No reflection on policy

Conversely, however, there is reason for wondering whether reform on defections is called for if one addresses a very fundamental question: what are anti-defection laws for? Why is floor-crossing so repugnant that laws are needed to control it, as if it were on a par with grand larceny or homicide. Because it is a crime of sorts, executed against the electorate. Or, to be painfully honest, because it used to be.

Today’s political climate bears no relation to that of 1985, when the Rajiv Gandhi government passed the 52nd Amendment, and it would be incomprehensible to the Constituent Assembly, which laid down the law at a time when things were comfortingly traditional — with a neatly arranged Centre, Right and Left. There were clearly demarcated ideological divisions, and, therefore, defection was an act of faith, a conversion based on conviction. A formal split signified the legitimate birth of a new ideology. Individual defections, on the contrary, were despicable. Democracy was about value-based politics, not frequent tergiversations. But now that there are no longer values from which to run from or to run to — one of the reasons why every party lives in fear of polls — do these assumptions still hold good?

Our electoral system is based on the premise that competing parties represent competing ideologies. The voter confers on winning parties the right to implement the agenda of its ideology, which had been set forth in its manifesto before elections. Setting aside the obvious issue of money changing hands, defection after the event is criminal because it weakens a party’s authority to implement its agenda. Also, until the next election, the thousands of constituents that the defector represents effectively stand disenfranchised. Worse, at every vote on Bills, a false ballot is cast, reflecting a misuse of their single transferable vote.

Such, at least, is received wisdom. But today, apart from the Left and the Dalits, who tread a distinct line, other ideologies have converged to the extent that it is difficult to see daylight between them. There are perceivable differences in policy, of course. The biannual arrangement between Mayawati and Kalyan Singh saw the administration being transferred back and forth, allegedly in the interests of policy implementation. But this is just the window-dressing of ideology, not its substance.

That is put to the test by economic policy and there, as Manmohan Singh has assured us, nothing is reversible. Economic decisions are acts of compulsion and there can be little qualitative difference between party lines. It is worth recalling that liberalisation itself, often projected by the Congress as the most daring policy move of all time, did not proceed from some lofty ideological compulsion. It was done to keep the wolf from the door. Today, in an irreversible order, legislators can vote on how much needs to be done. What needs to be done has been decided in advance.

The cosmetic issues which defined party positions earlier have been marginalised. Five years ago, the BJP confidently asserted the supremacy of God over the Supreme Court. Today, were it to build the temple — and that is a commitment from which it is rapidly distancing itself — it would probably apply to the municipality for a completion certificate. Had Vajpayee’s government remained in power, could it have continued with the swadeshi line? Not likely. Similarly, the Left is relatively silent on a once-favourite topic: self-sufficiency in foodgrains. Over the last year, Parliament has been subjected to that shopworn phrase only once. The Left’s reticence is understandable, given that CPI(M) leaders are routinely discovered on foreign shores, pitching for direct investment.

If there is such unanimity of purpose across party lines, should floor-crossing remain criminalised? After trading horses, does a legislator have new voting options on core national issues? Is he in a position to alter policy in ways that were not available to him before? Yes, on issues which have limited financial implications. No, when it comes to the core sector, subsidies or fiscal policy, so long as he is allowed to vote freely.

In legislating on defections, Parliament should take into account the basic way in which the Indian polity has changed over the years. It is easy enough to deal with the sharp practice that accompanies horse-trading. Invoke established anti-corruption law. Send the defectors back to their constituencies. Debar them from positions where they can sell discretionary powers for a consideration. By all means get them to submit asset declarations. All the suggestions are already in, and all are workable.But there is a greater need for change in the internal structure of parties. Our parties operate not as democratic institutions but as clutches of feudatories led by a small coterie of maximum leaders.

In operational terms, they bear a greater resemblance to the petty medieval courts of Bundelkhand or Baghelkhand than democratic institutions. Power is concentrated in the hands that apportion party tickets. To deal with dissent within the House, there is the atavistically named whip. Leaders and their camp-followers continue to perpetuate the very patron-client relationship that had been institutionalised in medieval times, which democracy is supposed to supersede, and the leaders continue to exercise a slightly democratised version of the divine right of kings.

Anti-defection law is a very small part of the political reform that is called for. The fact that it excites such attention as an individual issue only reveals the immaturity of our polity.