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Journalism of Courage
Eyebrows were raised when Colin Powell recently announced that the United States had offered its 8220;good offices8221; to promote reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Powell also revealed that the Bush Administration had remained involved in defusing tensions, especially after the terrorist attack on India8217;s Parliament. This is no surprise to those who have discerned American fingerprints on every door across the India-Pakistan divide. An American role in deescalating tensions has been a fact of life for decades. When General Sundarji claimed that Pakistani forces were poised on our borders during Operation Brasstacks in January 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi obtained American satellite photographs that established that our army8217;s apprehensions were not entirely well founded.
The American role in defusing tensions in the sub-continent has, however, assumed larger dimensions after Kargil. It was during this conflict that the US demanded assurances that Pakistan would respect the 8220;sanctity8221; of the Line of Control. India sought American intervention to restrain Pakistan, by warning that the conflict could escalate, in exchanges National Security Adviser Brajesh Misra had with his then US counterpart Sandy Berger. But, it is only following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and on our Parliament in 2001, that the Bush Administration has moved in a big way to defuse tensions between India and Pakistan. When Indian forces were deployed on Pakistan8217;s borders, following the attack on Parliament, the White House stepped in. It obtained assurances from General Musharraf that he would 8220;permanently8221; end support for cross-border terrorism.
There have also been other factors determining American policies towards India and Pakistan. Over the last few years the US has come to the conclusion that India is a vibrant democracy, embarking on a path of sustained and accelerated economic growth. India is a factor for stability and a potential asset, if not an ally. Pakistan, on the other hand, is seen as a problem child, to be dealt with by a judicious mix of carrot and stick. In private, the Americans acknowledge that Pakistan is today the epicenter of jihadi terrorism. This assessment of Pakistan is reflected in a series of American studies ranging from the CIA8217;s 8220;Global Trends 2015,8221; to the more recent study by the Asia Society and the Council for Foreign Relations in New York. It is in this perspective that one has to understand the Bush National Security Doctrine unveiled in September 2002. It states: 8220;The United States has undertaken a transformation in its relations with India based on the belief that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedoms, protected by representative Government. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of trade through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and creating a strategically stable Asia8221;. Bush reiterated these sentiments on January 12, when he announced a new 8220;glide-path8221; to deepen cooperation with India in crucial areas of space, missile defence, nuclear safety and hi-tech transfers. What few people in India realise is that for the first time in years, we are dealing with an American president who has high regard for Indian democracy and recognises that India has a larger strategic role in world affairs. Despite all the hype about Bill Clinton8217;s visit to India, the early Clinton years were perhaps the worst in the history of Indo-US relations, marked by a blatant effort to 8220;roll back8221; our nuclear programme, while seeking to be unduly intrusive on Kashmir.
Does all this mean that we can be complacent about our relations with the US? The answer is an emphatic 8220;No8221;. Even though the Bush Administration has been forthcoming in addressing our concerns on terrorism and responding positively to our purchase of Phalcon AWACS systems from Israel, there is still a strong lobby within the administration, particularly within the State Department, that can raise impediments in our relations with the US. The nonproliferation warriors there are still not reconciled to our independent approach to issues of nuclear proliferation. Given this mindset, we should be prepared for all forms of bureaucratic delays when issues like hi tech transfers and missile defence are actually discussed in detail. Finally, there are many in the State Department and elsewhere who look back nostalgically on the days when the CIA and ISI were 8220;bleeding8221; the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The temptation to be more intrusive on issues like Kashmir could increasingly manifest itself. The 8220;liberals8221; in the US still believe that Kashmir is a useful tool to pressurise India on issues and particularly on our nuclear and missile programmes.
It is in this perspective that we have to look on our relations with the US as presenting huge opportunities and challenges. Vajpayee has handled this relationship with skill, without allowing the US to take us for granted. We will have to demonstrate that India is set to become a hub for economic integration, security, stability and progress across Asia, if we want the Americans to deal with us as a serious strategic partner. Dealing with the Americans will be much easier if we demonstrate that while technology denials may delay our progress, they cannot halt our progress. We demonstrated this when Indian scientists developed the Param supercomputer, after supply of a second Cray supercomputer was denied.
