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Journalism of Courage
As friends, they part
July 1987, Prabhakaran comes to New Delhi, Rajiv brokers a deal
When Indian officials handed over a copy of the India-Sri Lanka accord to Prabhakaran on the morning of July 25, Puri first read out the various clauses, which were translated to Tamil by his aide A.S. Balasingham. This took about 75 minutes, after which Prabhakaran sought time to discuss the agreement with his colleagues. The Indian officials went back into his room around noon with an air of expectancy, only to be told categorically that the agreement was completely unacceptable.
The Indians were taken aback. Prabhakran raised a string of objections. Sri Lanka had not recognised Tamils as a distinct nationality; it did not reserve the north-eastern region to the Tamils 8230; making it obligatory for the LTTE and other Tamil groups to put down their weapons within 72 hours of the pact being signed was unrealistic 8230;
Rajiv Gandhi pressed Indian officials to make Prabhakaran relent. 8216;8216;He is obstinate but he is a key player,8217;8217; Gandhi told an aide. 8216;8216;If he accepts the accord,
he will become the chief minister of northeastern Sri Lanka. He must then move on.8217;8217;
Rajiv Gandhi was to travel to Colombo on July 29 to sign the agreement, but the Tiger leader stuck to his objections. Hectic efforts got under way again to change his mind 8230;
Dixit told Prabhakaran the pact would be signed, even if he did not accept it. When Prabhakaran refused to budge, Dixit reportedly said accusingly: 8216;8216;You have deceived us India four times.8217;8217; Prabhakaran snapped: 8216;8216;That means we have saved our people four times.8217;8217; The air was tense 8230;
When an Indian Tamil MP, V. Gopalasamy, sympathetic to the LTTE cause, telephoned Prabhakaran, the Tiger chief sounded dismal. 8216;8216;I feel like committing suicide,8217;8217; he lamented. 8216;8216;We have been betrayed by the government of India, by Rajiv Gandhi.8217;8217; 8230;
Finally, late on the night of July 28, Prabhakaran agreed to meet Rajiv Gandhi at his office 8230; Gandhi was at his disarming best. He told Prabhakaran that he had the best interests of the Tamils in his heart and was trying to extract from Sri Lanka what he felt was a good deal for the community.
Prabhakaran brought up the monetary problems he would face if the LTTE called off its tax regime in Jaffna. Without hesitating, Gandhi agreed to make good the loss. The LTTE chief said his cadres also needed to be rehabilitated if they were to stop fighting. He needed money for that too 8230; Gandhi told Prabhakaran that the LTTE8217;s interests would be kept in mind. He promised the LTTE a lion8217;s share in the proposed administration in the northeastern province of Sri Lanka.
Prabhakran insisted that the ERPLF, a group he hated, should have no say in the affairs of the Tamil region. Gandhi nodded. Prabhakaran decided, albeit belatedly to give the India-Sri Lanka accord 8212; and by extension peace 8212; a chance.
Gandhi was very happy. He immediately ordered a celebratory dinner. As Prabhakaran was leaving, Gandhi called his son Rahul and asked him to fetch his Gandhi8217;s bulletproof jacket. He put the jacket on Prabhakaran8217;s back and remarked with his usual charming smile: 8216;8216;Take care of yourself.8217;8217;
Not everyone was upbeat though. Gandhi8217;s foreign minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, urged caution. Rao wanted the agreement to be signed by Sri Lanka and the Tigers, and not by New Delhi and Colombo. Another Indian minister felt Prabhakaran could not be trusted. He had a suggestion: Why not hold Prabhakaran in India till the LTTE surrendered its weapons? Gandhi rejected the idea. 8216;8216;Prabhakaran has given his word,8217;8217; he said. 8216;8216;I trust him.8217;8217;
Soon, general. Soon
Back in Jaffna, Prabhakaran spies on the Indian army. Waiting to strike
The LTTE leader was nowhere around when the Tigers put down a small quantity of mostly obsolete weapons before Indian troops at an air force basee. The weapons given up included mortar shells, AK-47s, German-made G-3 rifles, RPGs, .303 rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. Some of the weapons had been seized by Indian authorities from other Tamil militant groups in Tamil Nadu in November 1986 and quietly passed on to the LTTE. A day earlier the LTTE had collected revolvers and pistols from all local commanders of Jaffna. None of those was seen at the surrender ceremony.
The LTTE announced a few days later that the Tigers had no intention of giving up all its weaponry. When journalists confronted Prabhakaran, he made no effort to deny it. 8216;8216;Yes, we made that statement,8217;8217; he said, sounding betrayed. 8216;8216;It is better to fight and die than surrender the weapons in an insecure environment and die on a mass scale.8217;8217;
Indian policy makers were confused. Some thought he was probably hoping that Sri Lanka would ditch the accord and a frustrated India would come out in support of a Tamil homeland. Others felt he was stuck to the path of Eelam and whatever he had told the Indian premier in New Delhi was obviously a tactical move to return to Jaffna.
Prabhakaran seemed to convince himself that the India-Sri Lanka pact was aimed at mainly subjugating the Tamil Eelam campaign to the larger geopolitics of New Delhi 8230; Speaking to an Indian journalist he said: 8216;8216;Having fought so much, having sacrificed so many lives and having lost 20,000 people, all this has been subordinated to India8217;s strategic interests.8217;8217;
Like a tuning fork, the LTTE chief emitted different notes at different times. This confused those who followed his every speech and move. Turning to his poet friend Kasi Anandan, he said, 8216;8216;Our boys know only how to shoot, not to speak. Teach them how to speak. Give them training in PR.8217;8217; He also told Andaman that LTTE would build Jaffna with the money promised by India. 8216;8216;We can use this opportunity to take our struggle forward.8217;8217; 8230;
Understandably, most Sri Lankans were not happy about the presence of Indian troops in their country. Prabhakaran shared the anti-India feeling, albeit for different reasons. His grouse was that Indian troops were lording over what had been his fiefdom.
As India went ahead with plans to set up an interim administration in Sri Lanka8217;s northeast, with members drawn from all Tamil groups, Prabhakaran became uneasy. There was also a suggestion to set up an advisory body that would be made up of leading Sinhalese and Tamils to oversee the administration. Feeling shortchanged, Prabhakaran complained that the Indian premier had promised LTTE a dominant say in the affairs of the Tamil northeast 8230;
Although there was a lot of goodwill between LTTE guerrillas and Indian military officers, Prabhakaran kept a distance from the Indians, meeting top officers only when a meeting was sought. Much later, Indian officers would allege that many LTTE members who called on them were actually studying Indian military hardware and communication sets. The LTTE itself played by different rules. When a Tamil-speaking officer of the Indian military intelligence wanted to spend a night with LTTE cadres, the request was politely turned down 8230;
Prabhakaran continued to give interviews criticising the India-Sri Lanka accord but insisted he didn8217;t want take on India. He was still reluctant to surrender arms. When Lt General Depinder Singh asked him about it, his answer was: 8216;8216;We are collecting the weapons and will hand them over soon.8217;8217; The 8216;8216;soon8217;8217; never came.
Brother Premadasa
Sri Lanka gets a new president. And Prabhakaran an unlikely ally
J.R. Jayewardene declined to contest for another term. The presidential campaign boiled down to a fight between two candidates, both of whom promised, much to New Delhi8217;s dismay, to send the Indian army packing if they won. The winner was Ranasinghe Premadasa 8230;
The president started courting EROS, which he knew was close to the LTTE. He also informed India that he wanted an early departure of the Indian troops. In April 1989, Sri Lanka announced a weeklong ceasefire throughout the country and invited the LTTE and the leftwing JVP for negotiations with Colombo. The JVP rejected the appeal. In what turned out to be a momentous decision by Prabhakaran, the LTTE sought a specific and direct invitation.
India was disconcerted. Even as LTTE was killing Indian troops, Premadasa was extending a hand of friendship to Prabhakaran, the man who had refused to accept the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
Balasingham flew to Colombo from London and called on Premadasa. Later, he flew to Mullaitivu in a Sri Lankan air force helicopter to meet Prabhakaran. Balasingham returned to Colombo with an LTTE delegation 8230; It was a historic turnaround for Prabhakaran. Despite still being committed to a Tamil homeland, Prabhakaran had made a move that would effectively checkmate New Delhi.
When LTTE supporters asked if it was wise to patch up with a Sinhalese regime, Prabhakaran argued it was a tactical move, akin to the friendship Mao forged with Chiang Kai-shek to drive the Japanese army out of China.
There was another reason why Prabhakaran needed Premadasa8217;s help. The Indian military and RAW had set up a proxy Tamil armed force called the Tamil National Army TNA. If this was allowed to take root, it could prove a serious stumbling block in the LTTE8217;s scheme of things.
LTTE negotiators called upon Premadasa to publicly demand withdrawal of the Indian army from Sri Lanka. He did precisely that on June 1, giving New Delhi a terse deadline of July 31, 1989. India was furious. Rajiv Gandhi refused to take back the troops unless the Tamil community was given its due in line with the 1987 accord. Premadasa thundered that it was his prerogative 8230;
Prabhakaran exploited Premadasa8217;s anger with New Delhi to pull off another coup. Balasingham informed the president8217;s emissaries that the Indian army was viciously attacking Base One Four Prabhakaran8217;s HQ in a desperate bid to have Prabhakaran killed. Indians were forming their proxy TNA. The Tigers were woefully running short of weapons. So could Colombo provide the Tigers arms and ammunition?
Premadasa pondered and then pandered to the bizarre request. He pleaded with the LTTE not to make it public because Sri Lankan military would not be happy. The decision soon became an open secret as military and intelligence machinery had to be used to transfer weapons from army bases in the northeast 8230;
The large quantity of military weapons handed over to the LTTE by the Premadasa regime included T-56 and M-16 rifles, mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, grenades besides several thousand rounds of ammunition. Once Premadasa agreed to the initial request, like a reluctant father to his prodigal son, Prabhakaran pressed for more and more, taking on the role of a patriotic Sri Lankan determined to drive away invading Indians.
The LTTE sought Colombo8217;s help to import equipment from Singapore and demanded concertina wire, batteries, cement, concrete and even handcuffs. All request were approved and acted upon. It was during this period the LTTE, without Colombo8217;s knowledge, quietly laid a network of agents and sleepers who would one day wreak havoc in Sri Lanka.
Dictator of Eelam
In the land of the Tigers, discipline is supreme. Pregnancy means death
The LTTE, the Indian military learnt, was a thoroughly well knit group that documented every single death of its members meticulously, starting from 1982. The only exceptions were the rare suicide attacks that the LTTE, for reasons of its own, did not want to claim.
When a member signed up, he or she was photographed and asked to take an oath of allegiance to Prabhakaran. The guerrillas8217; performance was constantly monitored. The LTTE maintained a dossier on every member, much like the confidential files maintained by governments on civil servants, with details of the member8217;s family background 8230;
The guerrillas had to strictly adhere to the rules of the LTTE. Prabhakaran hated homosexuality. Smoking, Liquor and sex were forbidden, although deviations by some were overlooked. The cadres were allowed to get mail from their families but letters were censored. They were occasionally allowed to visit their families if it involved no risk to them or to the LTTE.
From 1984 it was made compulsory for every cadre to carry a cyanide phial and bite it without hesitation if there was even a slight chance of capture.
Weapons were sacred to LTTE cadres. If a guerrilla lost his weapon, he would never be armed again. If he fired accidentally, his rifle would be taken away and he had to work in the kitchen for a day or two. If freak firing resulted in injuries to someone, the errant guerrilla would be confined to the camp for days or put on prolonged kitchen duty.
Even in the thick of the jungles, the LTTE enforced a strict training regimen. Besides physical drill and weapons training, cadres roughed it out in forests infested with snakes and wild beasts. Shortly after moving to Mullaitivu, Prabhakaran acquired three leopard cubs as pets. Some daredevil cadres dangled snakes around their necks.
Prabhakaran remained paranoid about security 8230; Once while leaving Base One Four in a jeep, he saw one of his sentries dozing. On his return, he got out of the jeep before entering the camp and told the driver to proceed. The sentry, still half groggy, took a cursory look at the jeep and, assuming his chief was inside, made a note in the diary. The sentry was sacked.
One day Prabhakaran noticed a woman guerrilla in the second layer of security with an unusual bulge in her stomach. As she could not explain what she was suffering from, the woman was sent to Tamil Nadu. The medical report stunned the Tiger chief8212;the young woman was pregnant. Prabhakaran was furious. Her partner, who was quickly traced, was from the first layer of security. He admitted to having sex with the woman one night when they were supposed to be on duty. Prabhakaran refused all pleas for mercy. Both were executed.
His fetish for cleanliness continued even in the forests of Mullaitiva, where flies were a major nuisance. Prabhakaran did not like pesticides, instead he asked young cadres to swat them. There was even a competition to see who swatted the most number of flies. Some killed as many as 1,000. Prabhakaran told a visitor that the flyswatting contests gave him immense entertainment. He also grew flowers in the camp and around training areas.
