The elephant and the dragon

China has exuded cautious optimism prior to the visit, and an official statement notes: 8220;We will make joint efforts to find a fair and rational settlement that is acceptable to both countries.8221; However, on current evidence a major breakthrough seems unlikely. This assertion stems from two reasons. The scars and humiliation of 1962 remain embedded in the collective Indian consciousness and for their own reasons, both India and China have linked national sovereignty to their respective interpretations of territoriality in a hypersensitive and inflexible manner. Consequently, the national discourses in both countries lack the malleability to revisit their tangled colonial past without being trapped by its emotive contours. And India has already conceded what China has sought on Tibet and Taiwan.

This visit, however, is expected to lead to a major political declaration, including promotion of 8216;strategic cooperative partnership8217;, though competition and mistrust is abiding in the security domain. Sino-Indian bilateral trade that was a meagre US 260 million in 1990 has increased almost a hundred-fold to 25 billion by 2006, and the target of 40 billion is in sight. It is another matter that India8217;s exports are still primary commodities in the main and the need to balance the quality of goods is an imperative.

But the relationship remains deeply asymmetrical and contradictory in China8217;s favour. China8217;s GDP is thrice that of India, and the gap will increase progressively till at least 2025. Beijing8217;s defence expenditure officially pegged at US 45 billion is almost twice what Delhi allocates, though most China-watchers place the Chinese figure closer to 60 billion. In every aspect of critical trans-border military capability barring the naval, China looms much larger. The January 2007 successful anti-satellite missile test by the PLA sent out a strong signal about the texture of China8217;s military modernisation drive. India remains several notches behind China in composite strategic trans-border military capability, which includes nuclear weapons, missiles, satellites and the ability to move sizeable troops. China8217;s growing politico-military influence in the South Asian region and the contrast with India adds to the asymmetry. Furthermore, Beijing8217;s reticence to support the India-US nuclear agreement heightens Delhi8217;s discomfiture.

India8217;s relative subaltern status leads to many deep, and not invalid, anxieties about China8217;s intent, and this is further exacerbated by the trajectory of the Beijing-Islamabad relationship. Since the 1971 war for Bangladesh, Beijing has cultivated Pakistan as a fetter to contain India and abetted the covert Pakistani quest for nuclear weapons. North Korea was part of the loop and Beijing midwived this transaction.

Beijing8217;s deeper intent at the time was to encourage WMD proliferation knowing that this was enabling the Pak military to intensify its terrorism campaign against India. Since Kargil of May 1999 and the enormity of 9/11, there appears to be a tentative rethink of China8217;s proliferation policies 8212; for, both North Korea and Pakistan detract from Beijing8217;s aspiration to be a responsible global power.

Thus a review of the bilateral relationship would suggest that China had adopted a strategy wherein its own interests were being advanced by either stoking or aggravating India8217;s anxieties. This may have been tactically successful 8212; but only to a limited extent 8212; as the current turbulence in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan and the global concern about religious radicalism and non-state actors acquiring WMD indicate. The big shift that would restore abiding trust in the brittle Sino-Indian bilateral lies in the ability of the current Chinese leadership to minimise if not remove the anti-India orientation in its policies and nurture their common aspirations and interests.

India will not attain equivalence with China in the near future on any determinant that should cause concern for Beijing 8212; but it is in the latter8217;s objective interest to arrive at equitable mutuality in the relationship. The alternative is a testy bilateral relationship between the two Asian giants, which will detract from China8217;s 8216;peaceful8217; rise to global power status. The elephant and the dragon do not share a similar DNA but can contribute to a balanced eco-system that is differently described as multi-polarity and the Asian century.

The writer is a security analyst cudaybgmail.com