Truth won146;t bring House down

Terror and nuke deal will exercise MPs. Best govt defence: share information

Two foreign policy challenges are likely to dominate the Parliament8217;s monsoon session starting today. In the wake of the Mumbai blasts, the government8217;s response to terrorism, and its stand on a possible Pakistani complicity in the matter, is likely to come under immense scrutiny. The controversy generated by Jaswant Singh8217;s modest revelations about the Kandahar hijacking, will ensure that the government and the Opposition will trade charges and counter-charges, each accusing India of being soft. The Indo-US nuclear deal, and the riders introduced by the Congress, will also be debated, with the principal derogatory word at stake being 8216;sell-out8217;. But the government would, for once, do itself a great favour, if it did not fall into the trap, arguing like the defendant in an old joke. A man, accused of hitting another man responded in court thus. 8220;My Lord, the charge against me is totally baseless for three reasons. First, I was out of the country the day the incident occurred. Second, the blow had to have been struck by a right-handed person and my right arm does not work. And third, he started the fight.8221; Instead of taking recourse to any argument that scores a point, the government would do well to put its case as forthrightly and clearly as possible.

Take the issue of terrorism for instance: the Prime Minister initially indicated Pakistan8217;s complicity in the matter, but now insinuation of Pakistan8217;s guilt is more muted. The Americans have asked for clearer evidence in this matter. Is or is not Pakistan complicit in the Mumbai bombings? What is the real and credible evidence of Pakistan8217;s complicity? While governments routinely make reference to this evidence, and it has allegedly been shared with both Pakistan and the Americans at various points, the government would enhance its credibility a great deal if it could least give a forthright account of this evidence to the Indian public and in a manner that it could be subjected to some independent scrutiny.

Admittedly governments cannot reveal everything, but it is high time that there was greater public clarity on Pakistan8217;s complicity. Otherwise, it appears, as it does now, that accusations against Pakistan are simply a rhetorical trope we switch on and off when convenient. The government faces a crisis of credibility, not because it was unable to prevent incidents like those in Mumbai, but because it is unable to clearly communicate a single story and stick to it. Its softness is reflected, less in its inaction, than in its confusion about the underlying causes.

Greater public clarity on the nature and causes of terrorism is hampered by many things. We have had few public trials that can focus on the underlying causes; most of our assessments of terrorism are intelligence based. We need to evolve mechanisms that can, in the first instance, hold intelligence information to wider political accountability; and second, mechanisms to communicate the emerging and credible storylines more effectively to the public. It is difficult to get any clarity and unity of purpose against terrorism, if the underlying stories emanating from government itself reflect the disarray of Babel more than underlying consistency. The government would do itself a favour if it at least got its own arguments straight. And we would be able to relate ends and means better.

A similar weakness underlies the way in which the Indo-US nuclear deal has been argued for in India. The discussion has been hampered by the fact that the government has been unwilling to articulate clearly what India8217;s nuclear doctrine is. It seems to want to argue two propositions simultaneously. First, that the deal imposes absolutely no restrictions on our weapons capabilities. Second, that whatever restrictions it imposes are compatible with our having a credible minimum deterrent. It would be easier to argue for the deal if the government clearly spelled out what our nuclear doctrine is, what our objectives are. The two claims are in internal tension.

This tension is compounded by the fact that there is still no decisive and clear articulation of our indigenous capabilities. There is a sniping war between government and scientists on very basic issues: how successful were 1998 tests and how trustworthy is our arsenal? Assessments of our three stage nuclear programme range from parts of the government thinking its objectives are eminently achievable and parts of the government thinking the whole programme is junk. What is the rigorous costing scenario for nuclear energy? How scientifically sound and economically effective is our breeder programme? The more one follows the debate on the nuclear issue, the more one thing becomes clear: the real danger stems not from what the US might hoodwink us into, but from our own deep un clarity about our objectives or indigenous capabilities. What would an actual economic and technological audit of the Indian programme reveal?

In the absence of a clear articulation of objectives it is difficult to calibrate means to ends. What we think of testing restrictions depends upon an assessment of the soundness of our arsenal. What we think of the restrictions the deal imposes depends upon our assessment of indigenous alternatives available to us. If our own progress is as bad as some claim it is, the deal looks very different. It would serve the cause of the deal and the nation better, if in instead of this information trickling in leaks, the government was forthright about what it knows.

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Governments are instinctively economical with the truth; they reveal something only as and when necessary. But the casualty of this approach is the lack of clarity, the threat of debilitating inconsistency in the arguments you use, and the room for speculation and doubting of motives every bit of information provides. If the government wants to learn a lesson from the foreign policy debates, it is this: draw the big picture as clearly as you can, fill it with credible facts and evidence, and have confidence that the Indian public can handle the truth. Otherwise be prepared to oscillate between vicious innuendo and pious homilies.

It is up to the government now to ensure that in the upcoming parliament session, these two issues of vital importance are debated with the greatest clarity and evidentiary force. Otherwise its critics, whether on the nuclear deal or our attitude to Pakistan, will be right to suspect that the emperor has no clothes.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi