Unbound by the rules

Clear understanding is needed on the deliberations in the Nuclear Suppliers Group...

Clear understanding is needed on the deliberations in the Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG on August21-22 on granting India a waiver from guidelines which prohibit all nuclear commerce with countries which are not members of the Nonproliferation Treaty NPT and with non-nuclear weapon nations which are not under full scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA. India is not a signatory of the NPT and the safeguards agreement approved by the IAEA on August 1 recognises that India has a military nuclear programme which will not come under safeguards.

India has not approached the NSG for the waiver. The United States, the founder of the NSG earlier called London Suppliers Club,backed by other co-founders Russia, France, UK and Germany is now recommending the waiver. The irony is the London Club was established in 1975 by US, USSR, UK, France, Germany, Japan and Canada as a response to India8217;s 1974 nuclear test. At that stage the aim was to prevent nuclear proliferation by countries obtaining dual use nuclear technology and diverting it to weapon development. 34 years have passed since that nuclear test. It is logical to review the situation today.

Currently, only four countries are outside the NPT 8212; Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and India. Israel had developed its arsenal since 1967 even before the NPT was drafted and has no interest in civil nuclear commerce. North Korea was a member of the NPT, but withdrew and conducted a nuclear test. After negotiations with China, US, Russia, Japan and South Korea, it has agreed to give up is nuclear arsenal and return to the NPT. That leaves only two countries outside the NPT 8212; India and Pakistan which have nuclear weapons and are interested in nuclear commerce.

The NSG founders have come round to the view that incorporating India into the nonproliferation regime, though not into the nonproliferation treaty is to the advantage of the nonproliferation objective and in international interest. They cannot include India as a weapon state in the NPT as that would require amendment to the treaty. The nuclear weapon powers dare not touch the NPT as that might lead to its unravelling .India8217;s reasons for going nuclear are now well understood. Though India conducted its nuclear test in 1974 and it was called a peaceful nuclear explosion,it did not go for weaponisation till 1989. Meanwhile Pakistan developed an India-specific nuclear arsenal with Chinese assistance. At that time China was neither in the NPT nor in the NSG.

The NSG during the Eighties did not pay attention to nuclear proliferation through uranium enrichment using centrifuge method. The Zangger list of technologies and equipment to be prohibited for export did not include items related to uranium enrichment but concentrated on plutonium production and reprocessing. Pakistan benefited from this grave lapse and most of its technology and equipment came from the NSG countries of Western Europe. It was only after Iraq8217;s clandestine nuclear programme was uncovered in 1991 the uranium enrichment technology and equipment came under export ban list. It may also be noted the Pakistani proliferation to North Korea, Iran and Libya were all uranium enrichment technology.

In the view of US and other co-founders of NSG, India is a country with advanced nuclear technology which has now been admitted into the international thermo-nuclear research project. India is developing fast-breeder technology and is also doing research on conversion of thorium into uranium 233 for use in reactors. India has designed its own reactors. India has an impeccable record on non-proliferation over the last 34 years and has now legislated export controls regarding dual use technologies in harmony with NSG requirements. It has displayed remarkable restraint in its doctrinal position by adopting a no first use strategy and in the build up of its arsenal, though placed between two nuclear weapon powers with an ongoing proliferation relationship between them and one of which has declared its arsenal as India specific.

The founders of the NSG therefore feel that India is an eminently suitable case to be brought within the nonproliferation regime by being extended a waiver. This brings in India8217;s additional reactors under the IAEA safeguards, makes India a stake holder in the non-proliferation regime and provides India one more source of clean energy. India8217;s fast growth will lead to vast expansion of energy generation and providing India nuclear energy option will contribute to reduce carbon emission by India. These are all in global interests.

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The NSG is not a statutory body like the IAEA. While its decisions are recorded in IAEA they are implemented by each member according to its own national laws. The NSG consensus is largely influenced by the major powers who are the primary sources of nuclear technology. Therefore there are limits to the extent nonproliferation devotees can press their points of view against the wishes and interests of major powers. The role of the NSG is becoming increasingly consultative.

What is at stake in the NSG meeting is the prestige of the major nuclear powers who are in favour of incorporating India in the mainstream non-proliferation regime. Waiver for India will not create any inconvenient precedent because there is only one other nuclear weapon country with a civil nuclear programme 8212; Pakistan. But its proliferation history cannot be compared to India8217;s nonproliferation record nor can it be classified as a country with advanced nuclear technology. Therefore the Indian case will have to be considered a unique one and there are no proliferation consequences involved in this waiver.

The writer is a senior defence analyst

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