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Journalism of Courage
US President George Bush8217;s visit to India has been termed as historic. The US administration8217;s decision to make an exception to the NPT and change its domestic laws to accommodate India reflects a radical rethink in Washington. India has been recognised as a rising power and is now clearly the sixth pole in the global balance-of-power system, along with USA, the EU, Russia, Japan and China. Paradoxically though, along with this fundamental transformation, the curtains are being formally brought down on one of India8217;s most coveted strategic objectives. Delhi8217;s 8216;Monroe Doctrine8217;, as an analyst put it, has hinged on treating South Asia as its sphere of influence, while keeping other powers out of its backyard. This tenet has been gradually modified in recent years, but got a complete burial when Bush 8212; with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh by his side 8212; enunciated the US position vis-a-vis other parts of the region.
Will this, as critics of Indo-US bonhomie allege, curtail India8217;s strategic space by allowing Washington to dictate terms on the Sri Lankan peace process, the political deadlock in Nepal, or rising fundamentalism in Bangladesh? Or will the US hug make South Block even more arrogant in its dealings with its smaller neighbours, as many here fear?
It may seem paradoxical, but the new intimacy with the US has the potential of making India so secure about its increasing power, that it can allow itself to embark on a more enlightened regional policy. The clue to such an approach can be found in the Gujral Doctrine. That doctrine rested on the premise that India, as the biggest power in the region, must grant concessions to its smaller neighbours without expecting reciprocity at every step. But this bold policy did not go down well with myopic and insecure diplomats. Being a benevolent 8220;big brother8221; is not merely a 8220;romantic8221; notion, but one rooted in ground reality. Under I.K. Gujral8217;s tenure as prime minister, the Farakka dispute with Bangladesh was resolved and the trade and transit treaty with Nepal renegotiated. The goodwill towards India in Kathmandu and Dhaka, as evidenced during Gujral8217;s tenure, has remained unmatched. India8217;s new-found confidence must pave the way for such sensitivity to its neighbours, even if it has to be in a different form.
With Manmohan Singh at the helm, the economic thrust believed to be lacking in Gujral8217;s vision can be remedied as well. Of course, the specificities of every state will need to be borne in mind. For instance, the present Nepali regime is clearly an exception, and both morality and realpolitik would dictate that India not treat King
Gyanendra8217;s unconstitutional regime with any kindness.
While anti-Indian populism might have been the basis of a flawed nationalism in the past, or may have helped fetch a few extra votes in competitive politics, no government in the region can now afford to antagonise New Delhi, given its closer proximity with Washington. Even the radical Nepali Maobaadis have come to accept this reality. They have toned down their rhetoric on Indian 8220;expansionism8221; and are engaging with Delhi8217;s opinion makers. If smaller states believe that the active role of other international actors 8212; Norway and US in Sri Lanka, and the US and UK in Nepal 8212; gives them the space to play these countries against India, they could not be more mistaken. Similarly, China is not a possible countervailing force to India, as Gyanendra is gradually learning, with Beijing unwilling to engage in a war of words and endanger its process of rapprochement with India.
The route to Kathmandu, Colombo and Dhaka still lies through New Delhi. India8217;s involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process, or the frequent stop-overs that European and American diplomats dealing with Nepal make at New Delhi, only reaffirms India8217;s pre-eminence in the region.
So even as smaller states of South Asia need to wake up to India8217;s increasing power and operate within that reality, the greater responsibility of bridging ties lies with the Indian establishment. India must introspect about the intense distrust towards it among political classes in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and not merely dismiss it as a 8220;small country complex8221;. South Block8217;s newly acquired sense of security presents the right opportunity to turn the gaze closer home and be sensitive to concerns in the neighbourhood.
The writer is the assistant editor of 8216;Himal Southasian8217;
