Musharraf, more equal than the others

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, has publicly expressed its reservations over the referendum exercise. Once the referendum is exposed as the one-sided exercise that it is meant to be, General Musharraf will face more questions internationally about the legitimacy of his regime than he has bargained for. In the past western support for democracy in Pakistan was dismissed as 8216;8216;outside interference in domestic affairs8217;8217;. But having accepted hundreds of million dollars in external assistance or debt rescheduling, this position would be difficult for General Musharraf to adopt.

In his address to the nation in April 5, General Musharraf passionately argued that democracy in Pakistan need not be modelled on western experience. But most Pakistanis know the difference between military rule and democracy and their support for the latter has been consistent over the last four decades. General Musharraf8217;s unique definition of democracy 8216;8216;The people can vote as long as I remain in charge8217;8217; will only increase polarisation within Pakistani society without resolving his quest for personal legitimacy. It will pitch the country8217;s democratic politicians against Musharraf, distracting both from the task of dealing firmly with militant Islamists.

In opting for a referendum, General Musharraf has invited comparisons with Pakistan8217;s last military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq. Ironically, Zia put Pakistan on the road of militant Islam while General Musharraf wants to bring it back to the path of moderation. The ideological difference between the two will be obscured by the decision to pursue a similar political strategy.

General Zia8217;s referendum in 1984 was also marred by a low turnout and boycotted by mainstream political parties. From all indications, history will soon repeat itself. People vote to change the status quo or to elect people who will represent their interests. In a referendum endorsing a military ruler there is no such incentive. Regardless of how people vote, the general already occupies the presidency.

General Musharraf8217;s promise of fundamental reforms has so far been the only source of legitimacy for his government. The general has promised that the focus of these reforms would be to establish a functioning democracy besides providing the framework for a market based economy. The decision to take the same route as former military rulers undermines the reformist character of General Musharraf8217;s regime. The idea of a referendum with no candidates is integral to the notion of 8216;8216;guided8217;8217; democracy8217;8217; too often practiced in Pakistan since 1958.

But then, Pakistan8217;s society and the global environment have under gone major changes since Ayub Khan8217;s 1958 military takeover. Then, Pakistan had not seen a general election despite 11 years of independence. Politics was the arena of a limited number of players, most of whom operated out of drawing rooms in the big cities. The media8217;s size and impact were also limited. By the time General Ziaul Haq imposed martial law in 1977, political populism had taken root. Zia dealt with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto8217;s popularity by seeking the support of anti-Bhutto politicians. He also did not have to contend with a vibrant media 8212; something that the present regime must accept and deal with.

The last 15 years have seen several Pakistanis participating in the political process. The mystique of power has ended. Civilians belonging to many political and religious groups have shared power through numerous coalitions in the past decade. Four general elections have increased people8217;s awareness of their relevance to the process of governing. Above all, a free and vibrant media refuses to allow government to function secretively and arbitrarily on the basis of self-defined criteria.

To try and rule Pakistan through recipes of 1958 or 1977 simply won8217;t work. Pakistan8217;s previous civilian political leaders have often lacked vision. The military leaders, on the other hand, seem to believe in a divine right to rule the country. They do not want to share power with the 8216;8216;uneducated masses8217;8217; and their chosen leaders. Every few years, military leaders rewrite the constitution 8212; ostensibly to rescue democracy from the excesses of its incompetent practitioners. In the process, it has spawned civilian 8216;8216;leaders8217;8217; who, like Sharif, have only compounded the country8217;s problems rather than solve them.

A faction of the Pakistan Muslim League and some smaller political parties have allied themselves with General Musharraf, hoping to now be chosen as the military8217;s new civilian partners. The general expects to secure his power in the stage-managed referendum and then will try to guide the nation8217;s destiny with the help of a new set of pre-selected Nawaz Sharifs. These efforts to rewrite the rules and impose a new leadership are unlikely to result in anything better than what it yielded in the past.

Instead of accepting a stage-managed referendum, the United States and other western nations with leverage with General Musharraf should ask him to abide by the supreme court ruling to hold free and fair general elections by October. The poll should be open to all Pakistani political parties and leaders. If he wants to continue as president, General Musharraf should compete as an equal against his domestic rivals in a contest subject to the country8217;s constitution. Only a genuine election will confer legitimacy on General Musharraf, enabling him to regain his mantle of a reformer rather than a run-of-the mill Pakistani military ruler.

The writer is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He served as adviser to Pakistani prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto