Serenading the Ulfa

There is a clear and present danger in the UPA government8217;s present policy with regard to the United Liberation Front of Assam Ulfa, that allows it to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. It makes for a confusion that, while greatly benefiting the Ulfa, blunts New Delhi8217;s will to decisively end a vicious insurgency that has always threatened large swathes of Assam.

The incident at Tinsukia forests, where an army operation against Ulfa cadres was called off, evidently because of political pressure, indicates how expensive this waffling on policy can be. In their anxiety to get the insurgents to the dialogue table 8212; provoked, some say, by the even greater anxiety to win Assam for the Congress in next year8217;s assembly election 8212; the UPA government has not done the country a favour. The move signalled a government that is soft on insurgency. Such 8220;favours8221; to militants have a way of boomeranging on the state. The comparison between the incident at Tinsukia, and the earlier one where Naxals were allowed to flee after police forces had closed in on them in Andhra Pradesh8217;s Nalamalla forests, is not inapposite. In the latter instance, the Naxals demonstrated their gratitude by mounting a brutal offensive against the state, which included the gunning down of Congress MLA M.C. Narsi Reddy and his son.

Over the years, the Ulfa has demonstrated an uncanny ability to ride over reversals and emerge with renewed ferocity. The optimism generated by the crackdown of the Bhutanese government on Ulfa hide-outs in its territory was quickly belied by incidents like the massacre of Bihari brick kiln workers in Assam. Today, with evidence that a dialogue between New Delhi and the Ulfa is in the offing, we need to understand the history and mutation of the Ulfa in this region; its years of drug dealing and gun running; the safe havens it negotiated for itself across the Assam border and the resilience of its terror machinery.