No letting down the guard

But there is another side to the Chinese, the cultured and the refined. Like a Haitian statue with a half-black and half-white face depicting two sides of their identity, the Chinese national character has two intrinsic traits, both genuine. When these contradictory strands find expression in foreign policy it makes dealing with the Chinese very complicated.

With India, the Chinese are in both a competitiveand complimentary position. Competitive when it comes to realpolitik, complimentary because India is the only country with whom they can philosophically interact. Nothing like this occurs in their relations with the US or Russia whom they decisively consider inferior.

Pakistan is nowhere near to being treated as an equal by China. It has a certain nuisance value in regard to India and the Chinese use it to keep Indian attention diverted. It is nothing for China outside the Indian context. The use of Pakistan by China against India does not behave a civilisational power. But China8217;s two faces are real though contradictory. The Chinese do not want India to get its due. India is a short-term political rival and a long-term civilisational competitor.

Further complicating matters is the rivalry between the Chinese military and foreign-policy administration. It appears that Chinese diplomats want good relations with India but the military is keen to continue the security tie-up with Pakistan. The military isfast becoming a political power centre. This confounds matters for other countries too. The Americans already view China as 8220;a peer competitor8221; in the years to come.

But the Chinese, unlike Indians, are good at hiding their differences. In his excellent but unnoticed book, My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India, Purnendu Banerjee, the Indian Charge d8217;Affaires in Beijing during the 1962 war, notes how at the height of hostilities Zhou En Lai would receive him in the Forbidden City at midnight to discuss Sino-Indian relations. In a supreme paradox Banerjee had the best access of all diplomats to Zhou at a time when Chinese infantry and armed divisions were racing down the Tibetan plateau towards the plains of India.

With the hindsight of history it would appear that Zhou, in his signals through Banerjee to the Indian leadership, was not trying to stop the war but pick up the threads of the relationship after the war. He was trying to say that the war was Mao8217;s doing, not his. Indianeeded to be humiliated as it had, in Mao8217;s view, grown too big for its boots, but after the punishment Zhou wanted relations to be good once again. Wisely India rejected Chinese overtures and only improved relations when it suited her.

On a personal level Nehru8217;s love affair with China had all the foolishness of an old man8217;s infatuation. Banerjee notes at the end of his book, 8220;When I left the Prime Minister8217;s residence I knew that I would never see Mr Nehru again. Chairman Mao had cut short his life by a number of years.8221;While relations with China must improve India must not let down its guard if only because the Chinese, like all old societies, have a subtlety, a certain craftiness, which never lets their intentions become explicit.

India must handle its relations with China on its own. There is a new tendency to run to the Americans to solve tangles with China, or even Pakistan. A recent statement by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation Robert Einhorn is worth noting. Askedwhat effect China8217;s military relations with Pakistan and Iran would have on US interests, he said, 8220;We are terribly concerned about the behaviour of Iran. Pakistan of course is a friend of the US and we wish to have good bilateral relations with Pakistan. We also recognise China is a good friend of Pakistan and we don8217;t wish to interfere in any way with their close relationship8221;. To look to the US to safeguard Indian interests is foolhardy.

As long as the militaries of China and Pakistan are able to ally against Indian forces, there can be no scaling down or disarmament measures. India must build up its military because all is not quiet on either the western or the eastern front. This fact was admirably highlighted by Defence Minister George Fernandes. The attempt to belittle his remarks is regrettable. Foreign diplomats are asking if Fernandes was speaking in his personal capacity. Now what could be more ridiculous? Does a defence minister speak on national security in his personal capacity?

TheCongress-communist combine has begun a sustained campaign against Fernandes for his remarks on China. The Congress spokesman did not question his facts on the Chinese build-up in Myanmar or the Coco Islands but spoke of a reversal of the 8220;foreign-policy consensus8221;. Does that mean sacrificing national sovereignty? In that case the Congress and the communists can be accused of being Chinese quislings. Ironically this was exactly the posture in the years before the 1962 invasion. Who can forget Krishna Menon clinking champagne glasses with Chinese leaders when Indian jawans were being slaughtered? It was with historical irony that Fernandes chose the Krishna Menon memorial lecture to debunk past policy on China.

Congress and CPIM statements repeat virtually to the comma the type of statements made by Nehru and Krishna Menon. Also surprising is the Foreign Office8217;s failure to endorse the defence minister8217;s statement. Are bureaucrats above the minister? Who decides a country8217;s foreign and defence policy 8211;officials or the government? Fernandes must be congratulated for making the Indian public aware of the threat it faces, swept for too long under the carpet.

A friendship with China is very important. But in life as in foreign policy no one claps with one hand. Not even a Congress hand.