
A second round of nuclear tests by Pakistan does not say much more than the first one. Apart from the possibility that more tests were required to improve the reliability of its weapons and to compensate for shortfalls in the first series, the message is essentially for the Pakistani people who are being deluded to think tests demonstrate strength and invincibility. The security scenario in the subcontinent remains what it was after the first five Pakistani blasts: two neighbours with nuclear weapons and ratcheting tensions. As India gets to grips with reality, there is no point in denying the obvious. The whole country saw on its television screens that the government and opposition are poles apart on the nuclear question. This need not be as worrying as it appears at first. It is sensible to bring differences out into the open because only through the process of reconciling them can a sturdy and sustainable national consensus be rebuilt to deal with the new and grave situation in the subcontinent. As thePrime Minister said, even though there is no new threat to India8217;s security, the danger from weaponisation in the neighbourhood should not be minimised.
Although Vajpayee made a serious effort to narrow the gap in the House, he was unsuccessful. The argument that his government8217;s stance at Pokharan and thereafter was appropriate and a continuation of policies pursued by previous governments was rejected, not least by former prime ministers. The claim that there was no alternative to testing was questioned and the government criticised for accelerating the arms race, nullifying the gains of Indian diplomacy and getting national priorities wrong. The divide in Parliament is complete.
We have been here before, of course, but that is little consolation when the country is faced with so much uncertainty. There is no quick way of bridging the divide complicated as it is by political interests. The way to proceed is to disaggregate the problem. The first matter to attend to is the dismay in the country aboutdomestic disputes in the context of a series of nuclear events one after the other. Vajpayee8217;s first steps towards bringing the Opposition aboard involved informal meetings with their leaders. Were these consultations to be formalised through a suitable mechanism and announced publicly, it would show both sides of the House pulling together. The second area for early action is to convey effectively to Islamabad the importance of entering into no-first-use and other confidence-building agreements. The siege mentality in Pakistan is not conducive to such a process. An initiative stemming from the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee which Vajpayee has already asked I. K. Gujral to chair might help without undermining the firmness the government displays in its approach towards Islamabad. A clear Indian position on the CTBT and related arms control issues needs to be thrashed out. None of this will come about if political parties on both sides allow partisan agendas to blur their vision. The country demands aconsensus on nuclear policy and all of them better work hard and honestly at achieving it some time soon.