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Journalism of Courage
One phase of the diplomatic moves by the major powers to defuse the current Indo-Pak tension has just ended.
Prime Minister Vajpayee8217;s discussions with world leaders at the Almaty conference has been preceded and followed by visits from the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
Western leaders led by President George W. Bush have started acknowledging Pakistan as a centre for terrorism, including admitting to the possibility of Al Qaeda cadres being active on the LoC.
They have, however, stopped short of acknowledging the direct link between the Musharraf government and terrorist activities on the subcontinent. Musharraf himself is the target of incremental terrorist attacks within Pakistan, as the recent bomb explosion outside the US consulate in Karachi shows.
It would be pertinent to assess how far the major powers may succeed in de-escalating Indo-Pakistan tensions and persuading the two countries to talk. India has withdrawn its warships from the Arabian Sea and allowed Pakistan8217;s aircraft the use of its air space. Pakistan has responded by withdrawing its warships.
It is, however, important to assess the more recent ingredients of Pakistan8217;s policies towards India to see if there is going to be any qualitative change in its policies, particularly in J038;K.
Realities on the ground have to be taken note of. Pakistan-sponsored terrorists have continued their infiltration, although at somewhat reduced levels. The massacre of the families of Indian army personnel at Kaluchak, the assassination of Lone and reports that about 2,000 to 3,000 cadres of the Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants on the other side of the LoC is being prepared for infiltration, clearly belie the assurances contained in Musharraf8217;s speeches in January and May.
The question is whether these positive interpretations of Musharraf8217;s policies are an emerging reality, or are they just cosmetic moves? Musharraf in his speech has reiterated that there will be no change in Pakistan8217;s support to the secessionist movements in J038;K. This means that India faces a complex predicament.
First, there is no clear shift in Pakistan8217;s India policies. Second, Musharraf8217;s credibility as a moderate leader committed to defusing of tension with India has increased in international perception. Third, India8217;s politico-military stance, which has achieved the desired objective to an extent, is now subject to the law of diminishing returns.
It is necessary, therefore, for India to appear reasonable without lowering its guard. It must examine its options to de-escalate military tensions in a gradual manner. It should agree to bilateral discussions with Pakistan at the sufficiently high official level within a defined time frame in the coming six to eight months.
It should continue its diplomatic campaign to sustain international pressure on Pakistan. At the same time, it should initiate substantive negotiations with leaders of all groups in J038;K to resolve the domestic dimensions of the Kashmir problem. Holding elections in J038;K as scheduled in September is very important.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the US and the Indian Parliament of December 13, international concern is now focused on South Asia, particularly on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. This has led to an incrementally activist role adopted by the US and other major powers in the subcontinent. Visits of senior leaders of foreign governments to Delhi since mid-December have not just been advisory exercises.
In objective terms, these exercises amount to third party intervention in Indo-Pak ties. This is just a statement of fact and not a value judgement.
The likelihood of international involvement, particularly that of the US and Russia, is to be expect for the reasons: First, whatever India8217;s convictions, the international community considers the problem of J038;K as a territorial dispute in which Pakistan has a stake.
Neither the accession of the state to India nor the issue of Pakistani aggression is a part of their perceptions. Second, despite the passage of more than 50 years, the dispute remains unresolved and it has sparked off major conflicts between India and Pakistan. Third, the anxiety about such conflicts has qualitatively increased in the international community because both India and Pakistan have become nuclear weapons states. Fourth, the phenomenon of cross-border terrorism and pan-Islamic militancy has become a matter of global concern and the view is that it flourishes because of disputes like that involving J038;K.
India must clearly understand, therefore, that there is every possibility of the US intervening in the subcontinent, not just politically but operationally if, according to its assessment, there is an impending nuclear confrontation. And it will have the support of the world8217;s nations in this.
At the same time, Musharraf8217;s inclination to support terrorist groups may be eroded because of international pressure, he will not be able to completely distance himself from them because his survival in power depends on not antagonising them beyond a point. The question is whether the political and diplomatic pressure being generated by important world powers on India and Pakistan, will defuse tensions and lead to a dialogue.
One can be cautiously optimistic about these two countries at least managing to de-escalate tensions between them. But this is entirely dependent on Musharraf preventing any major escalation of terrorist violence in J038;K in the coming months. USA and Russian diplomatic and political pressure should focus on this critical, even imperative, requirement otherwise the prospects are bound to affect peace and stability in the subcontinent.
