New book explodes myth on terrorism in Punjab

The access to arms only provided the powerless young men an 8220;entitlement to power,8221; say three professors of Guru Nanak Dev university, Harish K Puri, Paramjit Singh Judge and Jagrup Singh Sekhon who have written Terrorism in Punjab: Grassroots reality.

8220;Shaukia8221; for fun was surprisingly a prominent expression used by the respondents as reason or motivation for taking to gun by the boys, says Dr Puri, noting that young boys were fascinated with modern weapons as holding arms provided a sense of being someone to reckon with.

For the study a total of 323particpants in terrorist violence were identified by the respondents spread over 28 terrorist affected villages in the four police districts, as belonging to their villages.

Three teachers visited these villages and had interactive discussions with the people in open. According to the study 38 per cent of the terrorists from these areas said they joined for adventure and thrill and 21 per cent due to influence or at the behest of terrorists.

For 12 per cent of them, the moving impulse was smuggling, looting or making money. Khalistan was identified as the main reason only by five per cent of the respondents; the influence of Sant jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in the case of three per cent while only four per cent took up arms in an emotional response to Operation Blue Star and anti-Sikh riots.

The data also negates another prevalent notion that most of those who took to the gun joined as a consequence of police atrocities on them or their kin as most of the terrorists were motivated by reasons ofinter-family enimity or motive of revenge.

Open discussions with the participants and their families also indicated that terrorists groups were not well organised units and generally suffered from factionalism. There was no strong uin-linear structure in the party rank and file and there was no trust even within members of the same sect.

More than 700 villages of Punjab had close encounters with terrorist violence although the number of villagers seriously affected by it constituted a small proportion just about 268 out of the total 12,000 villages. A majority of them were from the four police districts of Tarn Taran, Amritsar, Batala and Majitha, according to a police assesment cited by the academics.

Puri observes that contrary to popular perception, 24per cent of those who took to arms were illiterate while another 26 per cent had been to school only uptill the middle level and just two per cent of them were graduates. While a lot of religious fervour was accorded to the movement, the book pointsout that 90 per cent of the boys including the baptised ones had little familiarity with religious scriptures although they conferred honorifics such as baba8217; or bhai8217; on them, which were considered saintly.

8220;It was an opportunistic escapism that provided the boys an escape from the rotten world they were living in and also gave them religious legitimacy. In no way can they be called religious fanatics,8221; says the book. They were rather interested in weapons, property and women, says Dr Puri.

8220;Practically no fighter8217; came to the notice of the villages for articulation of a political or religious issues except in terms of symbolic reference to the dominating presence of Singhs8230; The terror and violence related largely to matters of personal or family disputes, vendatta, mercenary interests, sexual gratification and general assertion of power and dominance in their villages, notes the author.

However, atrocities committed by the police and the killing of suspects in fake encounters disturbed themasses. Dr Puri affirmed that repeated references were made to terrorists becoming an industry for policemen.There was an underlying sense of relief among the villages when the terrorists were killed by the police.

Following the end of the terrorist violence what struck the people most was not only the collapse of the Khalistan movement but also the virtual disappearnce of the logic of the struggle.

Terrorism made little impact on the agricultural production in the state. And despite some incidents of mass killings of migrant labourers the regular influx to Punjab remained uninterrupted. And surprisingly there has been little evidence of cultural sympathy which failed insurgencies often evoke in the form of literature on battles, idealism, heroism or the vision of the fighters.

The book states that the movement failed because it was removed from the ground realities of the masses and its grievances and moreover, points out that hasty conclusions were drawn on the basis of it, which were not neccesarilysupported by facts.