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Journalism of Courage
With the war clouds on account of transborder terrorism getting thicker by the day, I am reminded of the Clausewitz8217;s quote, 8220;No one starts a war 8212; or no one in his senses ought to do 8212; without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it8221;.
India has been suffering and combating Pakistan8217;s 8216;policy of terror8217; and proxy war since the mid-1980s; first in Punjab and now in J038;K. This is not counting the training and material support, which it gave to Naga and Mizo rebels in East Pakistan in the sixties.
Since September 11, when Pakistan joined the global war against terrorism, it has been running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Pakistan8217;s military is unwilling to wind down the Jehadi organisations that have served its strategic interests in Afghanistan in the past and are continuing to do so against India.
The terrorist assault on Parliament on December 13, resulted in the deployment of armed forces of both countries on the Line of Control LoC and International Boundary IB. We were a few hours away from war in early January when the US managed to persuade the Indian government to wait for General Pervez Musharraf8217;s now famous address to his nation on January 12. The general then said that Pakistani territory including PoK will not be used for terrorism and terrorism will not be allowed in the name of Kashmir. That statement raised some hopes in India but not for long. In April, even before the snows had fully melted in J038;K, over 300 civilians and security personnel lost their lives due to terrorist acts. The heinous terrorist attack at Kaluchak on May 14 has triggered off events that are becoming difficult to control.
At the cost of repetition, I must state that a war with Pakistan should be preferably avoided. If necessary, it must be the very last option. We should exercise restraint and pursue all possible diplomatic and economic options. But here I must also quote the well-known US strategist, Admiral JC Wylie, who while outlining a general theory of war suggested four basic assumptions. The very first is, 8220;Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war8221;. So it would be prudent to prepare for it.
What kinds of war options are possible? Are we adequately prepared? Have we created the famous Clausewitzian 8216;trinity8217; 8212; competence of the military, support of the people and the will of the government 8212; to fight a successful war? The hard reality is that we cannot conduct an all-out conventional war against Pakistan due to nuclear weapons available in both countries and also the presence of US military forces on the Pakistani soil. The US may stop the Pakistani military from going near its nuclear arsenal and the buttons but with that it will also carry the responsibility of preventing any major war damage to Pakistan. In the current scenario, therefore, only limited war options 8212; limited in time, space, and force levels are possible. These limited military options can be:
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We cannot conduct an all-out conventional war against Pakistan due to nuclear weapons available in both countries and the presence
of US forces in Pakistan |
Increased artillery firing across the Line of Control to inflict more damage on the Pakistan side. To some extent, this is already taking place.
Carry out ground/ air strikes on known militants8217; camps across the LoC even though these camps can be easily shifted and re-established.
We may capture some posts/areas in PoK, close to the LoC, which facilitate infiltration of the Jehadis into India, notwithstanding the political implications of never having violated the LoC. Some people call that salami slicing or a Kargil in reverse.
Carry out air strikes on known militants8217; concentrations close to the LoC.
Capture an economically or strategically vital objective close to the border or the LoC, which will not evoke a Pakistani nuclear response.
All the above-mentioned options, except perhaps the last one, will send only a 8216;signal8217; to Pakistan. That would not amount to unacceptable costs, or be fully effective, to force it to give up its terror policy unless fully supported by the international pressure.
How long will India be able to sustain such operations? Do our people have the stomach for such a sustained action and have we prepared them for it? Can we retain a political consensus for a prolonged conflict when already there are political parties who do not even agree on military options? Is it possible to muster international support for such a long duration? According to Stephen Cohen, 8220;An inconclusive military strike will only alienate the international community and make it difficult to come to an eventual dialogue with Pakistan8221;. We have to consider and plan for these before we adopt a 8216;sustained8217; limited conflict strategy.
In a limited war, politico-diplomatic factors play a very important role. Controlling ascent of the 8216;escalatory ladder8217; by political and military leadership is important. A careful orchestration of military operations, diplomacy and domestic environment is essential. Under these circumstances, one cannot sufficiently emphasise on the need for selecting a 8216;political aim8217; that is politically and militarily achievable. This requires a great deal of discussion between the political leadership and the military brass. Since individual perceptions often vary, a consensual, rather than an imposed, political aim is necessary.
The media too has an important and responsible role. While it needs to be informative and deserves to be briefed properly by the government on a daily basis as we did during the Kargil war, the media should not become too 8216;intrusive8217;, ask leading questions on war planning or file unauthenticated stories.
Finally, we must not symbolically react with military at a national level to individual terrorist attack. If we need to react, it should be deliberate, diplomatically supportable and done at a time, place and in a manner of our choosing. Till then let us prepare as never before. Security policy making, as someone has said, is an exercise in understanding abiding national interests and threats to them. It is realism 8212; cold, calculated and crafty, and not a normative orientation to war, or emotional and hysterical provocation, which can be periodically switched on and off.
The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff
