a case of professional misconduct of an advocate was a detailed and elaborate one and not of a summary nature as contempt proceedings and, therefore, it was not permissible for this court to punish an advocate for professional misconduct in exercise of itsappellate jurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body exercising original jurisdiction.