Paranoid in Pakistan

Of course, he said that Kashmir was the core issue and that there could beno peace between India and Pakistan until it was settled. He did indicatehis willingness to discuss other issues, which he called peripheral8217;,provided Kashmir was on top of the agenda. This stance seems to have becomethe thinking of Pakistanis. People from different walks of life argue for asolution in Kashmir. They have no formula, except for the few who want theMuslim-majority Valley to merge with Pakistan.

The difference I found between the government and the people of Pakistan wasthat they were tired of hostility which made their life more insecure, morecostly and more isolated. They wanted to reach Indian markets and technologycentres. The government, on the other hand, went on whipping up the Kashmirproblem. A bit of religion was also being thrown in to touch as many peopleas possible. The purpose of all this is to evoke support for the militaryrule, which is losing lustre.

My stay in Pakistan was short. I could find no explanation why the countrywas prone to military rule. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto appointed a committee tostudy the reasons for military interventions in Pakistan. The report pointedout three deficiencies in the polity: weakness of democratic institutions,lack of education, and the colonial tradition of using the army to maintainlaw and order. Twentyeight years later, the country has not overcome thelimitations. Democratic institutions like parliament and the stateassemblies have been superseded. The judiciary is there but it has beengrievously mauled by every military ruler. The Press is the only institutionwhich has kept the flag of defiance flying. What saddened me was the absenceof resistance or even an inclination to oppose the military regime.

Except for Nawaz Sharif8217;s wife, Kulsoom, and a few of her supporters, thereis no one on the streets to voice a protest. Benazir Bhutto is unhappy evenover Sharif8217;s defence by his party lawyer, Atizaz Eshan. Despite themilitary8217;s scant respect for political parties, the Muslim League and thePakistan People8217;s Party are not willing to forge a joint front for therestoration of democracy.

As of today, Musharraf has no challenge from within and without. True,politicians have a battered image. But they are at least answerable to thepeople who elect them. The worst culprits are the elite, including lawyers,businessmen, academicians and leading journalists. They are the ones whorationalise the military takeover. One of them told me at Islamabad: quot;It isIndia8217;s perennial tendency to run us down and to make us feel unequal thatgives legitimacy to men in the khaki.quot; But the real reason is the fear inthe minds of the people.

This may also be the main reason why no commission has been appointed toassess the failure of the Kargil operation. I did not hear any criticismagainst Musharraf, the architect of Kargil, on that count. Even when he saidbefore the Indian media that Kargil was no mistake, there was no adversecomment. One leading columnist said that India8217;s relentless criticism ofKargil had made them even defend the operation.

This is a sign of a persecution complex. I find it increasing over theyears. At least top journalists are so edgy that they take offence when noneis meant. During my speech at Islamabad, I referred to a letter by the Shahof Iran to General Ayub Khan during the 1962 war between India and China.The letter, a copy of which the Shah sent to Jawaharlal Nehru, said thatPakistan should send its forces to stand by the side of Indian soldiers quot;torebuff the attack by the communists from the north.quot;

My purpose was to point out how such a gesture would have evoked strongemotional feelings and even affected India8217;s policy on Kashmir. I said howthe then Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shashtri I was his Press secretaryreminded me of the Shah letter after the end of hostilities and talked ofhow he would have reacted if Ayub had sent the troops. Shastri said that, ifPakistani forces had fought by the side of Indians, spilling their blood, itwould have been difficult to say no8217; if quot;they had asked for Kashmir.quot; ManyPakistani journalists wanted to react to what I said. The few who got theopportunity to speak criticised me squarely. They argued that Ayub had doneIndia a good deal by not opening the second front. I did not mention howPakistan gave a part of Kashmir to China during the 1962 war to placateit.

Still the attack on me was relentless. They lost the real point. I felt hurtbecause they were doubting my bona fides. I think the enemy syndrome cloudedtheir judgment. I don8217;t believe that the people of Pakistan and the peopleof India are enemies. But I do feel that the syndrome covers thenitty-gritty of India-Pakistan relations, consisting of fear and mistrust,if not hostility.

Fear is the key to the understanding of today8217;s world, as Bertrand Russellsays in his essay, The World As It Could Be Made. It is the key to theunderstanding of all India-Pakistan problems. But what is it that the twocountries their governments fear? This fear has spawned a perennialhate-India-or-hate-Pakistan campaign by the fundamentalists on both sides.

And now, 53 years and nearly three wars later, things have come to such apass that the choice before the two nations is: coexistence or noexistence. For, both now have nuclear weapons and there is an arms race onbetween the two.

Two flowers but one stem that was how a Bengali poet once described Hindusand Muslims. India, a Hindu-majority state and Pakistan, a Muslim-dominatedcountry, are similar in many ways. Muslim and Hindu cultures have commonroots. Should we let the religion make us enemies? That is a point allhonest Pakistanis and Indians should ponder.