Swadeshi Jehad?

Although the assembly attack provided the Government of India the moral high ground and a much needed diplomatic tool, it was the December 12 Jaish attack on the Parliament that actually shifted the balance. and brought the sub-continent at the brink of conflagration.

Sensing the unease across the globe and a possible Indian strike round the corner, Musharraf immediately disowned jehadis and talked not only of a crackdown on these outfits but also measures to prevent Pakistani soil from being used to wage terrorist attacks. This gained him international appreciation, but in real terms, Musharraf could do little to rein in the militants.

THE reason for this lies deep in Pakistan’s history of handling Kashmiri militancy. Kashmir’s militancy had seen three major phases till September 11 changed the world. It began as a pro-independent Kashmir militancy. Though the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front introduced the gun in Kashmir and Pakistan provided them training, arms and even money, the movement banked on Kashmiri nationalism to win its aim: Independence.

Pakistan’s help for the Kashmiri separatists was exposed soon after the JKLF-launched militant campaign received massive street support in Kashmir. But soon after the Hizbul Mujahideen emerged as a military wing of Jamat-e-Islami, the JKLF fell out of Pak favour. This not only changed the aim of the movement but also its very ideology. From a political struggle, it became a religious movement.

In the mid-1990s, security agencies collected a band of surrendered militants to form the Ikhwan, an effective pro-government militia. In this temporary calm, the first foreign militant group emerged on the Kashmir centrestage. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen used its Afghan connection to sustain the violence in Kashmir. Harkat was, however, not allowed to be at the forefront of the Kashmir militancy. But its kidnapping of five foreigners and the murder of one put it on the terrorist list of the US State department, causing it to fall out of Pak favour. But the Harkat had done its bit: The Afghan war veterans kept the pressure on the security forces.

Meanwhile, in 1997, Pakistan introduced another jehadi outfit, the Lashkar-e-Toiba. This group was instrumental in changing the contours of Kashmir’s militancy. Lashkar introduced sensational suicide attacks on security installations and raised the levels of violence to alarming levels. Then came the hijack of an Indian Airlines aeroplane to Kandahar. The three men released in exchange for the crew and passengers of the aircraft included top Harkat commander Moulana Masood Azhar, who immediately launched a new outfit called Jaish-e-Mohammad. This new outfit announced its operations with a suicide bombing at the Corps headquarters in Srinagar. By the time the September 11 attacks took place, the Lashkar-Jaish duo had literally taken over the entire militant movement and also changed its aim. Kashmir was now one of the several battlefields for pan-Islamism.

Such is Pakistan’s investment in these jehadi outfits that even a sincere Musharraf would find it tough to control them. These groups have penetrated deep into the armed forces and even society at large; even a little pressure on them is interpreted as Musharraf’s betrayal of the Kashmir cause.

IF Musharraf keeps his promise and actually forces a fullstop on infiltration, the first fallout will be evident within a month. The message will demoralise active jehadis, which will make it extremely difficult for the groups to maintain their strength. The psychological fallout, too, will be decisive: Pakistan’s move to seal the LoC will be seen as a repetition of his U-turn on the Taliban. According to security agency sources, foreign militant groups will be contained within six months if Pakistan effectively stops infiltration.

Local militancy, especially the Hizbul Mujahideen, however, will not be impacted so drastically. The group has a massive network inside Kashmir, moreover, over the past 12 years, sources say, the group has been smuggling in large caches of weapons and ammunition. According to security sources, the group can sustain its campaign for almost five to six years.

The main worry for security agencies is the possibility of Hizbul providing local Kashmiri recruits to the jehadi groups and indigenising them. Hizbul supremo Syed Salahudin, however, has rejected any such possibility.

The security agencies believe that it will be easy to tackle the Hizbul if it controls the militant movement because — unlike jehadi groups who do not believe in negotiations — the outfit had once chosen to open a dialogue with New Delhi.

Although highly unlikely, if Musharraf manages to enforce his promise to stop infiltration, there will be a drastic decline in the levels of violence. The peace will be temporary, but it can pave the way for a permanent solution — the key to which lies in political effort.