Qawali from the fortress

But Pakistan cannot be compared to South Korea for several reasons. South Korea did not face the issues created by an ethnically heterogeneous population and its military was not a party to ethnic disharmony. Moreover, the country had a clear phase of authoritarianism (and economic development) followed by a sustained evolution towards democracy. Once the military accepted a set of rules, it abided by them and there was no effort to micromanage the political transition. In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf has the difficult task of overcoming the credibility gap created by the failure of phased transitions under his preceding military leaders.

Unlike South Korea, where the script for phased nation-building was being written on a clean sheet, Pakistan has to contend with over-writing the ideological and political baggage of the past. In South Korea, the military came first, followed by the Chaebols (business conglomerates) and both oversaw the evolution of political parties, an independent judiciary and a free press. The military did not interfere with the working of political parties once they had emerged and certainly did not fix elections. The military did not compromise the judiciary by seeking its stamp of approval for the Generals’ right to rule. All these factors made the phased evolution towards modern institutions of rule of law possible.

In Pakistan, the track record of military rule does not generate confidence. There will always be a strong pocket of resistance to Musharraf’s plans because of doubts over his intentions, emanating from the conduct of Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. The so-called optimists have a tough task in overcoming these doubts. The first group of so-called optimists about Musharraf can be described as the ‘‘economic growth with external help is the first step in Pakistan becoming another South Korea lobby’’.

The General has another corner of support from the segment of Pakistani society that can best be described as ‘‘cultural liberals’’. An example of this segment’s views can be found in novelist Mohsin Hamid’s article in The Smithsonian magazine, titled ‘‘Re-inventing Pakistan’’. The article begins with the words, ‘‘One night, as troops from Pakistan’s army massed 300 miles away to hunt for remnants of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, I went to a concert in my hometown of Lahore’’.

The cultural liberals see the progress of Pakistan through non-political eyes. Ayub Khan and Yahya were fine in their view because music and the arts were not interfered with. Zia-ul-Haq was bad because he intruded in the cultural aspects of liberty. Musharraf is good because basant can be celebrated with ease, music and dance and theatre are alive and the police does not stop and smell people’s breath for booze any more. But there is total disregard for what is happening politically in such analysis.

Cultural freedom is, of course, important but it is not equally accessible for all Pakistanis. Moreover, security and political freedom are more important in the long term for a society to move forward. Lahore must be contrasted, for example, with Karachi, where sectarian violence involving groups sponsored (or at least tolerated) in the past by Pakistan’s invisible government remains rife. The Jihadist groups continue to thrive, albeit selectively, and political liberals continue to be harassed throughout (and outside) the country.

Pakistan’s problem as seen by General Musharraf’s critics is that he is making no effort to build independent judicial or political institutions. The PML has been taken over by the GHQ in a manner similar to the ones adopted by Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, leading to a party being ‘‘in office’’ without a support base.

There is little move in the direction of rule of law. From the perspective of his critics, General Musharraf has simply reversed General Zia-ul-Haq’s strategy for political survival without making fundamental changes in Pakistan’s governance. General Zia projected himself as a pious man and secured the support of the ultra-religious segment of the Pakistani population. He maintained a semblance of good relations with India, with several rounds of talks without serious change in overall policy. Zia’s primary objective, however, was to consolidate personalised rule and the military’s dominance. He succeeded in both, leaving behind social anarchy and a political wasteland.

General Musharraf has decided to cultivate the culturally liberal end of society. Instead of Salat (prayer) committees he fosters basant committees. Just as religious conservatives praised Zia for encouraging religiosity and piety we have cultural liberals praising Musharraf’s tolerance and encouragement of the finer aspects of life. Like Zia, General Musharraf is presiding over economic growth spurred by substantive inflows of foreign assistance. But governance is, in the final analysis, about politics and issues such as inclusion versus exclusion, rule of law versus arbitrariness.

Musharraf’s final goal of retaining power for the military does not differ from Zia’s. His refusal to allow politics to take its own course and the constant meddling in political matters by security agencies is also similar. Just as Islam pasands (Islam lovers) under Zia failed to see his repression and the future problems emanating from his support of Jihadism, some Pakistani ‘‘optimists’’ appear to ignore Musharraf’s pursuit of manipulative politics aimed at keeping GHQ and ISI ascendant.

The ‘‘optimists’’ have a desire to project a ‘‘positive view of the country’’ reflecting a kind of misplaced patriotism. The truth is, one can find ‘‘achievements’’ and ‘‘positive developments’’ in all situations. What one must assess is the overall direction of State and society. I would be willing to transform into an ‘‘optimist’’ if I felt the State is seriously trying to take away power from the gangs it has armed in the past or if the rulers showed signs of submitting themselves to some established rules and norms. It would be a good sign if Pakistan’s Generals appeared willing to submit to judges, for example, or bureaucrats started responding to the common man.

The writer is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He served as adviser to Pakistani PMs Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka